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I would like to dedicate this volume to immigrants, in honor
of your many achievements and in sympathy for
the sacriﬁces that come from leaving your home to oﬀer
your talents in a new country.
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1
Immigration Policy Today
Susan Pozo
Western Michigan University

This volume collects the lectures of distinguished immigration
scholars delivered at Western Michigan University (WMU) during the
2016–2017 academic year, with cosponsorship from the W.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research. This was not the ﬁrst time that the
Upjohn Institute partnered with the WMU economics department to
host social scientists in Kalamazoo to reﬂect on immigration policy.
Healthy debate concerning the proposed and eventual enactment of
the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 took place
on the WMU campus 30 years earlier. That legislation was charged
with accomplishing two major goals. First, IRCA aimed to provide a
solution for the many unauthorized immigrants residing and working
in the United States at the time. The vast majority of the long-term
undocumented were made eligible for legal permanent residency status. In oﬀering this solution to the approximately 3 million undocumented immigrants, the United States rectiﬁed what many considered
an inconsistency in its treatment of this population. IRCA’s second goal
was to impose sanctions on ﬁrms that knowingly hired undocumented
immigrants in an attempt to stop the pull of undocumented immigration originating from U.S. employer demand for this labor. In sum, the
overall attitude at the time was that we had a problem, partially owing
to our own policies and behavior. We would be wise to make peace with
the long-term undocumented within our borders while modifying the
system so that we do not face this problem moving forward.
The tone of the debate raging across the United States today is far
from what it was back in the 1980s. Today’s cacophony of pronouncements concerning immigration is often uncivil and indisputably divisive. Policy is advanced without foundation in fact or theory, positions
are rationalized on the basis of a single anecdote, and scholarly discourse is pushed aside. The chapters in this volume serve to provide
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counterbalance to the current chaotic debate by presenting the ﬁndings
of prominent immigration scholars who use data and theory to help
unravel facts about immigration, to assess the impact of immigration
on a host of economic and social variables, and to analyze cumulative
results stemming from past policies that addressed perceived immigration problems. These scholars oﬀer blueprints for how one might best
approach, evaluate, and reset the discourse on this diﬃcult topic.
The book begins with a broad overview of the economic impacts
of immigration on the U.S. economy by Pia Orrenius and Stephanie
Gullo. This chapter sets the stage by providing a comprehensive overview of the demographic make-up of the United States, while outlining
economic trends and ﬁscal impacts of immigration. Of note is the idea
that because of their locational ﬂexibility, immigrants move to where
the jobs exist, raising productivity and economic growth by improving
the allocation of resources in the economy. Immigrants do not hunker
down in areas of decline and instead oﬀer their labor and talents in areas
of greatest need, boosting the economy’s productivity.
In addition to providing up-to-date information on immigration and
immigrants, the topics covered in Chapter 2 dovetail nicely with many
of the subsequent chapters. They dive into generational diﬀerences,
which are proving to be center stage for understanding how immigrants
aﬀect the economy. The authors note that in order to accurately assess
the ﬁscal impacts of immigration, one needs to consider and clearly
specify a host of assumptions while employing modeling to account
for diﬀerential impacts by generation. Earnings (and tax revenues) tend
to be low for the initial generation of immigrants, contributing toward
ﬁscal deﬁcits. The initial generation also tends to push up government
expenditures on services, particularly schooling for children. However,
the picture improves for the children of immigrants and subsequent
generations. As assimilation takes place, revenues and spending patterns shift with subsequent generations, generating ﬁscal surpluses.
Tracking and understanding these subtle generational impacts is important for inducing productive discussion of immigration and its impacts
on the economy.
Brian Duncan and Stephen J. Trejo continue with this line of inquiry
in Chapter 3. Are more recent immigrant groups slower to integrate? Is
the intergenerational pace of assimilation diﬀerent today relative to the
past? In examining these questions, Duncan and Trejo focus on the edu-
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cational attainment of diﬀerent immigrant groups. And while they ﬁnd
that there is perhaps some truth to the idea that more recent immigrant
ﬂows are slower to assimilate, they also ﬁnd that ethnic attrition, the
idea that subsequent generations shed their ethnic identity, clouds the
issue. If we lose track of the second generation through ethnic attrition,
are we mismeasuring assimilation; in particular, are we underestimating
the speed at which immigrants fully integrate into the economy?
One of the main concerns expressed by individuals skeptical of liberal immigration policies is that immigrants, particularly poor immigrants, will compete with natives for resources. The two resources that
generally come up as being at risk for depletion should there be a surge
in immigration are jobs and welfare. By competing with natives for
jobs, the fear is that immigrant ﬂows will worsen the income levels of
native households either by undercutting wages or by directly substituting for natives in the job market—in the ﬁrst case, lessening natives’
job earnings, and in the second case, their job opportunities. However,
economists have, by and large, shown that immigrants (at the lower
end of the skills distribution) do not compete with natives for jobs. If
anyone loses in the job market to immigration, it is the earlier waves of
immigrants. The previous immigrant group more closely resembles the
newer cohort, bearing the highest risk of being displaced.
The second area of competition for resources that is often mentioned concerns public assistance. Naturally, one would imagine that
newer immigrants, with less-secure job prospects, lower seniority, less
education, and a limited stock of savings and wealth, might be more
prone to suﬀering from economic shocks and accessing public assistance. But economists have found that immigrants have relatively low
welfare participation rates. This may be due in part to policy and legal
statutes that prevent recent immigrants from accessing many public
assistance programs, but there are other reasons for expecting that participation by immigrants in the welfare system is more sparse.
Giovanni Peri addresses the issue of resource competition in Chapter 4. With the backing of empirical evidence, Peri appeals to the idea
that immigrants are very mobile. They tend to move to areas that oﬀer
jobs over staying put and using public assistance. The reluctance to use
public assistance might be motivated by a fear of losing rights and the
ability to stay in the United States should its usage be detected. However, there are other reasons for low welfare participation, according to
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Peri. Low-skilled Mexican and Central American immigrants are a selfselected group, coming to the United States primarily to work. If there
are no jobs, they move on to ﬁnd work elsewhere. Peri does not see much
competition between natives and immigrants in terms of using public
assistance. However, he does point to another area of potential competition between immigrants and natives for resources—public schooling.
Immigrants may compete with natives for educational resources, potentially crowding out natives. Peri oﬀers solutions through policy, particularly aimed at stemming school segregation. Native-ﬂight, resulting
in segregation of immigrants in schools with declining resources, bodes
poorly for the second generation and ultimately does not serve anyone
well, reducing the potential of the U.S. economy in the long run.
While Peri and others in this volume oﬀer ideas for how to implement new policies, in Chapter 5 Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes and Esther
Arenas-Arroyo discuss how policies are impacting immigrant communities today. They focus on undocumented immigration and distinguishing border enforcement from interior immigration enforcement. Much
of the literature has zeroed in on border enforcement, but the news that
dominates the headlines today is the dramatic increase in resources that
have been applied to interior enforcement. The authors analyze how
interior enforcement has aﬀected a host of variables that are not on the
radar, showing, for example, how American citizen children’s schooling has responded to interior enforcement, and examining the impact
of enforcement on the fertility of immigrants. It is important to analyze
both intended and unintended consequences of stepped-up immigration
enforcement if we are to generate a complete and frank discussion of
the eﬀectiveness and implications of current immigration policy.
To understand why immigration policy is such a contentious topic,
it is useful to have access to a framework to theoretically measure how
diﬀerent policies aﬀect the various stakeholders in an economy. This
is what Alfonso Cebreros, Daniel Chiquiar, Monica Roa, and Martín
Tobal accomplish in Chapter 6. Their insight is to recognize the many
parallels that can be found with respect to immigration and international
trade policy impacts. In age-old standard trade models, we observe that
specialization in production with subsequent trade across national borders results in winners and losers. However, generally the gains from
the winners exceed the losses of the losers. Those standard models show
that, with redistribution of the gain (many ﬁnd that diﬃcult to stomach),
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everyone would be better oﬀ in comparison to a no-trade situation. The
trade models that have been developed also help us explain the political economy of tariﬀs and other restrictions on trade. In the same way,
Cebreros and coauthors show that parallel arguments can be made by
adopting trade models to explore immigration, understand resistance to
immigration, and trace the impacts of policies regarding immigration.
Motivated by the European refugee crisis and in an attempt to overcome resistance to refugee inﬂows, the authors of Chapter 7, Jesús
Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Hillel Rapoport, propose combining
physical and ﬁnancial solidarity in asylum policy to allocate and spread
refugees across countries. A tradable refugee-admission quota system—
paired with a matching system that considers preferences and skills of
asylees and of countries assigned the task of taking them in—might
make settlement more palatable for countries. Despite diﬀerences in
context and in the operationalization of the mechanisms to settle refugees and satisfy the needs of employers for immigrants at various skill
levels, employment-based visas and the refugee tradable quotas scheme
could potentially result in less haggling about who is gaining and who
is losing, perhaps lessening the opposition to immigration and refugee
settlement.
In this age of increasingly restrictive immigration policies, it is
important to continue to challenge preconceived, often biased assumptions about immigrants using sound, empirical, and theoretical research
methods. The contributors to this volume assist with this task by providing data and new perspectives, and by oﬀering policy tools crafted
to solve perceived shortcomings of the system.
Recently, I attended a lecture and reading by Ha Jin, a distinguished
novelist and poet. Jin was born in China, is a U.S. immigrant, and is
currently professor and director of the creative writing program at Boston University. He spoke of the displacement and loneliness that comes
with being an emigrant. “Once you leave, you can never come back.
The space you left becomes ﬁlled in.” What Ha Jin did not speak of was
the companion idea that once immigrants settle, they occupy a space
that becomes changed forever too. Much of the immigration rhetoric
we hear today seems to idealize the world before the latest wave of
immigration took place. Whether the world was better then or better
now is certainly an area we can debate, appeal to data, consult models,
and compare information. But the bottom line is that, given the dra-
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matic reductions in transportation and information costs, immigrants
and immigration are likely to stay, and it makes much more sense to
debate the best ways to harness the beneﬁts of immigration rather than
to incite divisiveness and invoke nostalgia for a yesterday that we will
never see again.
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2
The Economic and Fiscal
Eﬀects of Immigration
Implications for Policy
Pia M. Orrenius
Stephanie Gullo
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

RECENT TRENDS IN IMMIGRATION AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH
The United States is the world’s largest economy and top migrant
destination. U.S. GDP accounts for 25 percent of global output.1 And
although the United States makes up less than 5 percent of the world’s
population, it is home to 19 percent of the world’s international migrants.2
The U.S. foreign-born population increased rapidly between 1990 and
2010, rising from 19.8 million in 1990 to nearly 40 million in 2010, but
growth since then has slowed.3 The foreign born today number around
45 million, representing a little over 13 percent of the total population.
And while it’s true the United States takes in the most migrants, there
are an increasing number of countries with higher migrant shares, such
as Canada, at 22 percent, or Australia, at 28 percent. Even some Western
European nations now have higher migrant shares than does the United
States, including Germany and Sweden.
Immigration has contributed signiﬁcantly to U.S. labor force
growth. In fact, between 1995 and 2015, immigrants and their children
accounted for more than half of labor force growth (National Academies of Science, Engineering and Math [NAS] 2016, p. 68). Given
the contribution of immigration to employment growth, slowing immigration will slow future economic growth, particularly considering the
quickening labor force exodus of the baby boomers.

7
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Immigration to the United States is slowing, even as the economy
continues to steadily grow. GDP growth has averaged about 2 percent
since 2010, job growth 1.8 percent, and the unemployment rate has
fallen to well below 5 percent, a rate most economists would consider
to be below the NAIRU (nonaccelerating inﬂation rate of unemployment). Wages have begun to increase in real terms on average (if not in
every group) and in certain regions more than others. In past decades,
this relatively robust labor market would have attracted more immigration, both legal and illegal, but migration trends have remained modest
by recent historical standards (see Figure 2.1).
The decline in illegal immigration, as measured by Border Patrol
apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border, is by far the most pronounced change. Apprehensions today are around 400,000 per year,
levels last observed in the 1970s, when the U.S. economy was about
one-third its current size. The decline in inﬂows has resulted in a shrinkFigure 2.1 Migrant Inﬂows as a Percent of Working-Age Population
1.0

0.8

Apprehensions
(southwest border)

%

0.6
Temporary worker
visas issued

0.4

0.2
Legal permanent residents
(new arrivals)
0.0
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

NOTE: Working-age population is 16–64.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, Report of the Visa Oﬃce, various years; U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, various years;
U.S. Customs and Border Protection; U.S. Census Bureau.
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ing of the unauthorized immigrant population, which peaked in 2007
at 12 million but estimates suggest was down to 11.3 million by 2016
(Krogstad, Passel, and Cohn 2017).
Inﬂows of legal immigrants have been more stable. New arrivals of legal permanent residents, which include family, humanitarian,
and employment-based green cards, have been ﬂat around 480,000
per year since 2010. Temporary worker visas, which declined during
the Great Recession, have picked up some since 2013. Increases have
been mostly in the uncapped visa programs, which include agricultural
workers (H-2A) and NAFTA professionals (TN). A special provision
exempting returning seasonal nonagricultural workers (H-2B) from the
cap also resulted in a large increase in those visas (although that exemption was rescinded in 2016). It is very likely that the decline in illegal
immigration has compelled employers to make more use of visa programs for low-skilled workers.
There is no reason to expect that the relationship between economic
growth and immigration should remain constant. In fact, this relationship is likely changing along several dimensions, some of which can
be addressed by public policy. Production of both goods and services is
becoming less labor intensive as technology makes further inroads into
the U.S. workplace. Consumption patterns are also changing. Fewer
workers may be needed in the future, at least relative to economic output. However, there are also forces acting in the opposite direction, such
as the aging of the U.S. labor force with the retirement of the baby
boomers. The United States is currently in its most signiﬁcant period
of aging in history. As Figure 2.2 shows, the U.S.-born labor force, not
including children of immigrants, is projected to decline by 8.2 million workers over the next two decades (2015–2035). Immigrants—ﬁrst
generation—and to a larger extent their children—the second generation—will make up all the growth in the labor force over this period.
Hence, less immigration will mean slower labor force growth.

IMMIGRANTS IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET
The foreign-born share of the population is a little over 13 percent,
as noted above, but immigrants are overrepresented in the labor force,

Pozo book.indb 3

10/22/2018 1:43:49 PM

10 Orrenius and Gullo
Figure 2.2 Net Change in Working-Age Population (25–64), by
Generation for Each Decade
25
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SOURCE: Pew Research Center.

where they make up over 17 percent of all U.S. workers. Immigrants
are more likely to work than natives primarily because they tend to be
of prime working age. Nearly 60 percent of immigrants are between the
ages of 25 and 54, compared with fewer than 40 percent of U.S. natives.4
It bears noting that U.S. immigration policy, labor market regulation,
and the lack of worksite enforcement of immigration laws are eﬀective
in encouraging that immigrants work or, at a minimum, requiring that
they be self-suﬃcient. This is most obvious among male unauthorized
immigrants who are not allowed to work yet have the highest labor
force participation rates of any immigrant (or native) group (see Passel
and Cohn [2016]).
Furthermore, immigrants are not randomly sprinkled across occupations, industries, or regions, but tend to ﬂow into the areas where they
are most in demand. The relationship between immigration and regional
growth is apparent in Figure 2.3, which plots relative state growth in the
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Figure 2.3 Growth in Foreign-Born Population and Employment, by State
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foreign-born population along the vertical axis and job growth by state
along the horizontal axis, both for the 1990–2016 period. States that
have experienced the fastest employment growth have had the highest relative growth in foreign-born population; these are the states in
the top right quadrant and include Southern and Mountain West states.
States in the lower left quadrant have had below-average job growth
and immigration and include many states in the Northeast and Midwest.
There are relatively few states in the top left and bottom right quadrants because growth and immigration are typically positively—not
negatively—correlated.
The tendency of immigrants to ﬂow where demand is growing
is one of the most important economic beneﬁts of immigration. Several eﬀects follow: resources are reallocated from slowing to growing
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regions, which improves the allocation of workers, speeds up overall
growth, and lowers the national unemployment rate. Monetary policymakers have noted how this particular aspect of immigration increases
the speed limit of the economy since growing regions are less likely to
overheat, reducing the likelihood of excessive wage pressure and ensuing monetary policy action.
Immigrants also ﬂow into occupations and industries where there
is a relative need. Historically, this has been at the low and high ends
of the education distribution, where U.S. workers are relatively scarce.
Figure 2.4 shows that the disproportionate inﬂow of low-education
immigrants, many of them arriving as undocumented immigrants from
Mexico and Central America, has resulted in immigrants making up
over half of the low-skilled labor force, those with less than a high
school diploma. Immigrants are also overrepresented among workers
with very high levels of education, including master’s (18.8 percent),
Figure 2.4 Share of Foreign-Born Workers in the U.S. Labor Force,
by Education
60

50

%

40

30

20

Foreign-born share of labor force

10

0
Less than high High school
school graduate graduate, some
college

Bachelorʼs
degree

Masterʼs
degree

Professional
degree

Doctoral
degree

NOTE: Percent of foreign workers aged 25 and over in the U.S. labor force by education.
SOURCE: 2015 American Community Survey.
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professional (18.1 percent), and PhD degrees (29.4 percent). There are
relatively fewer immigrants in the categories where natives are concentrated, namely among workers with a high school diploma and some
college and among those with a bachelor’s degree.
It’s not surprising to ﬁnd immigrants at the bottom and top of
the education distribution of workers. After all, nearly 30 percent of
immigrants lack a high school degree or equivalent, compared with just
under 10 percent of U.S. natives.5 Immigrants are also slightly more
likely to hold a graduate or professional degree, about 12 percent versus
11 percent of U.S. natives.
Unauthorized immigration has boosted the share of less-educated
immigrants. Nearly half of unauthorized adults aged 25–64 lack a high
school diploma (Passel and Cohn 2009). Commensurate with their relatively low educational attainment, immigrants are concentrated in lowskilled occupations such as housekeeping, farm work, food preparation,
construction, and groundskeeping.
Top jobs for highly educated immigrants include STEM (science,
technology, engineering, and math) and health care occupations; the
high-skilled occupations with the highest share of immigrants include
computer software developers, medical scientists, engineers, registered
nurses, subject instructors, computer systems analysts, and dentists and
physicians.
On both ends of the skill distribution, immigrants are disproportionately found in occupations and industries that have grown quickly or
that U.S. natives have exited or eschewed. For example, there are stark
diﬀerences when one compares the college majors of U.S.-born collegeeducated workers with those of immigrants. Almost half of such immigrants have a STEM major compared to 28 percent of natives (see Peri,
Shih, and Sparber [2014]).

IMMIGRATION’S ECONOMIC IMPACT
The eﬀects of immigration are similar to those of international trade.
There are net economic gains from immigration (trade) that accrue to
natives. The controversial aspect of immigration (trade) is not the overall beneﬁts, but who gets them. Opening up the economy to these addi-
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tional workers (goods in the case of trade) creates winners and losers
among the native population, at least in the short run.
Immigration’s ﬁrst-order eﬀect is to increase the labor force and,
thus, economic output. As long as immigrants diﬀer from natives, there
can be additional beneﬁts or second-order eﬀects, such as greater eﬃciency and factor mobility. Immigration can also aﬀect productivity
growth. High-skilled immigration in the STEM ﬁelds is associated with
innovation, which drives productivity growth.
Regarding the speciﬁcs, labor in-migration shifts out the labor
supply curve, which increases total output, or gross domestic product
(GDP). Most of the gain in GDP accrues to immigrant workers in the
form of labor earnings, but the fall in the cost of labor also raises the
return to capital. Owners of capital, who tend to be natives, get a windfall gain, whether they are business owners, landowners, or shareholders. Consumers also beneﬁt from the lower prices and the specialization
in production that may occur. The distribution of the gains is uneven,
however, with owners of capital and complementary workers typically
beneﬁting, while substitutable workers who compete directly with
immigrants lose out.
Estimates of the immigration-induced increase in GDP that accrues
to natives, also referred to as the “immigration surplus,” are typically
based on simulations or back-of-the-envelope calculations using labor’s
share of national income, the size of the foreign-born workforce, and
the responsiveness of labor demand to changes in wages (Borjas 1995).
In a standard competitive model, the immigration surplus is between
0.2 and 0.4 percent of U.S. GDP. In any case, a plausible range under
standard assumptions and in a $19 trillion economy may be $40–$80
billion per year in income gains to natives from immigration.
The immigration surplus, natives’ income gains from immigration,
is larger when skill levels of immigrants diﬀer from those of natives.
If immigrants’ skills are complementary to those of most natives, then
the immigration surplus is larger than it would be if immigrants and
natives were close substitutes (Borjas 1995). In fact, if immigrants and
natives are exactly alike, then income per capita does not change at
all in response to immigration and the immigration surplus is zero. If
skilled immigrants are complementary to capital, as the literature suggests, then the immigration surplus is larger with high-skilled rather
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than low-skilled immigration, regardless of the skill composition of the
native workforce.
High-skilled immigration has an additional beneﬁt: there is mounting evidence that such immigration, by contributing to growth in the
STEM occupations, is contributing directly to productivity growth.
In the long run, increases in output per capita come from productivity
growth, which is a result of technological progress. More recent work
in macroeconomics has suggested that this technological progress is
endogenous, stemming from investment in research and development,
which generates innovations that permanently raise productivity (see
Aghion and Howitt [1992] and Romer [1990]). Drinkwater et al. (2007)
show that adding high-skilled immigration to an endogenous growth
model substantially increases innovation, boosts the immigration surplus, and leads to a higher long-term growth rate. Jones (2002) estimates that 50 percent of total factor productivity growth between 1990
and 2010 came from the increase in the science and engineering workforce. Since immigrants made up 80 percent of that workforce growth,
some economists argue that STEM immigrants accounted for as much
as 40 percent of productivity growth during this time period (Peri, Shih,
and Sparber 2014).
There is additional evidence that supports the correlation between
high-skilled immigration and innovation. For example, Hunt and
Gauthier-Lauselle (2010) ﬁnd that immigrants patent new products at
double the rate of U.S. natives, a diﬀerence explained by immigrants’
overrepresentation in STEM occupations. They also ﬁnd some evidence
of positive spillovers on patenting among U.S. natives. In related work,
Hunt (2011) demonstrates that these STEM immigrants are primarily
entering on temporary work-based visas and student visas. Kerr and
Lincoln (2010) also ﬁnd that these visas play a key role by demonstrating that increases in H-1B visas (temporary skilled worker visas)
signiﬁcantly raise patent activity by immigrants, without reducing patenting among natives.
Immigrants also appear to be more entrepreneurial than U.S. natives.
They are more likely to own a business; typically, the diﬀerence is about
one or two percentage points with regard to the fraction of immigrants
who are self-employed. Foreign-born business owners make up 18.2
percent of all business owners, which is greater than the immigrant
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share of the labor force (Fairlie and Lofstrom 2014). Immigrants are
particularly overrepresented among new business owners, making up a
quarter of business startups. Immigrants’ entrepreneurial activities are
likely a net beneﬁt for the economy, but they may also reﬂect the lack
of opportunities some immigrants face in the labor market. Moreover,
while immigrants are more likely to start a business, immigrant-owned
businesses are also more likely to fail than native-owned businesses.
Labor Market Eﬀects
According to standard economic theory, immigrant inﬂows should
have a negative eﬀect on the wages and employment of existing workers, at least in the short run. Despite that clear prediction and the massive immigrant inﬂows that the United States has experienced since the
1970s, most empirical evidence on the wage and employment eﬀects
of immigration suggests that immigration has had either no eﬀect or
just a small adverse eﬀect on natives’ labor market outcomes (see NAS
[2016]). Negative eﬀects are not found on native workers overall, but
for subgroups of workers, typically high school dropouts and prior
low-skilled immigrants. There is little evidence of signiﬁcant negative
eﬀects on medium- and high-skilled natives’ wages.
The magnitude of the wage and employment eﬀects on natives
depends on how substitutable immigrants are for native workers.
Natives whose skills are complementary to those of immigrants may
see increases in their wages and employment from immigration, while
natives with substitutable skills are most likely to lose. The brunt of the
negative labor market impact falls on earlier immigrants, not natives,
because they are most similar to new immigrants and hence compete
most closely with them.
Why doesn’t immigration have a more negative eﬀect on natives?
First, the number of low-skilled workers in the United States has been
on the decline for several decades. There are, in a sense, fewer native
workers that compete directly with low-skilled immigrants. Second, the
economy—including its workers—is constantly adapting to the forces
that shape economic activity. When the cost of labor falls, ﬁrms will use
more labor. In other words, immigration aﬀects the factor mix that is
used by ﬁrms to produce output. Immigration can also aﬀect the output
mix; ﬁrms may begin to produce goods or services that are more labor
intensive.
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The decline in the cost of labor also raises the relative return to
capital, as noted above, so immigration should spur investment and
inﬂows of capital. Immigrants also tend to move to booming areas
that otherwise might experience labor shortages, relieving growth
bottlenecks. Natives and other immigrants may also move or change
occupations or industries in response to immigration, making adverse
wage and employment eﬀects diﬃcult to measure. And immigrants are
themselves consumers and create jobs via their own eﬀect on aggregate
demand. Last but not least, certain immigrants also create jobs via their
entrepreneurial activities and innovation, as discussed above.

IMMIGRATION’S FISCAL IMPACT
Apart from immigration’s direct economic and labor market
impacts, it has a ﬁscal impact—the diﬀerence between what immigrant
families pay in taxes and what they consume in government-provided
beneﬁts.6
Immigrants, much like natives, contribute taxes in several ways:
they pay taxes on earnings, including income and payroll taxes, purchases (sales taxes), housing (property taxes), motor vehicles (registration fees), and so on. Similar to natives, immigrants typically also consume at least some government-provided services, which may include
public schools for their children, subsidized health care in the form
of Medicaid and/or Medicare, income support programs such as the
Earned Income Tax Credit, and welfare programs such as Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or the Women and Infant Children (WIC) program, and Social Security. It bears noting that unauthorized immigrants are not eligible for most welfare programs, including
TANF, and there are restrictions on the eligibility of some legal immigrants as well. Immigrants also rely on publicly provided services such
as police and ﬁre protection.
The characteristics of immigrants, such as their age, earnings, and
family size, will be key to determining how much they ﬁscally contribute
and receive. The progressivity of the tax system and the generosity of
public programs will also play a role. Tax and beneﬁt systems, as well
as the characteristics of immigrants, vary greatly across states, which

Pozo book.indb 11

10/22/2018 1:43:49 PM

18 Orrenius and Gullo

suggests the ﬁscal impacts of immigration may also be diﬀerent across
states.7
Other considerations are also key to determining ﬁscal eﬀects,
particularly the time horizon over which revenues and expenditures
are measured. Cross-sectional or static short-run estimates look at
individuals (or households) at a point in time. While this is a transparent
method, it ignores the crucial role played by age and time in the United
States. Dynamic or long-run estimates are much more representative
of an immigrant’s complete ﬁscal impact because tax contributions
and government beneﬁts are typically measured over an entire lifetime
and will include the contributions of descendants. The downside to
dynamic estimates, however, is that projecting income and beneﬁts
into the future requires making many assumptions. The 2016 National
Academies of Science (NAS) report presents both static (short-run) and
dynamic (long-run) estimates.8
Past Estimates of Immigration’s Fiscal Impact
Before the 2016 NAS report, most scholars cited the ﬁscal
estimates in the National Research Council report, The New Americans:
Economic, Demographic and Fiscal Eﬀects of Immigration (1997). The
report ﬁnds that, over their lifetimes, low-educated immigrants, those
with a high school diploma or less, impose a net ﬁscal cost while higheducated immigrants, those with a college degree or higher, represent
a net ﬁscal beneﬁt.9 Using a similar dynamic methodology, Lee and
Miller (2000) ﬁnd that the initial ﬁscal impact of immigrants and their
households is negative due to their low initial earnings and the costs of
schooling their children. However, after about 16 years, the impact of a
representative immigrant turns positive.
Another ﬁnding in the 1997 NRC report, which was later reinforced
by updated analysis in Lee and Miller (2000), shows that immigration’s
ﬁscal impact is typically negative at the state and local level but positive
at the federal government level. A key reason is that state and local governments bear the bulk of education costs, which immigrants disproportionately incur because they have more children and lower education
and incomes than natives.
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New Fiscal Estimates of Immigration: Static and Dynamic
The cross-sectional ﬁscal impact estimates from the 2016 NAS
report are shown in Table 2.1, which replicates two scenarios from the
2016 report—namely, one in which immigrants are assigned the average cost of public goods (top rows), and another in which immigrants
are assigned the marginal cost of public goods (bottom rows).10 Public
goods include the cost of national defense, interest on the national debt,
and foreign aid, among other shared expenses.11 The columns reﬂect
three groups: immigrants and their minor children or ‘dependents’ (“ﬁrst
generation”), the adult children of immigrants and their dependents
(“second generation”), and other U.S.-born adults and their dependents
(“third generation”).12 This methodology assigns parents the education
expenses of their children; in the case of immigrants, the returns to this
investment in education (which mainly take the form of higher tax payments resulting from higher earnings) is thus attributed to the second
generation. The rows in Table 2.1 also break the total eﬀect into ﬁscal
impacts at the federal versus state and local government level.
Table 2.1 Net Per Capita Fiscal Impacts of First, Second, and Third-plus
Generations in 2013, by Public Goods Scenario and Level
of Government
1st generation
with dependents

2nd generation
with dependents

3rd generation
with dependents

Receipts
Receipts
Receipts
− outlays Fiscal − outlays Fiscal − outlays Fiscal
($)
gap (%)
($)
gap (%)
($)
gap (%)
Scenario 1: Immigrants assigned
average cost of public goods
Federal
−2,650
State and local
−2,372
Total
−5,021
Scenario 2: Immigrants assigned
marginal cost of public goods
Federal
State and local
Total

963
−1,746
−782

27.1
38.6
31.6

−3,598
−1,062
−4,660

27.5
17.4
24.3

−2,577
−1,031
−3,608

21.4
17.7
20.2

−15.7
31.7
6.7

−4,239
−1,177
−5,415

30.9
18.9
27.1

−3,218
−1,146
−4,364

25.4
19.2
23.4

SOURCE: Cross-sectional ﬁscal estimates based on NAS (2016, Table 8-2). Fiscal gap is
deﬁned as 1 minus receipts/outlays. Scenario 2 corresponds to scenario 5 in the NAS report.
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It is notable that, with one exception, every generation, immigrant
and native, at every level of government, consumes more in public beneﬁts than it contributes in taxes. Because the nation is running a sizable
deﬁcit, the entire public represents a net cost on average. Fiscal impacts
are negative in every case except immigrants in the second scenario
at the federal level. In the “Total” row, the ﬁscal gap in funding varies
from a low of 6.7 percent for the ﬁrst generation to a high of 31.6 percent, also for the ﬁrst generation.
The assumption about how to assign the costs of public goods
makes a big diﬀerence in evaluating the ﬁscal impact of immigrants.
Although the 2016 NAS report does not indicate a preferred or baseline
speciﬁcation, the marginal cost assumption is clearly the most relevant
for future policy decisions because it represents the incremental eﬀect
of immigrants on public goods spending.
It is clear from Table 2.1 that the ﬁscal funding gap for immigrants
is most acute at the state and local government level. As noted above,
this is primarily due to the costs of public education; immigrant families in the United States have more children than do native families,
which drives up their costs at the state and local levels relative to nonimmigrants. The oﬀset, the higher incomes and tax contributions of
their children, is attributed to the second generation. Immigrants’ lower
incomes also mean they pay less in taxes on average than natives.
As discussed above, cross-sectional or static ﬁscal estimates like
those presented in Table 2.1 are inherently limited by several shortcomings, including not controlling for diﬀerences in age between the foreign
born and native-born populations at a point in time, and hence should
be used with great caution. Long-run or lifetime estimates are preferred
when, for example, evaluating ﬁscal impacts to formulate immigration
policy. The 2016 NAS report’s long-run ﬁscal estimates are presented
in Table 2.2 and broken down for two sets of immigrants—those who
arrived recently (in the last ﬁve years) and all immigrants. We again
show the ﬁscal impact with and without assigning immigrants the cost
of public goods. The top row is the weighted average of the remaining
rows, which show ﬁscal impacts by education levels of immigrants and
their dependents. Education level is a key determinant of income, so it
will be an eﬀective predictor of ﬁscal impact.
Table 2.2 shows that in dynamic, long-run scenarios, the present
value of the net ﬁscal impact of immigration is typically positive and
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Table 2.2 Dynamic 75-Year Per Capita Net Fiscal Impacts for Recent
and All Immigrants, by Public Goods Scenario and Education
Level (000s of 2012 $)
Recent immigrantsa
No public
Public
Education level
goods
goods
Average
259
173
Less than high school
117
−200
High school degree
49
−33
Some college
261
170
College degree
481
395
More than college degree
812
726

All immigrants
No public
Public
goods
goods
58
−5
−196
−259
−47
−109
99
34
280
216
547
485

Arrived in the past ﬁve years.
NOTE: Forecast is based on the CBO long-term budget outlook. Includes taxes and
expenditures at the federal, state, and local levels for an individual and his dependents.
SOURCE: NAS (2016, Table 8-12).

a

can be quite large. If we assume that an additional immigrant does not
increase spending on public goods, which is a reasonable assumption, a
new immigrant represents a positive ﬁscal contribution with a net present value of $259,000. A recent immigrant has a much larger positive
ﬁscal impact than does an immigrant who reﬂects the characteristics of
the population of all immigrants ($58,000). The diﬀerence is because
the stock of all immigrants has, on average, less education and is older
than recent immigrants. The rise over time in education levels among
U.S. immigrants partly reﬂects the rise in employment-based immigration in the post-1990 era and the more recent decline in low-skilled
immigration.
Some of the estimates are astounding. A representative recent immigrant with more than a college degree contributes over $800,000 to
government coﬀers on net over a 75-year period. In contrast, a typical
recent immigrant who lacks a high school diploma represents a net cost
of about $117,000 dollars. Interestingly, this net cost does not reﬂect
disproportionate outlays as compared with similar natives. Figure 2.5
shows the diﬀerence in net ﬁscal 75-year impacts of immigrants versus
natives by education level. Although low-skilled immigrants impose a
net ﬁscal cost, apparent in Table 2.2, the net ﬁscal cost of natives of
similar education is far larger. For example, the diﬀerence is on the
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Figure 2.5 Immigrant-Native Diﬀerence in 75-Year Dynamic Net Fiscal
Impact, by Education Level
250

200

150

$000s

100

50

0

-50

-100

Less than high
school

High school

Some college

Bachelorʼs

More than
bachelorʼs

NOTE: Estimates assume no public goods are included in beneﬁts.
SOURCE: NAS (2016, Table 8-13).

order of $200,000 less in ﬁscal cost of an immigrant who lacks a high
school diploma versus a high school dropout native. The only education
category where immigrants impose a smaller (in this case, less positive)
ﬁscal beneﬁt than natives is among those with bachelor’s degrees.
Summary of Fiscal Impacts
New estimates of the ﬁscal impact of immigration reﬂect some of
what was already known while also highlighting some important new
ﬁndings. Cross-sectional estimates based on 2013 CPS data suggest
that immigrants represent a net ﬁscal drain on average. However, so
does everyone else, including natives. When immigrants are assigned
the marginal cost of public goods, their ﬁscal impact is signiﬁcantly
less negative than that of natives. Immigrants’ tax contributions cover
93 percent of their publicly provided beneﬁts, while natives’ contri-
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butions cover only 77 percent of theirs. The dreary overall ﬁscal scenario is due to large public deﬁcits and high national debt—problems
that were much less pronounced in the 1997 report. In addition, natives
have grown more costly over time because they have become an older
population; their health costs impose a disproportionate burden on the
federal government because it pays for Medicare and subsidizes related
expenses such as nursing homes. Meanwhile, immigrants are more
costly than natives at the state and local levels because they have lower
incomes and more minor children; this means immigrants are particularly burdensome to state and local governments, which pay for public
schools.
The long-run, dynamic estimates of immigration’s ﬁscal impact
are both far more positive and arguably more relevant, at least from
a policy perspective. Recent immigrants represent a large ﬁscal boon
because they are projected to pay much more in taxes than they use
in beneﬁts over the next 75 years. Even low-skilled immigrants, those
without any college education, while they impose a net long-run cost,
are far less costly than similarly educated natives.
The overall results of the 2016 NAS report suggest that the rise
of high-skilled immigration and more recent decline in low-skilled
immigration is resolving some of the most pressing concerns around
immigration’s ﬁscal impact. Since present trends are likely to continue
and possibly intensify in future immigration ﬂows, immigration may
increasingly be seen as a ﬁscal boon rather than a burden. Immigration
may even play a part in future plans to address the nation’s looming
ﬁscal shortfalls.

IMMIGRATION POLICY
Nations use immigration policy to meet many objectives, including
economic, humanitarian, political, cultural, and national security. The
United States has a multifaceted immigration policy that engenders
some of each of these, although it is principally a family reuniﬁcation
policy. Most permanent resident visas (green cards) are designated
for family members of U.S. citizens, many of whom are immigrants
themselves. Immediate family members of U.S. citizens include parents,

Pozo book.indb 17

10/22/2018 1:43:50 PM

24 Orrenius and Gullo

spouses, and unmarried children, and they enter without limit. Other
family members, employment-based immigrants, diversity immigrants,
and refugees and asylum seekers are all subject to annual caps, which
are typically exhausted every year.13 After ﬁve years on a green card,
permanent residents can naturalize. Once citizens, they too can sponsor
their foreign-born relatives, a process that is sometimes referred to as
chain migration.
Under this system, the United States annually issues about 1.1
million green cards. About 94 percent are to family members of U.S.
citizens or permanent legal residents, people seeking humanitarian refuge, and diversity immigrants (Figure 2.6). The remaining 6 percent
are to people who are immigrating for employment, most of whom are
high-skilled. As can be seen in Table 2.3, no other major developed
economy places such a low priority on permanent employment-based
immigration.
Figure 2.6 Allocation of Permanent Resident Visas, by Category
Employment
6.5%

Other
7.2%

Humanitarian
14.5%

Family
71.8%

NOTE: Work includes free-movement migrants. Family includes accompanying family
of workers. Data refer to 2015.
SOURCE: OECD (2017).
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Table 2.3 Permanent Visas, by Category and Country
Total numCountry
ber (000s)
United States
1,051
Switzerland
131
United Kingdom
379
Spain
195
Germany
686
Netherlands
147
Italy
161
France
256
Australia
226
Canada
272

Work
(%)
6.5
76.5
75.9
72.7
66.2
57.6
48.2
44.4
36.6
28.2

Family
(%)
71.8
16.0
13.0
20.3
12.0
14.3
30.2
40.4
57.2
58.6

Humanitarian (%)
14.5
5.4
4.8
0.5
20.9
28.1
18.4
6.5
6.1
13.2

Other
(%)
7.2
2.1
6.3
6.5
0.9
0.0
3.1
8.7
0.1
0.0

NOTE: Only includes OECD countries. Work includes free-movement migrants. Family includes accompanying family of workers. Data refer to 2015.
SOURCE: OECD (2017).

Temporary Worker Programs
The United States has several temporary visa programs that help
make up for the low number of hard-to-get employment-based green
cards. The best known of these is the H-1B program, which brings in
over 100,000 high-skilled workers in a typical year, many of them computer programmers from India and many others foreign-born STEM
graduates from U.S. universities. The private sector faces a cap on H-1B
visas of 85,000 each year, while there is no limit on nonproﬁt institutions. The number of H-1B applications outstrips supply every year.
Another important temporary job-based visa is the Trade NAFTA
(TN) visa, which admits an additional 70,000-plus professionals, mostly
from Canada but a growing number from Mexico. The L-1 program is
for intracompany transferees (uncapped, with about 75,000 annually),
and the O-1 program provides temporary visas for a small number of
workers of “extraordinary ability.”
The growth in temporary job-based visas has not led to any increases
in the green card caps. As a result, there is a growing mismatch between
the number of immigrants on temporary visas who wish to stay permanently in the United States and the number of available permanent resi-
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dence visas. Although it is impossible to know how many temporary
visa holders are in the green card queue, one study estimates that nearly
1.1 million people were waiting for an employment-based green card
in ﬁscal year 2006 (Jasso et al. 2010). It is likely that many more would
have applied if permanent visas were available. For those in the queue,
green cards typically won’t be available for many years because of the
numerical limits on work-based permanent visas. Country-of-origin
limits further restrict the number of visas that can go to immigrants
from populous nations such as India and China.
Low-skilled workers face even longer odds. There are two temporary
visa programs designed for low-skilled workers—the H-2A (for farm
workers) and H-2B (other seasonal workers) programs. Both are only
for work that lasts less than one year. H-2A visas are not capped and
have grown considerably in recent years. H-2B visas have an annual
cap of 66,000.
Illegal Immigration
Employers’usage of temporary visas has increased notably as illegal
immigration has tapered oﬀ. This is encouraging in that it suggests
employers will hire legal workers if that option exists and unauthorized
workers are hard to ﬁnd. And they are increasingly scarce. Estimates
suggest the unauthorized immigrant population peaked in 2007 and has
since declined from 12 to 11.3 million (Krogstad, Passel, and Cohn
2017). The Great Recession and accompanying housing bust and
ﬁnancial crisis may well have been the end of mass illegal immigration
to the United States, at least from Mexico. Illegal immigration from
Mexico never recovered from the Great Recession, and heightened
enforcement is likely the reason why. Since the early 2000s, both
federal and state governments have signiﬁcantly tightened both border
and interior enforcement and increased penalties.
In addition to more border fencing, border patrol agents, and
stiﬀer penalties for apprehended migrants, the United States has also
implemented more interior enforcement. In the wake of the 9/11
attacks, the Bush administration required that federal contractors and
subcontractors participate in E-Verify, created the 287(g) program
that trained state and local police to enforce federal immigration law,
and launched Secure Communities, a program that checks whether
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immigrants in police custody are deportable. Although the Obama
administration rolled back many of these programs, the Trump
administration has been bringing them back, and many states have
implemented their own laws in the meantime. The consequences for
unauthorized immigrants are apparent not just in reduced inﬂows,
but also in worse labor market outcomes. Research suggests that the
tougher enforcement climate after 9/11 led to a decline in employment
and earnings among Hispanic immigrants likely to be unauthorized
(Orrenius and Zavodny 2009). Worksite enforcement and other measures
likely forced some undocumented immigrants into self-employment or
the shadow economy, where wages are lower and fringe beneﬁts are
rare.

IMMIGRATION POLICY REFORM
In implementing immigration reform, policymakers might consider
three conclusions from this chapter: 1) there are net economic beneﬁts
to natives from immigration, so there should be immigration; 2) highskilled and employment-based immigration is particularly beneﬁcial,
with potential to increase productivity growth and contribute positively
to the ﬁscal balance; and 3) the United States is entering two decades
in which the native labor force will shrink as the baby boomers retire.
Implementing immigration reform will help oﬀset this drag on labor
force expansion and safeguard economic growth.
By following these basic principles, immigration policy could be
used to advance the nation’s economic and ﬁscal interests. The current
system does not do this as well as it could because it prioritizes family
reuniﬁcation over work-based migration and strictly limits high-skilled
immigration. The focus on family-based immigration serves the interests of earlier immigrants and only a small minority of U.S. natives.
Since immigrants are already the biggest beneﬁciaries of immigration,
it doesn’t make sense to confer additional beneﬁts on them through a
system that is overwhelmingly family-based.
A good way to shift the immigration system toward employmentbased immigration is to adopt an auction-based system that admits
work-based immigrants and redistributes the auction revenue to natives.
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In such a system, the federal government would regularly auction oﬀ
permits to employers that allow them to hire highly skilled foreign
workers, who would then receive visas. Visas would be portable across
employers to facilitate worker mobility, and employers would be able
to resell permits they no longer need (see Orrenius and Zavodny [2010]
for more details). The auctions could be extended to include low-skilled
and seasonal workers.
An auction-based system would have a number of advantages. Its
emphasis on market forces would allocate visas to the workers most
desired by employers, as measured by permit auction prices, rather than
on the basis of how long someone has been standing in line or the random luck of winning a visa lottery. This emphasis on market forces is
better than a point system in which bureaucrats determine how points,
and hence visas, are allocated, as has historically been the case in Australia and Canada and has been recently proposed in the United States.
Such systems tend to attract highly educated immigrants but not those
with the best labor market prospects.
The United States also needs a legalization program to regularize
the status of the more than 11 million unauthorized population. A legalization program has the beneﬁt of boosting newly authorized immigrants’ earnings, primarily because they are better able to move into
higher-paying occupations instead of being trapped in just a few sectors
of the economy. It also boosts tax revenues as newly authorized immigrants earn more and move out of the underground economy. The children of newly authorized immigrants are perhaps the biggest beneﬁciaries. Research indicates that children’s educational outcomes improve
when their parents obtain legal status (Bean et al. 2011). Children who
are able to legalize their own status are more likely to go to college.
Of course, a major concern regarding a legalization program is
whether it spurs additional unauthorized immigration. The U.S. experience suggests that increases in border enforcement are unlikely to
reduce illegal immigration to publicly palatable levels. Looking to the
future, minimizing unauthorized inﬂows will require creating a way for
employers to bring in more foreign workers whose skills are aligned
with employers’ needs. Auctions would do this. Requiring employers
to verify virtually all workers’ legal status in an easy, fast, low-cost,
and foolproof manner—as with the E-Verify system—is also necessary.
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Notes
The views expressed here are solely those of the authors and do not reﬂect those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.
1. Source is IMF in current dollars; PPP-adjusted U.S. GDP accounts for 15.5 percent
of world output.
2. The United Nations estimates the world migrant stock was 243.5 million in
2015. See http://www.pewglobal.org/interactives/migration-tables/ (accessed
June 21, 2017). The UNDP estimates there are 50 million migrants worldwide
with irregular status. See http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/ﬁles/2016_human_
development_report.pdf (accessed June 21, 2017).
3. We use the terms immigrant and foreign-born interchangeably in this chapter to
refer to all individuals residing in the United States who were born abroad to nonU.S. parents. Immigrants thus include unauthorized immigrants, temporary and
permanent resident visa holders, and naturalized citizens.
4. Authors’ calculations based on 2015 American Community Survey one-year
estimates.
5. 2015 American Community Survey one-year estimates.
6. The ﬁscal impact section is based extensively on NAS (2016) and Orrenius (2017),
a version of which is also forthcoming in Spanish in Coyuntura Demográﬁca,
available at http://www.somede.org/coyuntura-demograﬁca/ (accessed March 15,
2018).
7. Chapter 9 of the 2016 NAS report presents estimates of the ﬁscal impact by state.
8. See Chapter 7 of the 2016 NAS report for a detailed discussion of the two methods
and related assumptions.
9. Immigrants with less than a high school education were found to cost $89,000
more (based on 1996 estimates) than they contribute in taxes over their lifetimes,
whereas immigrants with more than a high school education were found to
contribute $105,000 more in taxes than they use in public services.
10. Tax contributions and beneﬁts receipts are based on data from the March 2013
CPS.
11. Public goods, deﬁned in this way, accounted for one-third of total federal spending
in 2013.
12. Some immigrants’ dependents are U.S.-born; in addition, some young adults who
are students with very low incomes are also included as dependents.
13. Refugee admissions are capped each year, but there is no limit on green cards for
refugees or asylees.
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3
Socioeconomic Integration
of U.S. Immigrant Groups
over the Long Term
The Second Generation and Beyond
Brian Duncan
University of Colorado Denver
Stephen J. Trejo
University of Texas at Austin

As a self-styled nation of immigrants, the United States takes great
pride in its historical success as a “melting pot” able to absorb and unify
people coming from diverse lands and cultures. At the same time, however, pride in our immigrant heritage always seems tempered by the
nagging fear that the most recent arrivals are somehow diﬀerent, that
the latest wave of foreigners won’t integrate into the mainstream of
American society. Certainly, this fear was voiced when Irish, Italian,
and other relatively unskilled immigrants arrived in large numbers at
the end of the 1800s and the beginning of the 1900s (Jones 1960). Time
has assuaged this particular fear. In terms of outcomes such as educational attainment, occupation, and earnings, the sizable diﬀerences by
national origin that initially persisted among earlier European immigrants have largely disappeared among the modern-day descendants of
these immigrants (Alba and Nee 2003; Borjas 1994; Chiswick 1977;
Farley 1990; Lieberson and Waters 1988; Neidert and Farley 1985;
Perlmann 2005; Perlmann and Waldinger 1997).
There is considerable skepticism, however, that the processes of
assimilation and incorporation will operate similarly for the predominantly nonwhite immigrants who have entered the United States in
increasing numbers over the past several decades (Gans 1992; Portes
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and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994). Indeed, Huntington (2004) voices a
particularly strong version of such skepticism with regard to Hispanic
immigration. Are the descendants of present-day Hispanic and Asian
immigrants following the same trajectory of intergenerational integration experienced by the descendants of earlier arrivals from Europe?
In this chapter, we shed light on this question by documenting generational patterns of educational attainment and earnings for contemporary immigrant groups. We also discuss some potentially serious measurement issues that arise when attempting to track the socioeconomic
progress of the later-generation descendants of U.S. immigrants, and
we summarize what recent research has to say about these measurement
issues and how they might bias our assessment of the long-term integration of particular groups.

EDUCATIONAL PATTERNS IN THE FIRST AND
SECOND GENERATIONS
We begin by describing patterns of educational attainment among
foreign-born immigrants and their U.S.-born children. Education is a
fundamental determinant of economic success, social status, health,
family stability, and life opportunities (Hout 2012). In addition, information on education is available for all adults, whereas earnings data
are available only for those currently working. Our primary education
measure is average completed years of schooling, but similar patterns
emerge for other education measures, such as the percent of individuals in the lower (less than 12 years of schooling) and upper (at least a
bachelor’s degree) tails of the educational distribution.
Throughout this chapter, we employ microdata from the Current
Population Survey (CPS) for all months from January 2003 through
December 2016. The CPS is a monthly survey of about 60,000 households that the U.S. government administers to estimate unemployment
rates and other indicators of labor market activity. The sampling universe for this survey is the civilian noninstitutionalized population of
the United States, which potentially generates biased estimates for
groups with relatively high rates of institutionalization, such as young,
African-American males (Pettit 2012). Beginning in 1980, the decen-
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nial U.S. census stopped asking respondents about the countries of
birth of their parents, and the American Community Survey follows the
census in this regard. In 1994, however, the CPS began collecting this
information on a regular basis from all respondents. As a result, the CPS
is currently the best large-scale, nationally representative U.S. data set
for investigating how outcomes vary by immigrant generation.
In addition to the detailed demographic and labor force data reported
for all respondents, the CPS collects earnings information each month
from one-quarter of the sample, the so-called outgoing rotation groups.
The data we analyze come from these outgoing rotation group samples.
The CPS sampling scheme is such that surveys for the same month in
adjacent years have about half of their respondents in common (e.g.,
about half of the respondents in any January survey are reinterviewed
the following January). To obtain independent samples, we use only
data from the ﬁrst time a household appears in the outgoing rotation
group samples (i.e., we use only data from the fourth month that a
household appears in the CPS sample). By pooling together these 14
years of monthly CPS data, we substantially increase sample sizes and
improve the precision of our estimates.
Using the CPS information on the countries of birth of each respondent and his or her parents, we deﬁne the following generation groups.
The ﬁrst generation consists of foreign-born individuals, excluding
those born abroad of an American parent.1 The second generation consists of U.S.-born individuals who have at least one foreign-born parent. Remaining persons are members of the third+ generation (i.e., the
third and all higher generations), which consists of U.S.-born individuals who have two U.S.-born parents. Our analysis samples include men
and women aged 25–59.
For ﬁrst- and second-generation individuals overall and separately
from the largest national origin groups, Table 3.1 reports average completed years of schooling and the corresponding sample sizes on which
these averages are based.2 The bottom row of the table shows average
schooling levels for ﬁrst- and second-generation individuals from all
countries of origin (including countries not listed individually in the
table). Separate calculations are presented for men and women.
For the ﬁrst generation, these tables illustrate the well-known diversity of educational attainment among U.S. immigrants (Betts and Lofstrom 2000; Card 2005). Average schooling levels range from about
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Source country
Mexico
Puerto Rico
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Central America
South America
China
India
Japan
Korea
Philippines
Vietnam
Haiti
Jamaica
Africa
Canada
Europe
All countries

Men, by immigrant generation
First
Second
Avg. educ. Sample size Avg. educ. Sample size
9.5
31,039
12.7
7,671
12.2
2,909
12.7
2,459
13.0
2,062
14.3
821
11.9
1,658
13.5
363
9.7
8,323
13.4
938
13.3
5,962
14.4
1,116
14.9
3,149
15.4
886
16.3
5,200
15.9
576
15.7
560
14.4
659
15.4
1,898
15.0
544
14.4
3,779
14.4
1,590
13.1
2,637
14.6
395
12.8
1,056
14.1
175
13.1
1,215
14.1
286
14.4
4,755
14.7
604
15.1
1,725
14.2
3,330
14.5
10,147
14.5
12,895
12.2
99,966
13.9
38,459

Women, by immigrant generation
First
Second
Avg. educ. Sample size Avg. educ. Sample size
9.7
28,167
12.9
8,468
12.4
3,643
13.0
2,996
13.2
2,051
14.6
806
12.0
2,599
14.1
422
10.3
7,940
13.9
1,054
13.5
7,068
14.5
1,162
14.4
3,802
15.5
902
16.0
4700
16.0
552
14.9
1,099
14.7
645
14.6
2,827
15.4
530
14.7
5,970
14.7
1,674
12.6
3,031
14.9
397
12.7
1,246
14.8
235
13.5
1,756
14.8
361
13.6
4,238
15.0
637
14.9
2,072
14.5
3,481
14.5
11,594
14.6
13,351
12.4
106,372
14.1
40,812

10/22/2018 1:43:50 PM

NOTE: The education measure is completed years of schooling. The samples include people aged 25–59. The “ﬁrst generation” consists of
foreign-born individuals, excluding those born abroad of an American parent. The “second generation” consists of U.S.-born individuals who
have at least one foreign-born parent. The bottom row labeled “all countries” reports outcomes for ﬁrst- and second-generation individuals
from all countries of origin (including countries not listed individually in the table). Sampling weights were used in the calculations.
SOURCE: 2003–2016 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data.
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10 years for those born in Mexico and Central America to 15 years
and above for those born in India, Japan, Korea, and Canada. For comparison purposes, note that average years of schooling among third+generation non-Hispanic whites is 13.8 years for men and 14 years for
women.
Additional calculations (not reported in Table 3.1) reveal that the
foreign-born are greatly overrepresented among those with the lowest
levels of education. Overall, 27 percent of immigrant men and 24 percent
of immigrant women have completed less than 12 years of schooling,
and these rates exceed 40 percent for Central American immigrants and
exceed 50 percent for Mexican immigrants. In contrast, the corresponding rates of low educational attainment are below 7 percent for U.S.-born
individuals overall. At the same time, however, the foreign-born are well
represented among those with the highest education levels. Completion
of a bachelor’s degree is only slightly less common for immigrants than
for the U.S.-born, whereas a substantially higher fraction of immigrants
than U.S. natives have postgraduate degrees, and highly educated immigrants are heavily concentrated in science, technology, engineering, and
health ﬁelds (Bound and Turner 2014). College degrees and higher levels of education are especially prevalent for immigrants from Canada,
Europe, and parts of Asia (including China, India, Japan, Korea, and the
Philippines). To sum up, the foreign-born are overrepresented at the bottom and, to a lesser extent, the top of the U.S. educational distribution,
and they are underrepresented in the middle.
For assessing educational integration, it is particularly useful to
look at the second generation, because these U.S.-born children of
immigrants grew up in American schools. Table 3.1 reveals that, overall, second-generation men and women average about 14 years of
schooling. Additional calculations (not reported) indicate that secondgeneration Americans have high school dropout rates of 6–7 percent
and college completion rates of 36–39 percent (with women holding a
slight educational advantage over men). These measures of educational
attainment for the second generation are very similar to the corresponding measures for non-Hispanic whites in the third+ generation.3 In this
respect, the second generation as a whole has converged to the average
educational attainment of the typical American.
Moreover, for the vast majority of speciﬁc national origin groups,
average education levels of the second generation signiﬁcantly exceed
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those of the typical third+-generation American. The exceptions are
second-generation members of several important Hispanic groups:
Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Central Americans. Note
that this is not the case for all Hispanic groups—in particular, secondgeneration Cubans and South Americans exhibit relatively high levels
of educational attainment. But the low schooling levels of secondgeneration Mexicans and Puerto Ricans and, to a lesser extent, Dominicans and Central Americans stand in sharp contrast to the much higher
educational attainment of the second generations from non-Hispanic
source countries.4 As a result, Hispanics assume a central role in current
discussions of immigrant integration, not just because Hispanics make
up a large share of the U.S. immigrant population, but also because most
indications of relative socioeconomic disadvantage among the children
of U.S. immigrants vanish when Hispanics are excluded from the sample (Farley and Alba 2002; Perlmann and Waldinger 1996, 1997).
In large part, the educational deﬁcits displayed by some secondgeneration Hispanic groups reﬂect the very low schooling levels of
their immigrant parents (Perlmann 2005; Smith 2006). For example,
Mexican immigrants average less than 10 years of education and under
half have completed at least 12 years of schooling, so it is perhaps not
surprising that their U.S.-born sons and daughters do not fully erase
this enormous gap in human capital. Figures 3.1 (for men) and 3.2
(for women) provide further evidence on the relationship between the
education levels of ﬁrst- and second-generation individuals from the
same source country. For the 17 countries/regions of origin displayed
in Table 3.1, the ﬁgures plot average years of schooling for secondgeneration individuals aged 25–34 against those for ﬁrst-generation
individuals aged 50–59. These speciﬁc age groups are chosen so that
the ﬁrst generation more closely represents the parental cohort for the
corresponding second generation. The solid regression lines in the ﬁgures highlight the central tendencies of the relationships between the
average education levels of second-generation individuals from a particular source country and those of their immigrant ancestors. For reference purposes, the horizontal and vertical dashed lines indicate average
years of schooling—13.8 years for men in Figure 3.1 and 14.2 years for
women in Figure 3.2—for non-Hispanic whites in the third+ generation who are aged 25–34 (the same age range as the second-generation
samples in the ﬁgures).
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Education of second-generation men (aged 25–34)

Figure 3.1 Average Education (in years) of First- and SecondGeneration Men
17
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South America
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13
14
Education of first-generation men (aged 50–59)

15

16

NOTE: The education measure is completed years of schooling. The ﬁrst-generation
samples include foreign-born men aged 50–59, excluding those born abroad of an
American parent. The second-generation samples include U.S.-born men aged 25–34
who have at least one foreign-born parent. Sampling weights were used in the calculations.
SOURCE: 2003–2016 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data.

These ﬁgures reveal a strong relationship between the educational
attainments of second-generation individuals and their immigrant predecessors. Most data points are close to the corresponding regression line,
and the R-squared statistics of 0.63 for men in Figure 3.1 and 0.44 for
women in Figure 3.2 indicate that much of the variation across national
origin groups in the average education of the second generation is associated with diﬀerences in the human capital possessed by their immigrant ancestors.5 Moreover, three of the Hispanic national origin groups
with relatively low levels of second-generation schooling (Mexicans,
Dominicans, and Central Americans) are not prominent regression outliers in these ﬁgures, which indicates that their educational deﬁcits in
the second generation are roughly what we would expect given the low
schooling levels of their immigrant parents. Puerto Ricans, however, do
lie well below the regression lines. Despite having education levels in
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Education of second-generation women (aged 25–34)

Figure 3.2 Average Education (in years) of First- and SecondGeneration Women
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NOTE: The education measure is completed years of schooling. The ﬁrst-generation
samples include foreign-born women aged 50–59, excluding those born abroad of
an American parent. The second-generation samples include U.S.-born women aged
25–34 who have at least one foreign-born parent. Sampling weights were used in the
calculations.
SOURCE: 2003–2016 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data.

the immigrant generation that exceed those of the other disadvantaged
Hispanic groups, by the second generation Puerto Ricans join Mexicans
at the bottom of the U.S. educational hierarchy.
Regarding the educational integration of the second generation,
the evidence presented thus far can be brieﬂy summarized as follows.
On average, the second generation as a whole and second-generation
members from most contemporary immigrant groups meet or exceed
the schooling level of the typical American. The primary exceptions to
this pattern are several important Hispanic groups: Mexicans, Puerto
Ricans, Dominicans, and Central Americans; and the sizable educational deﬁcits that persist into the second generation for these Hispanic
groups largely reﬂect the very low levels of schooling, English proﬁ-
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ciency, and other forms of human capital brought to the United States
by their immigrant ancestors.
Because they start out farther behind, perhaps the lagging Hispanic
groups will simply require an extra generation or so to integrate into the
socioeconomic mainstream of American society. After carefully comparing the intergenerational mobility experienced by low-skill European immigrants arriving in the United States around 1900 with that
experienced by modern-day Mexicans, Perlmann (2005) concludes that
“Mexican economic assimilation may take more time—four or ﬁve
generations rather than three or four” (p. 124), but that such assimilation is nonetheless occurring. If Perlmann is correct, then the long-term
integration of Mexican Americans and other Hispanic groups may not
turn out all that diﬀerently from the success stories often recounted for
pervious waves of U.S. immigration.

BEYOND THE SECOND GENERATION
Given the patterns described in the preceding section, a key question becomes, How much educational progress takes place after the second generation for Mexicans and other disadvantaged Hispanic groups?
To tackle this question, we must ﬁrst confront the issue of how, with
available data, to identify immigrant groups in the third generation and
beyond. In the CPS, the only information about the national origins of
third+-generation individuals comes from their subjective responses to
the Hispanic origin and race questions. Using this information, Table
3.2 reports average years of schooling by immigrant generation for the
various Hispanic and non-Hispanic racial/ethnic groups identiﬁed in
CPS data.6
For Hispanics overall, Table 3.2 reveals a substantial schooling
advantage of more than 2.5 years for the second generation relative to
the ﬁrst, but no further improvement is evident for the third+ generation. This pattern largely repeats itself for each of the Hispanic national
origin groups: sizable schooling gains between the ﬁrst and second generations with no signs of additional progress beyond the second generation. Puerto Ricans are a notable exception, however, with average
education levels increasing by about one-half of a year between the
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Table 3.2 Average Education, Aged 25–59, by Race/Ethnicity, Sex, and
Immigrant Generation
Men, by immigrant generation
First
Second
Third+
10.3
13.0
12.8
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Mexican
9.5
12.7
12.7
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.02)
Puerto Rican
12.2
12.7
13.2
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.06)
Cuban
13.0
14.3
14.0
(0.06)
(0.09)
(0.18)
Central/South
11.0
13.8
13.2
American
(0.04)
(0.06)
(0.13)
Other Hispanic 12.1
13.6
13.2
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.04)
Non-Hispanic
White
14.4
14.4
13.8
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.004)
Black
13.5
14.0
12.9
(0.03)
(0.07)
(0.01)
Asian
14.8
15.0
14.3
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.04)
Other race
14.0
14.3
13.0
(0.16)
(0.07)
(0.02)
All race/ethnic
12.2
13.9
13.6
groups
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.003)

Race/Ethnicity
Hispanic
(aggregate)

Women, by immigrant generation
First
Second
Third+
10.6
13.2
12.9
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
9.6
12.9
12.8
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.02)
12.4
13.0
13.4
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.05)
13.2
14.7
13.9
(0.06)
(0.09)
(0.16)
11.6
14.2
13.6
(0.03)
(0.06)
(0.11)
12.4
13.6
13.2
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.04)
14.2
(0.02)
13.3
(0.03)
14.3
(0.02)
14.3
(0.13)
12.4
(0.01)

14.6
(0.02)
14.5
(0.06)
15.2
(0.04)
14.6
(0.07)
14.1
(0.01)

14.0
(0.003)
13.3
(0.009)
14.5
(0.04)
13.3
(0.02)
13.8
(0.003)

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The education measure is completed years of schooling. The samples include people ages 25–59. The “ﬁrst generation” consists of foreign-born individuals, excluding those born abroad of an American parent. The “second generation” consists of U.S.-born individuals who have at
least one foreign-born parent. Remaining persons are members of the “third+ generation” (i.e., the third and all higher generations), which consists of U.S.-born individuals who have two U.S.-born parents. Sampling weights were used in the calculations.
SOURCE: 2003–2016 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data.
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second and third+ generations. Another interesting pattern is that the
gains between the ﬁrst and second generations are particularly strong
for the national origin groups with the least-educated immigrants (i.e.,
Mexicans and Central/South Americans).
Turning now to the non-Hispanic groups in Table 3.2, Asians of all
three generations possess high levels of educational attainment, as do
ﬁrst- and second-generation whites. By the second generation, the average schooling levels of black and other race individuals exceed those of
third+-generation whites. Educational attainment is dramatically lower
(by a year or more, on average) for third+-generation members of the
black and other race groups, a pattern that reﬂects the fundamental demographic heterogeneity across generations for these particular groups.
First- and second-generation blacks, for example, primarily consist of
immigrants from the Caribbean and Africa and their U.S.-born children. Third+-generation blacks, however, are largely the descendants
of African American slaves whose families have been in the United
States for many generations. The residual nature of the “other race”
group also creates comparability issues across generations, especially
for the third+ generation that disproportionately consists of individuals
with American Indian and/or mixed-race ancestry. As a result, comparisons between the ﬁrst two generations and the third+ generation for the
black and other race groups are unlikely to shed much light on the intergenerational integration of immigrants. In contrast, such comparisons
are more meaningful for the Hispanic and Asian groups, because these
groups are more demographically homogenous across generations and
because most of the third+-generation members are indeed third generation rather than from a higher generation.
The apparent lack of socioeconomic progress between second
and later generations of U.S. Hispanics is surprising. Previous studies have consistently found parental education to be one of the most
important determinants of an individual’s educational attainment and
ultimate labor market success (Haveman and Wolfe 1994; Mulligan
1997). Through this mechanism, the huge educational gain between
ﬁrst- and second-generation Hispanics (documented in Figures 3.1 and
3.2 and Tables 3.1 and 3.2) should produce a sizable jump in schooling
between the second and third generations, because on average the third
generation has parents who are much better educated than those of the
second generation. Yet the improvement in schooling we expect to ﬁnd
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between the second and third generations is largely absent (except for
Puerto Ricans).

GENERATIONAL PATTERNS FOR WEEKLY EARNINGS
Until now we have used educational attainment rather than earnings
to measure skills to avoid potential biases from selective labor force
participation (i.e., earnings data are available only for those currently
employed). Earnings, however, are perhaps the ultimate indicator of
labor market success because they reﬂect the market’s valuation of
a worker’s entire package of abilities and attributes, including those
for which data are often lacking (e.g., family background or the quality of schooling). We now show that, in general, earnings patterns are
similar to the education patterns discussed previously, particularly with
respect to the apparent cessation of Hispanic progress after the second
generation.
Figures 3.3 (for men) and 3.4 (for women) display weekly earnings
diﬀerences associated with immigrant generation and race/ethnicity.
The reported diﬀerentials are estimated from least squares regressions
in which the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of weekly earnings from wage and salary work.7 Separate regressions were run for
men and women, and the samples include those aged 25–59 employed
in civilian wage and salary jobs. These regressions allow intercepts to
diﬀer across racial/ethnic and immigrant generation groups, but the
coeﬃcients of the control variables are restricted to be the same for
all groups. All regressions include controls for age, geographic location, and survey month/year. The controls for geographic location are
dummy variables identifying the nine census divisions and whether the
respondent lives outside of a metropolitan area. The controls for age are
dummy variables identifying ﬁve-year age intervals. The bottom panel
(Panel B) of each ﬁgure reports diﬀerentials estimated from regressions
that also control for education level (i.e., dummy variables identifying
the following years of schooling intervals: less than 12 years, exactly 12
years, 13–15 years, and 16 or more years). The reported diﬀerentials are
all relative to the reference group consisting of non-Hispanic whites in
the third+ generation.8 Because the outcome is weekly earnings, these
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diﬀerentials measure the cumulative eﬀect of diﬀerences in both hourly
wages and hours worked per week.
For Hispanics overall and for Mexicans in particular, the earnings
deﬁcits in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 display a similar pattern across generations as the education data presented earlier (see Table 3.2): large gains
for the second generation over the ﬁrst, with little or no evidence of
further gains for the third+ generation. Among men, for example, the
Hispanic earnings deﬁcit (relative to third+-generation non-Hispanic
whites) drops from over 50 percent for the ﬁrst generation to 21 percent for the second generation, but there is no additional decline for the
third+ generation.9 The corresponding pattern for Mexican men is quite
similar. Comparing the top and bottom panels of Figure 3.3, the earnings deﬁcits for Hispanic and Mexican men of every generation shrink
by about half after controlling for education. For Hispanic and Mexican women, Figure 3.4 shows that earnings gains between the ﬁrst and
second generations are even larger than for men, and conditioning on
education produces a greater reduction in the female earnings deﬁcits
relative to third+-generation non-Hispanic whites. Indeed, after controlling for education, earnings deﬁcits all but disappear for U.S.-born
Hispanic and Mexican women.
Broadly similar patterns emerge for Puerto Ricans, except that
Puerto Rican men exhibit earnings gains between the second and third+
generations in Figure 3.3, just as they were the one group of Hispanic
men to show educational gains between the second and third+ generations in Table 3.2. These educational gains for Puerto Rican men seem
to drive much of their observed earnings progress, as the decline in
the earnings deﬁcit between the second and third+ generations is substantially larger without controlling for education (the relevant earnings deﬁcit declines from 25 percent to 18 percent) than when such
controls are included (the earnings deﬁcit declines from 12 percent to
11 percent). On the whole, these results suggest that the educational
disadvantage of Hispanics accounts for much of their earnings deﬁcit,
and also that Hispanic schooling gains between the ﬁrst and second
generations play an important role in the earnings progress between
these generations.
Among the U.S.-born groups, third+-generation black men stand
out with earnings deﬁcits that remain large even after conditioning on
education. Compared to non-Hispanic white men in the third+ genera-
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Figure 3.3 Weekly Earnings Diﬀerentials of Men, Aged 25–59, by Race/
Ethnicity and Immigrant Generation (relative to third+
generation, non-Hispanic whites)
Panel A: Not Controlling for Education
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NOTE: The reported ﬁgures represent log weekly earnings diﬀerentials (× 100) between
each race/ethnicity and immigrant generation group and the reference group of third+generation, non-Hispanic whites. These diﬀerentials are estimated from least squares
regressions in which the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of weekly earnings. The samples include men aged 25–59 employed in civilian wage and salary jobs.
All regressions include controls for age, geographic location, and survey month/year.
The diﬀerentials shown in the bottom panel are from regressions that also control for
education level. Sampling weights were used in the regressions.
SOURCE: 2003–2016 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data.
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Figure 3.4 Weekly Earnings Diﬀerentials of Women, Ages 25–59, by
Race/Ethnicity and Immigrant Generation (relative to
third+ generation, non-Hispanic whites)
Panel A: Not Controlling for Education
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NOTE: The reported ﬁgures represent log weekly earnings diﬀerentials (× 100) between
each race/ethnicity and immigrant generation group and the reference group of third+generation, non-Hispanic whites. These diﬀerentials are estimated from least squares
regressions in which the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of weekly earnings. The samples include women aged 25–59 employed in civilian wage and salary
jobs. All regressions include controls for age, geographic location, and survey month/
year. The diﬀerentials shown in the bottom panel are from regressions that also control for education level. Sampling weights were used in the regressions.
SOURCE: 2003–2016 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data.
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tion with similar education, Panel B of Figure 3.3 indicates that third+generation black men earn about 28 percent less. In contrast, the corresponding deﬁcit is only 11 percent for Hispanic men. These ﬁndings
corroborate other research that suggests that, among men, U.S. labor
market opportunities are more similar to those of whites for Hispanics than for blacks (Duncan, Hotz, and Trejo 2006; Grogger and Trejo
2002; Trejo 1997). Panel B of Figure 3.4 shows that, after controlling
for education, earnings of U.S.-born women do not vary much with
race/ethnicity.
Contrary to the sizable gaps observed for blacks and Hispanics,
earnings deﬁcits (relative to third+-generation non-Hispanic whites)
are either small or nonexistent for ﬁrst- and second-generation whites
(not shown in the ﬁgures) and for Asians of all generations. However,
earnings comparisons for Asians become less favorable after controlling for education. As others have noted (see, for example, Sakamoto,
Goyette, and Kim [2009]), the schooling advantage of Asian Americans
can obscure the fact that, at least among men, they tend to earn somewhat less than whites with the same level of education.

STALLED PROGRESS FOR HISPANICS?
The education and earnings patterns presented thus far suggest that
progress stalls after the second generation for Hispanics overall and for
Mexicans in particular. Huntington (2004) points to several factors that
could slow the pace of intergenerational integration by Hispanics today
as compared to Europeans in the past. These factors include the vast
scale of current immigration ﬂows from Mexico and other Spanishspeaking countries, the substantial (though lessening) geographic concentration of these ﬂows within the United States, and the fact that such
ﬂows have remained sizable over a much longer period of time than did
the inﬂux from any particular European country. In addition, the close
proximity of Mexico to the United States facilitates return and repeat
migration. These unique features of Hispanic immigration might foster
the growth of ethnic enclaves in the United States where immigrants and
their descendants could, if they so choose, live and work without being
forced to learn English or to Americanize in other important ways.10
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Another salient factor is that many Hispanics enter the United States
as illegal immigrants. Some evidence suggests that undocumented
status may hinder socioeconomic advancement not just for the illegal
immigrants themselves but also for their U.S.-born children (Bean et al.
2011; Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier 2015).11
Moreover, today’s economy provides fewer opportunities for
unskilled workers to advance than did the economy that greeted earlier European immigrants (Perlmann 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2001).
Around 1900, high school completion was uncommon for native-born
Americans, so while many European immigrants arrived with relatively
meager educations, their skill disadvantage was smaller than that faced
today by Hispanic immigrants who typically lack the additional years
of high school and college that have become the norm for U.S. natives.
Furthermore, recent decades have witnessed a large rise in earnings
inequality among American workers, driven by substantial increases
in the labor market payoﬀs to education and other indicators of skill
(Autor and Katz 1999; Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008; Levy and Murnane 1992). As a result, the human capital deﬁcit possessed by most
Hispanic immigrants has become even more of a liability in our modern
economy that places a higher premium on knowledge and cognitive
ability.
Before accepting Huntington’s theoretical arguments for slower
assimilation by Hispanics, however, it is important to consider several potentially serious limitations of the empirical evidence that has
been presented in support of this phenomenon. First, as noted by Borjas
(1993, 2006) and Smith (2003, 2006), generational comparisons in a
single cross-section of data—like those reported so far—can be misleading because they do a poor job of matching immigrant parents and
grandparents in the ﬁrst generation with their actual descendants in later
generations. If we assume that schooling is complete by the age of 25
and does not change thereafter, we can use our CPS samples to conduct
an analysis of intergenerational changes in Hispanic educational attainment similar in spirit to Smith (2003).
Table 3.3 presents average schooling levels for Mexicans and Puerto
Ricans similar to those displayed previously in Table 3.2, except that
now separate calculations are reported for two particular age groups:
25–34 and 50–59.12 By choosing age groups 25 years apart, we create
a situation in which the older age group from a particular generation
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potentially represents the parental cohort for the younger age group in
the next generation. For example, the cohort of immigrant men aged
50–59 includes fathers of the second-generation cohort of sons aged
25–34.
If we make comparisons within age groups by reading across the
rows of Table 3.3, we see the same patterns that emerged in Table
3.2: For Mexicans, huge educational improvement between the ﬁrst
and second generations but no progress after the second generation,
whereas for Puerto Ricans’ there are more modest gains between the
ﬁrst and second generations but also advances between the second
and later generations. If, however, we instead compare age/generation
groups that potentially match parents with their children (i.e., by moving northeast between the connected cells with similar shading in Table
3.3), we begin to see some educational gains for Mexicans after the
second generation, especially for women. Among Mexican men, for
example, average schooling rises from 12.5 years for the older second
generation to 12.6 years for the younger third+ generation. The analogous educational increase between the second and third+ generations is
larger for Mexican women, from 12.4 to 13.0 years. Moreover, calculating schooling progress between the ﬁrst and second generations in
this same way produces bigger gains than those we saw in Table 3.2:
4.2–4.4 years for Mexicans and 1.0–1.2 years for Puerto Ricans, with
the larger gains for women. Despite these intergenerational advances,
young third+-generation Mexicans continue to trail the average schooling of their non-Hispanic white peers by more than a year, and the corresponding deﬁcits for Puerto Ricans are smaller but still sizable (about
two-thirds of a year).
A second issue concerns measurement bias arising from “ethnic
attrition.” The large, nationally representative data sources typically
employed to study U.S. immigrants and their descendants provide only
very limited information pertaining to immigrant generations. Microdata sources such as the decennial U.S. Census, the American Community Survey, and the CPS report each respondent’s country of birth,
thereby distinguishing foreign-born individuals (i.e., the ﬁrst generation) from the U.S.-born population. Only the CPS, however, currently
collects information about the countries of birth of each respondent’s
parents, which allows the second generation (i.e., U.S.-born individuals who have at least one foreign-born parent) to be diﬀerentiated from
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higher generations of U.S.-born individuals. Furthermore, none of these
surveys provide information about the countries of birth of an adult
respondent’s grandparents, so the third generation cannot be precisely
identiﬁed.
Because of these data limitations, research on the U.S.-born descendants of immigrants often must identify the populations of interest using
subjective measures of racial/ethnic identiﬁcation (Duncan, Hotz, and
Trejo 2006; Saenz 2005; Sakamoto, Wu, and Tzeng 2000; Snipp and
Hirschman 2004; Zeng and Xie 2004). In particular, this approach is
typically the only feasible option for studies that examine long-term
integration by distinguishing immigrant descendants in the third and
higher generations (Blau and Kahn 2007; Borjas 1994; Farley and Alba
2002; Goyette and Xie 1999; Grogger and Trejo 2002; Rong and Grant
1992; Smith 2006; Trejo 1997, 2003; Yang 2004). For example, the
standard deﬁnition of third+-generation Mexicans Americans is U.S.born individuals who have U.S.-born parents and who self-identify as
Mexican in response to the Hispanic origin question.
A potential problem with this approach is that assimilation and intermarriage can cause ethnic attachments to fade across generations (Alba
1990; Alba and Islam 2009; Lee and Bean 2010; Perlmann and Waters
2007; Waters 1990), and therefore subjective measures of racial/ethnic
identiﬁcation might miss a signiﬁcant portion of the later-generation
descendants of immigrants. Moreover, if such ethnic attrition is selective
on socioeconomic attainment, it can distort assessments of integration
and generational progress.
Our own previous work demonstrates the salience of these issues for
the speciﬁc case of Mexican Americans (Duncan and Trejo 2007, 2009,
2011). Analyzing microdata from the CPS for children living with both
parents, in Duncan and Trejo (2011) we compare an objective indicator of Mexican descent (based on the countries of birth of the child,
his parents, and his grandparents) with the standard subjective measure
of Mexican identiﬁcation (based on the response to the Hispanic origin
question). We ﬁnd that about 30 percent of third-generation Mexican
children are not identiﬁed as Mexican by the Hispanic origin question
in the CPS, and this ethnic attrition is highly selective. In particular, the
high school dropout rate of third-generation Mexican youth (ages 16 and
17) is 25 percent higher when the sample is limited to those youth subjectively identiﬁed as Mexican. Therefore, our previous research suggests
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that ethnic attrition is substantial among third-generation Mexicans and
could produce signiﬁcant downward bias in standard measures of attainment that rely on subjective ethnic identiﬁcation rather than objective
indicators of Mexican descent.
Extending our earlier work in Duncan and Trejo (2017), which
focused on Mexicans, we show that ethnic attrition is sizable and selective for the second- and third-generation populations of key Hispanic
and Asian national origin groups. Importantly, these results indicate that
ethnic attrition generates measurement biases that vary across groups in
direction as well as magnitude, and that correcting for these biases is
likely to raise the socioeconomic standing of the U.S.-born descendants
of most Hispanic immigrants relative to their Asian counterparts. The
results to date, however, shed more light on the direction rather than the
ultimate magnitude of these measurement biases, and so at this point
it is unknown whether correcting for selective ethnic attrition would
produce a small or large improvement in the relative attainment of latergeneration Hispanics.
A third but related issue is that the data limitations just described
imply that, for adults, researchers typically cannot distinguish the “true”
third generation from higher generations (e.g., this is why Tables 3.2
and 3.3 and Figures 3.3 and 3.4 refer to the “third+” generation). This
is potentially a problem because Mexicans in generations beyond the
third are disproportionately descended from ancestors who came of age
in places (e.g., Texas rather than California) and times (e.g., before the
Civil Rights era) where Mexicans faced discrimination that was more
severe and often institutionalized (Alba 2006; Foley 1997; Montejano
1987). The more limited opportunities for advancement experienced by
these families may result in lower attainment for Mexicans in the fourth
and higher generations compared with their third-generation counterparts whose families experienced less hostile environments. Alba et al.
(2011) and Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier (2015) provide evidence of
this pattern for schooling levels, highlighting the importance of distinguishing third-generation Mexicans from higher generations.
In recent work with coauthors (Duncan et al. 2017), we exploit previously untapped information from the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) that provides, among other things, the countries of birth of respondents’ grandparents. For a sample of adults aged
28–34, these data allow us to minimize ethnic attrition by identifying
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third-generation Mexicans using ancestors’ countries of birth rather than
subjective ethnic identiﬁcation, and they also allow us to distinguish
third-generation Mexicans from higher generations. We ﬁnd substantial
educational progress between second- and third-generation Mexicans
that is largely hidden when we instead mimic standard data sets and
aggregate the third and higher generations into a “third+” generation.
This analysis provides promising evidence of generational progress
for a recent cohort of Mexican-American adults. Indeed, in this birth
cohort, the high school graduation rate of third-generation Mexicans
is only slightly below that of non-Hispanic whites from the fourth and
higher generations.13 These NLSY79 ﬁndings are consistent with recent
evidence of improving high school completion rates for U.S.-educated
Hispanics from 1990 to 2010, with particularly large gains during the
second half of this period (Murnane 2013).

CONCLUSION
Research on the educational attainment of the descendants of U.S.
immigrants reveals clear success stories as well as reasons for concern.
On the one hand, most national origin groups arrive with relatively
high educational attainment and/or experience enough improvement
between the ﬁrst and second generations such that they quickly meet
or exceed, on average, the schooling level of the typical American. On
the other hand, several large and important Hispanic groups (including Mexicans and Puerto Ricans) are exceptions to this pattern, and
their prospects for future upward mobility are subject to much debate
(Alba et al. 2011; Alba, Jimenez, and Marrow 2014; Alba, Kasinitz, and
Waters 2011; Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier 2015; Haller, Portes, and
Lynch 2011a,b; Park, Myers, and Jimenez 2014; Perlmann 2005, 2011;
Portes 2006; Telles and Ortiz 2008).
Because of the measurement issues and data limitations that we have
discussed, Mexican Americans in particular and Hispanic Americans in
general probably have experienced signiﬁcantly more socioeconomic
progress beyond the second generation than available data indicate.
Even so, because many Hispanic immigrants arrive in the United States
with relatively low levels of human capital, it may take longer for their
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descendants to integrate fully into the American mainstream than it did
for the descendants of the European immigrants who arrived near the
turn of the twentieth century. Closing the remaining educational gap
between Hispanics and other Americans should be a key component of
any eﬀort to hasten such integration.

Notes
1. In the discussion that follows, we will use the terms ﬁrst generation and immigrant as synonymous with foreign-born individuals, in contrast to the oﬃcial terminology used by the U.S. government in which immigrants are legal permanent
residents, and nonimmigrant aliens are other foreigners such as tourists, business travelers, and recent refugee arrivals. The data analyzed here cannot make
such distinctions among foreign-born individuals. In addition, individuals born
in Puerto Rico and other outlying areas of the United States are included within
our ﬁrst-generation group. Persons born in Puerto Rico are U.S. citizens and
enjoy unfettered mobility between the island and the U.S. mainland, and therefore
Puerto Ricans are not, strictly speaking, a U.S. immigrant group. Nonetheless,
island-born Puerto Ricans who move to the United States and their U.S.-born
descendants encounter many of the same adjustment issues as conventional immigrant groups. Accordingly, the socioeconomic mobility of Puerto Ricans is often
analyzed using models and methods developed to study U.S. immigrant groups
(e.g., Feliciano 2001; Hirschman 2001).
2. The speciﬁc countries (e.g., Mexico) and regions (e.g., Europe) of origin identiﬁed
in these tables collectively represent 88 percent of the ﬁrst-generation individuals and 92 percent of the second-generation individuals in our samples. Secondgeneration individuals with parents born in diﬀerent foreign countries have been
assigned the national origins of their fathers. We follow Jaeger’s (1997) recommendations for how to construct a completed years of schooling variable from the
CPS information collected about postsecondary degrees obtained.
3. For third+-generation, non-Hispanic whites, the comparable measures for men are
an average education level of 13.8 years, a high school dropout rate of 5.8 percent,
and a college completion rate of 33.9 percent. The corresponding measures for
women are 14.0 years, 4.5 percent, and 36.3 percent, respectively.
4. Similar patterns have been found by researchers employing a variety of diﬀerent data sets and measures of educational attainment. See, for example, Rumbaut
(2005) and Perreira, Harris, and Lee (2006).
5. Borjas (1994) and Card, DiNardo, and Estes (2000) provide detailed analyses
of the transmission of human capital across immigrant generations for a large
number of national origin groups over several decades. These studies conﬁrm the
strong relationships suggested by Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
6. Using answers to the questions regarding Hispanic origin and race, we assign
each individual to one of ﬁve mutually exclusive and exhaustive racial/ethnic
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8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.
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groups: Hispanic (of any race), and non-Hispanic white, black, and Asian (including Native Hawaiian and Paciﬁc Islander), and a residual “other race” category.
Hispanics are disaggregated further by national origin group (Mexican, Puerto
Rican, Cuban, Central/South American, or Other Hispanic). Starting in 2003, the
CPS permits respondents to designate more than one race, similar to the 2000
and 2010 censuses and the American Community Survey (del Pinal 2004; Grieco
and Cassidy 2001). The Hispanic origin question, however, still requires a single
response. Our “other race” category includes any non-Hispanics who designated
two or more major race groups, as well as those who identiﬁed with an “American
Indian or Alaskan Native” group. Therefore, the non-Hispanic categories white,
black, and Asian represent individuals who designated a single major race group.
In the 2010 Census, only 2.3 percent of non-Hispanics designated more than one
major race group (Humes, Jones, and Ramirez 2011). Consequently, our decision
to include only those who report a single race in the white, black, and Asian race
groups does not have much eﬀect on the estimates.
CPS outgoing rotation group data do not report self-employment income.
To save space, the ﬁgures do not show the corresponding earnings diﬀerentials
for Hispanic national origin groups besides Mexicans and Puerto Ricans (the two
Hispanic groups with sizable third+ generations), for the “other race” group, and
for ﬁrst- and second-generation non-Hispanic whites.
For ease of exposition, we will refer to the estimated log earnings diﬀerentials as if
they represented percentage earnings diﬀerences (after multiplying the log diﬀerentials by 100). Strictly speaking, however, log diﬀerentials closely approximate
percentage diﬀerences only when the log diﬀerentials are on the order of 0.25 or
less in absolute value. For larger diﬀerentials, the implied percentage diﬀerence
can be calculated as (ec – 1) × 100, where c is the log diﬀerential and e is Euler’s
number (i.e., the base of natural logarithms).
Contrary to Huntington’s thesis, however, available evidence suggests rapid linguistic assimilation for the U.S.-born descendants of contemporary immigrant
groups (Alba et al. 2002). This holds even for Hispanics who live in areas with
high concentrations of Spanish-speaking immigrants. In Southern California, for
example, 96 percent of third-generation Mexicans prefer to speak English at home
rather than Spanish, and only 17 percent of third-generation Mexicans retain the
ability to speak ﬂuent Spanish (Rumbaut, Massey, and Bean 2006).
In this context, Puerto Ricans constitute an interesting case study because they are
U.S. citizens and automatically enjoy all of the associated legal rights, including
the ability to migrate to and work in the United States. Therefore, issues pertaining to undocumented immigration cannot explain the incomplete socioeconomic
integration of the U.S.-born descendants of migrants from Puerto Rico.
Table 3.3 focuses on Mexicans and Puerto Ricans because these are the Hispanic
national origin groups with the largest U.S. populations of individuals beyond the
second generation.
Even in this birth cohort, however, rates of attending and completing college for
third-generation Mexicans are still substantially below those of non-Hispanic
whites.
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Immigrants and Poverty
How Do They Cope with It,
How Do They Aﬀect Natives?
Giovanni Peri
University of California, Davis

The most important predictors of poverty status for a household are
the main demographic and schooling characteristics of its members,
particularly the breadwinner within it. Individuals without a high school
diploma, especially if they are young and single parents, are much more
likely to be in poverty relative to more educated, older, and married
heads of household. A large share of the ﬁrst group (about 25 percent as
of 2014) is foreign-born (vis-à-vis around 13 percent of immigrants in
the overall population); this implies that an important fraction of immigrants belongs to a demographic group at high risk of poverty. However, does their immigrant status aﬀect their income, their probability of
working, and their probability of being in poverty relative to similarly
educated natives? And given the high risk of poverty associated with
low schooling levels, are immigrant households participating in social
welfare programs (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families [TANF],
Medicaid, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance [SNAP], Supplemental
Security Income [SSI], and others) at a higher or lower rate than similar
natives? Are they more likely or less likely to work, and what share of
their income is wage income?
In this chapter I ﬁrst describe how immigration is related to poverty
levels in the United States, mainly because some large groups of immigrants—namely, Mexican and Central Americans—are at high risk of
poverty due to their education and demographic characteristics. Overall, immigration to the United States is rather balanced between the
more and less educated, and a signiﬁcant share of immigrants (about 33
percent in 2014) is college-educated and holds high-paying jobs. However, immigrants from Mexico and Central America constitute a large
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part of the group of young individuals without a high school diploma;
hence, they are at high risk of poverty. I show how these immigrant
households at high risk of poverty (i.e., with a less-educated head of
household) diﬀer from native households at similar levels of income
in their economic and social characteristics. In particular, I show how
immigrants’ employment rates and their reliance on wages are much
higher than natives’. There is some evidence that in recent decades
these immigrants have been penalized more severely during periods of
recessions and high unemployment, and their incomes have been more
strongly aﬀected by the slow growth of the median wage in the U.S.
economy. I also show their participation in welfare and social assistance
programs, even those for which they or their children are eligible, is
signiﬁcantly lower than natives’. After measuring these diﬀerences for
the 2000–2014 period, I review the potential explanations for low participation in welfare programs related to eligibility, lack of information,
reliance on wage income, and fear of enforcement.
Given the high participation of immigrants in the labor market, I
analyze whether competition between immigrants and low-skilled
natives may be a source of decline in the labor income of the less educated, indirectly aﬀecting their poverty status. I review recent studies
on this topic and conclude there is not much evidence of negative labor
market eﬀects of immigrants. Namely, the presence of immigrants does
not seem to deteriorate the employment and wage prospects of lessskilled natives. This is likely because their presence attracts investment
and induces adjustment in specialization, technology, and eﬃciency at
the local level. These are all channels that can spur growth and, especially in the long run, beneﬁt natives. Another relevant role of immigrants in local economies has been that of absorbing temporary shocks
as they respond faster—and in larger numbers—to changes in employment opportunities and are more willing to move across labor markets.
The presence of immigrants, even at low skill levels, is associated with
booming economies and contributes to generate thick and diﬀerentiated
labor markets that are attractive to ﬁrms.
The low rate of participation in welfare programs among immigrants (and their children) in general, and of undocumented immigrants
in particular, and the existing evidence that they move in response
to labor demand rather than to utilize welfare programs, implies that
immigrants likely do not crowd out natives from welfare. However, a
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very important aspect in which immigration can generate concerns for
lower-income natives’ access to local public goods, and for their ability
to assimilate, is the potential of crowding public schools. I will review
several strands of research suggesting that, on one hand, large inﬂows
of non-English-speaking low-income families into a school district may
generate a signiﬁcant outﬂow of native families and a deterioration
of the average school quality in the area. On the other hand, existing
research emphasizes that the assimilation and convergence of secondgeneration immigrants crucially depends on the level and quality of
schooling. Hence, investment in schooling, such as expanding capacity
and school programs in areas that receive large inﬂows of low-income
immigrants, can be a crucial component for the economic success of
these areas and of the immigrants’ children in the medium and long run.
To identify the most eﬀective policies, it is crucial to consider these
diﬀerent aspects and the multifaceted connections between immigration and poverty. Recognizing, for instance, that earnings have a crucial role in immigrants’ income emphasizes the important connection
between labor market access and immigrants’ ability to stay out of
poverty. Immigration policies aﬀecting their legal status (regularization, legalization, temporary visa status) and labor policies aﬀecting
their access to some occupations (e.g., licensing) are likely to be very
important as they restrict or broaden the ability of immigrants to work.
Similarly, policies that support the wage income of the low skilled without penalizing their employment opportunities (e.g., minimum wage
provisions) are likely to have important consequences on the immigrant
households’ ability to stay out of poverty.
At the same time, immigrants’ limited reliance on welfare (even
when eligible) generates the challenge of understanding the reasons
behind this and addressing the issue by increasing accessibility and
participation. Certainly, the precarious “undocumented” status of a
large share of low-skilled immigrants and the fear (and uncertainty) of
enforcement seems to be one of the reasons. These immigrants can be
afraid and do not come out of the shadows even to claim the welfare
beneﬁts for which their (usually U.S.-born) children qualify. At the same
time, such low participation implies that some policies related to scaling up these programs will be less eﬀective for immigrants than natives.
To the extent that those policies aﬀect immigrants’ health status, early
childhood development, and ability to go to school, such low participa-
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tion can be a hurdle for future assimilation and economic success of
second-generation immigrants from low-income families. Policies that
improve access to schooling for young undocumented immigrants, and
policies that open the possibility of regularization (such as the DREAM
Act), can have a signiﬁcant antipoverty eﬀect on the second generation.
At the same time, the strain on school districts from an inﬂow of low
English proﬁciency kids and the risk that native children leave or experience a reduction in the quality of their education is real and should be
tackled by investing the increased economic revenue created by immigrants—and by companies that employ them—into expanding school
capacity, enriching programs, and increasing the number of teachers.
This chapter begins by describing the evolution of employment,
welfare participation, and wage income for immigrants at high risk of
poverty during the 2000—2014 period. In the ﬁrst section I point out the
key features and diﬀerences between natives and immigrants and review
the recent trends in their employment, wages, and welfare income relative to similar natives. I also identify, using regression analysis, the differences in employment probability and income between immigrants
and natives after controlling for observables. This section also focuses
on the eﬀects of recession on immigrants and on explaining why immigrants are less likely to enroll in welfare programs relative to natives. I
then discuss the existing literature on the impact of low-skilled immigrants on labor markets and the likely mechanisms connecting immigration to local economic success and their link with the income and
employment opportunities of low-skilled natives. A large part of the
evidence in this area is that immigrants expand local labor markets and
the local economies with no negative eﬀects, especially in the long run,
on natives’ labor market opportunities. After that, I analyze the impact
of immigration on local schooling quality and on natives’ attendance,
and the role of schooling in allowing second-generation immigrants to
integrate and to succeed economically. I then use the important ﬁndings
from the research literature to inform important policy ideas. Which
labor market and schooling policies are more relevant to improving the
economic outcomes of communities with large inﬂow of immigrants
who are at risk of poverty? Which policies can turn the challenges from
these inﬂows into opportunities for growth and employment? The speciﬁc characteristics of immigrant families and communities should help
design the appropriate policies.
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IMMIGRANTS, POVERTY, EMPLOYMENT,
AND WELFARE
The most basic statistics providing an assessment of the nexus
between immigration and poverty is the poverty rate (percent of households below poverty line) for natives, Mexican-Central American
(MCA) immigrants, and other immigrants 18 years and older. Such statistics for years 2000–2014 are shown in Figure 4.1, Panel A. Figure
4.1, Panel B shows the average real yearly wage for each of those three
groups in the same period. Both charts reveal that MCA immigrants are,
on average, poorer than natives and have lower wage income.1 Other
immigrants, in turn, have very similar poverty rates and higher average
wage income relative to the native population.
These aggregate statistics, however, reﬂect more than anything else
the composition of each group in terms of education. Schooling is very
strongly associated with income and, as the schooling levels of MCA
immigrants are signiﬁcantly lower than natives (and, in particular, the
share of high school dropouts among them is much larger), it is the education composition that explains the higher risk of poverty and lower
mean wage of MCA immigrants. Other immigrants have higher average
schooling relative to natives, and this is reﬂected in their higher wage
income.2
Hence, going beyond this composition-driven diﬀerence, the comparison changes drastically if one considers wage income and poverty
rates only for the groups at highest risk of poverty, represented by adults
(18 or older) with no high school diploma. The percentage in poverty
and the average wage income (in 1999 constant $) for that group are
shown in Figure 4.2, Panels A and B, respectively. The poverty rate
of MCA immigrants in this group is comparable to that of natives. In
fact, it is lower than natives in the expansionary years of 2005–2008
and then after 2012. Similarly, poverty rates for other immigrants in
this group are lower than for natives and are more subject to economic
ﬂuctuations. As for average yearly wage income, its value was signiﬁcantly higher in this group for MCA immigrants than for natives (with
other immigrants in between). Low-educated MCA immigrants earned
an average wage income close to $12,000 per year in 2014, while loweducated natives earned close to $6,500. This substantial diﬀerence is
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Figure 4.1 Poverty Rates and Average Wages in the Adult Population
Panel A: Poverty Rate, by Nativity, 2000–2014 (heads of household 18+)
30

Poverty rate (%)

25

20

15

10

05
Natives

Mexican-Central immigrants

Other immigrants

00
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Panel B: Average Wage, by Nativity, 2000–2014 (heads of household aged 18+)
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NOTE: Nativity is deﬁned based on place of birth. Poverty rate is deﬁned as the percentage of heads of households with family income below the federal poverty threshold. Wages are calculated for employed persons and are deﬁned as wages and beneﬁts
earned in the previous 12 months.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the ASEC sample of the CPS using
heads of household aged 18 years and older.
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Figure 4.2 Poverty Rates and Average Wage in the Adult Population
with No High School Diploma
Panel A: Poverty Rate by Nativity, 2000–2014 (heads of household 18+)
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the ASEC sample of the CPS using
heads of household aged 18 years and older with less than a high school diploma.
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determined by the much larger employment rate of MCA immigrants
in this group. Figure 4.3 shows the stunning diﬀerence in the employment/population ratio—for heads of households—in the group with
no high school diploma between MCA immigrants, other immigrants,
and natives. While this ratio was around 0.7 for MCA immigrants, with
some increase in the 2004—2008 period and decline during the great
recession, the ratio for natives was 0.38 in 2000 and only about 0.33 in
2014.
This extremely high employment rate of MCA immigrants among
the low skilled was already noted by Duncan and Trejo (2012) and,
as I will show below, persists after the inclusion of several individual
controls and cannot be explained by location of immigrants or by their
individual characteristics. Low-skilled MCA immigrants work at much
higher rates than natives, and although they get paid somewhat less than
Figure 4.3 Employment/Population Ratio, by Nativity, 2000–2014
(heads of household aged 18+, no high school diploma)
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NOTE: Nativity is deﬁned based on place of birth. Employed persons are persons at
work or not at work, but with a job, in the last week. Population is the population of
heads of household aged 18 years and older.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the ASEC sample of the CPS using
heads of household aged 18 years and older with less than a high school diploma.
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natives per hour worked, their wage incomes are signiﬁcantly higher
because they work more hours per day and more weeks per year.
How is it, then, that in spite of this much better performance on the
labor market, MCA immigrants with no diploma have roughly the same
probability of being in poverty as natives with no high school diploma?
The answer is their signiﬁcantly lower participation in welfare programs
and the signiﬁcantly smaller income they draw from welfare sources.
Figure 4.4 shows the share of total income from wages for households
whose head has no high school diploma (and is 18 years or older). For
MCA immigrants, this percentage was between 80 and 90 percent of
their household income in 2000–2014. For natives, however, it was
only 60–70 percent, and for other immigrants it represented about 70
percent of their household income. The remaining part of income, once
Figure 4.4 Share of Income from Wages, by Nativity, 2000–2014
(heads of household aged 18+, no high school diploma)
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beneﬁts earned in the previous 12 months. Total income includes income from wages
and beneﬁts, business and farm earnings, welfare (public assistance), disability, SSI,
worker’s compensation, unemployment insurance, veteran’s beneﬁts, child support,
and alimony.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the ASEC sample of the CPS using
employed heads of household aged 18 years and older with less than a high school
diploma.
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wages are accounted for, is essentially the sum of payments from welfare programs; namely, SNAP, SSI, TANF, Unemployment Insurance,
Disability Insurance, Veteran Compensation, and a few others. Hence,
implicitly, Figure 4.4 shows that native households with a low-skilled
head rely on public assistance for more than 30 percent of their yearly
income. To the contrary, MCA immigrant households with a similarly
educated head receive only 10–15 percent of their income from welfare
programs.
It is instructive to see whether MCA-immigrant-headed households
with low levels of education diﬀer from “similar” native households in
other characteristics. The reason for their lower reliance on some social
security programs (several of which may be targeting children) could
be driven by the smaller household size. Figure 4.5, Panel A, shows the
share of families headed by a single parent among the less educated.
One sees a similar percentage between natives and MCA immigrants,
with the percentage of single parents increasing in MCA families in
the post-2007 period. The return of one parent to Mexico or the much
smaller inﬂow of two-parent families after the recession 2007–2009
may be the reason for this trend. In any case, the diﬀerence between
MCA and native households in this respect is rather small and unlikely
to explain the diﬀerential in welfare income dependence. At the same
time, MCA families tend to be larger relative to native families. Panel B
of Figure 4.5 shows that low-skilled MCA households include 1.5 children on average versus only 0.5 for the native households. This larger
family size may also be a reason for the similar poverty rates, in spite
of the much larger wage and employment rates of MCA. It certainly
makes the low participation in some welfare programs even more puzzling. The higher fertility rates of immigrant families in general, and
Mexicans in particular, is a well-known phenomenon that is changing
the demographic features of the United States. Children in low-skilled
families grow up in highly welfare-dependent households if they are
U.S. natives, and programs such as SNAP and Medicaid may be crucial
to providing access to food and health care. To the contrary, if they are
Mexican immigrants, they grow up in poor working families, and ﬂuctuations of the U.S. business cycle will aﬀect their ability to access food
and health care much more signiﬁcantly.
Figure 4.6 shows the reliance on income from several welfare programs, constituting the bulk of the assistance to poor families in the
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Figure 4.5 Family Structure of Households Whose Head Has No High
School Diploma

18

Panel A: Share of Single-Parent Households, by
Nativity, 2000–2014 (heads of household 18+)
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Panel B: Average Number of Children in Household, by
Nativity, 2000–2014 (heads of household 18+)
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NOTE: Nativity is deﬁned based on place of birth. A “single-parent household” is
deﬁned as a household with children and only one parent living in the household. The
average number of children per household by nativity is calculated as the total number
of persons under 18 living in households divided by the total number of persons living
in households for each nativity group.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the ASEC sample of the CPS using
households headed by a person with less than a high school diploma.
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Figure 4.6 Share of Total Household Income from Public
Assistance Programs
Panel A: Share of Total Income from Disability, by Nativity, 2000–2014
(heads of household aged 18+, no high school diploma)
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Panel C: Share of Total Income from Unemployment Insurance,
Workers’ Compensation, and Veterans’ Beneﬁts, by Nativity, 2000–2014
(heads of household aged 18+, no high school diploma)
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Panel D: Share of Total Income from Supplemental Security Income, by Nativity,
2000–2014 (heads of household aged 18+, no high school diploma)
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NOTE: Nativity is deﬁned based on place of birth. Total income includes income from wages
and beneﬁts, business and farm earnings, welfare (public assistance), disability, SSI, worker’s
compensation, unemployment insurance, veterans’ beneﬁts, child support, and alimony. Total
household income is the sum of total income for each individual aged 18 years and older plus the
value of food stamps received by the household.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the ASEC sample of the CPS using employed
heads of household aged 18 years and older with less than a high school diploma.
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United States. It indicates the income (or income equivalent) obtained
from that speciﬁc program by the household as a percentage of their
total income. Natives rely on each of the considered programs, as share
of income, more than MCA immigrants. Even for programs whose cash
equivalent increases with the number of children (such as SNAP), in
spite of the larger number of children per family, immigrant households
receive less as a share of their income relative to natives.
Diﬀerences in Employment Rate and Reliance on Welfare:
Regression Analysis
The summary statistics shown above describe diﬀerent economic
characteristics/behavior of low-skilled MCA immigrants relative to
natives. MCA immigrants are more likely to work and to receive wage
income, which in turn constitutes a much larger share of their total
income. On the other hand, they are less likely to receive welfare income
from SSI, Disability Insurance, SNAP, UI, and other welfare sources. In
this section I conﬁrm that a large portion of this diﬀerence is due neither
to observable characteristics of immigrants’ households, such as their
age, family structure, or number of children, nor to the state where they
live and its economic conditions. In fact, a large and signiﬁcant fraction
of higher employment rates of low-skilled immigrants and their higher
reliance on wages and lower reliance on welfare income survives the
inclusion of individual and state-speciﬁc controls in a regression analysis. To show this, I estimate the following regression:
(4.1)

ݕ௦௧ ൌ ߙ ܶ௧ ߙଵ ܺ௦௧  ߙଶ ܦ௦௧  Ⱦெ ሺሻ௦௧ Ⱦை ሺ ሻ௦௧  ߝ௦௧ 

The variable captures alternative outcomes for individual i in state s
at time t. It will alternatively be a dummy for being employed in the reference week, or the number of weeks worked in a year, or the probability of being in poverty or the logarithm of wage or the share of income
from wages and from other welfare sources. The term Tt is a year ﬁxed
eﬀect and is included in all regressions. The term Xit is a set of individual controls including age dummies, a dummy for being married, and
dummies for the number of children in the household (omitting 0 children). The term Dst represents a set of state-by-year eﬀects that absorb
the local economic conditions relative to a state in a speciﬁc year. They
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account for the diﬀerential location of immigrants and natives and for
their relative economic conditions in those states. Finally, (MCA)ist is a
variable equal to one if individual i is a MCA-born immigrant and zero
otherwise and (OTH)ist is a variable equal to one if the individual is a
foreign born not from Mexico or Central America. The variable εist is
an idiosyncratic zero-mean error. The period considered for this regression is 2000–2014. In speciﬁcations that analyze the diﬀerent sources
of household income, I include only the heads of households. Alternatively, in speciﬁcations analyzing the labor market outcomes of individuals, I include the whole adult population with no high school diploma.
The estimates on the coeﬃcients βM and βO capture the diﬀerence
in outcome between natives (the omitted category) and each type of
immigrant once I control for the covariates. By progressively including
more controls relative to the individual and to the state-year economy,
I can isolate diﬀerences that are associated genuinely with the nativity
characteristics of people (such as diﬀerent language spoken and immigration status) rather than with other observable characteristics.
Table 4.1 shows the estimates of the coeﬃcients βM and βO when
considering the employment rate—a dummy for being employed in
the reference week (Panel A) or the number of weeks worked (Panel
B) as dependent variables. Table 4.2 shows those estimates when the
dependent variable is the probability of being in poverty (Panel A) and,
conditional on working, the log of yearly wages (Panel B). The ﬁrst
column of each table reports the estimates from a speciﬁcation on heads
of household including only the time dummies as controls. Column (2)
includes the individual controls, Column (3) adds state-by-year ﬁxed
eﬀects, and Columns (4)–(6) show coeﬃcients on the same speciﬁcations but include all individuals with no diploma rather than only head
of households.
The ﬁndings are clear and consistent. When estimating the employment rate for household heads, Column (1) ﬁnds a higher probability of
working for low-skilled MCA immigrants relative to low-skilled U.S.
natives by 33 percentage points. More than half of this diﬀerence can
be attributed to diﬀerent characteristics and location, but a full 14 percentage point diﬀerence remains after controlling for individual variables and state-year dummies (Column [3]), and it is highly statistically
signiﬁcant. Similarly, after controlling for individual and state-year
eﬀects, MCA immigrants worked 6.8 extra weeks in each year relative
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Table 4.1 Unskilled Immigrant-Native Diﬀerential in Employment and Weeks Worked

Speciﬁcations

Sample: Head of households, no diploma
(1)
(2)
(3)
Only year
Individual
State-year FE +
eﬀects
controls
Individual

MCA immigrants

0.330***

Panel A: Independent variable: Dummy “employed”
0.132***
0.137***
0.281***
0.137***

0.147***

(0.00342)
0.105***
(0.00522)
No
No
150,818

(0.00358)
0.0722***
(0.00440)
Yes
No
150,818

(0.00246)
0.0553***
(0.00304)
Yes
No
318,867

(0.00273)
0.0621***
(0.00323)
Yes
Yes
318,867

16.87***
(0.166)
4.984***
(0.260)
No
No
150,818

Panel B: Independent variable: weeks workedlast year
6.679***
14.32***
6.867***
6.561***
(0.119)
(0.113)
(0.191)
(0.171)
2.409***
3.196***
3.634***
3.246***
(0.149)
(0.171)
(0.233)
(0.218)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
150,818
150,818
318,867
318,867

7.195***
(0.132)
2.639***
(0.158)
Yes
Yes
318,867

Other immigrants
Individual controls
State-by-year ﬁxed eﬀect
Observations
MCA immigrants
Other immigrants
Individual controls
State-by-year ﬁxed eﬀect
Observations

(0.00398)
0.0813***
(0.00469)
Yes
Yes
150,818

Sample: Adults, no diploma
(4)
(5)
(6)
Only year
Individual
State-year FE
eﬀects
controls
and Individual

(0.00234)
0.0633***
(0.00346)
No
No
318,867

10/22/2018 1:43:53 PM

NOTE: *** signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level. Individuals age 18 and older, no high school diploma. The reported coeﬃcients and standard errors (in
parentheses) are obtained from OLS regressions as Equation (4.1) in the text. Each column/panel reports coeﬃcients from a diﬀerent regression. Columns
1–3 include only head of households with no high school diploma in the sample. Columns 4–6 include all adults with no diploma. The dependent variable
is listed at the top of the panel, the explanatory variable is in the ﬁrst column. The observations are pooled individuals resident in the United States, from
the March CPS over the years 2000–2014. Each regression includes year ﬁxed eﬀects.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using CPS data.
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to natives, and conditional on working, they earn a 5 percent higher
yearly wage because of their longer working period per year rather than
higher hourly wage. Panel A of Table 4.2 shows that, after controlling
for location and individual characteristics, the low-skilled MCA immigrants were about as likely to be in poverty as U.S.-born individuals.
Other immigrants (dummy OTH) show diﬀerences relative to natives
in the same direction, but smaller than MCA ones for most of these
variables. They are 8 percent more likely to be employed than natives,
work 3.6 more weeks per year, and their wages, conditional on working, are 10 percent higher than natives. The results obtained including
all adult individuals (not just household heads) are comparable in that
they show similar diﬀerences in employment rates and weeks worked
between MCA immigrants and natives and somewhat larger diﬀerences
(in favor of MCA immigrants) in wages.
Despite the better labor market performance relative to natives,
low-skilled MCA immigrants are not much less likely to be in poverty than low-skilled natives (see Table 4.2, Panel A). The reason for
this is shown in Table 4.3, which shows the regression estimates for
the immigrant-native diﬀerential (i.e., βM and βO) when the dependent
variables are the share of household income from wages (Panel A), the
share from SSI (Panel B), the share from SNAP (Panel C), and the share
from UI, Workers’ Compensation, and veterans’ beneﬁts (Panel D). As
usual, the three columns include progressively more controls, starting
with time dummies only, then adding individual, and then state-year
controls. I only include household heads in this regression because the
unit of analysis is a household. Focusing on the columns that include
all controls, namely (3) and (6), one can see that for low-skilled MCA
immigrant households, wages account for 13 percent more of their total
income than for the similar low-skilled native household. This diﬀerence is almost completely accounted for by the higher welfare program participation of natives. Natives have 4 percent higher incomes
from SSI, 4.3 percent higher income contribution of SNAP, and 1.6
percent higher income contribution from UI and Workers’ Compensation. If immigrants, all else equal, used welfare at a rate similar to that
of natives, their total incomes would be signiﬁcantly higher and their
poverty rate lower.
The regressions that I estimated cannot rule out the diﬀerences
between immigrants and natives in labor market behavior and reliance
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Speciﬁcations
MCA immigrants
Other immigrants
Individual controls
State-by-year ﬁxed eﬀect
Observations
MCA immigrants
Other immigrants
Individual controls
State-by-year ﬁxed eﬀect
Observations

Sample: Head of households, no diploma
Sample: Adults, no diploma
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Only year
Individual
State-year FE
Only year
Individual
State-year FE
eﬀects
controls
and individual
eﬀects
controls
and individual
Panel A: Independent variable: Dummy “poverty”
0.0106***
−0.0151***
−0.0043
0.0268***
−0.00119
0.0142***
(0.00259)
(0.00232)
(0.00218)
(0.00395)
(0.00348)
(0.00335)
0.00698**
−0.00558*
−0.0149***
0.0222***
0.00740
−0.00864*
(0.00320)
(0.00302)
(0.00305)
(0.00505)
(0.00474)
(0.00487)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
150,818
150,818
150,818
318,867
318,867
318,867
ages)
riable:
ln(yearly
w
PanelB: Independent va
0.144***
0.150***
0.341***
0.0501***
0.0809***
0.215***
(0.00779)
(0.00676)
(0.00676)
(0.00986)
(0.00840)
(0.00818)
0.0414***
0.0776***
0.301***
0.0990***
0.157***
0.215***
(0.0118)
(0.0108)
(0.0112)
(0.0151)
(0.0137)
(0.0140)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
94,793
94,793
94,793
146,712
146,712
146,712

10/22/2018 1:43:53 PM

NOTE: *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 99% conﬁdence level. Individuals age 18 and older, no high school diploma. The reported coeﬃcients and standard
errors (in parentheses) are obtained from OLS regressions as Equation (4.1) in the text. Each column/panel reports coeﬃcients from a diﬀerent regression.
Columns 1–3 include only head of households with no high school diploma in the sample. Columns 4–6 include all adults with no diploma. The dependent
variable is listed at the top of the panel, the explanatory variable is in the ﬁrst column. The observations are pooled individuals residing in the United
States, from the March CPS, over the years 2000–2014. Each regression includes year ﬁxed eﬀects.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using CPS data.
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Table 4.2 Unskilled Immigrant-Native Diﬀerential in Poverty Rates and Wages
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Table 4.3 Unskilled Immigrant-Native Diﬀerential in Wage and Welfare Dependence
Speciﬁcations

MCA immigrants
Other immigrants
Individual controls
State-by-year ﬁxed eﬀect
Observations

MCA immigrants
Other immigrants
Individual controls
State-by-year ﬁxed eﬀect
Observations

(1)
(2)
(3)
Only year
Individual
State-year FE
eﬀects
controls
and individual
Panel A: Dependent variable is
wages as % of household income
21.26***
13.36***
13.44***
(0.279)
(0.288)
(0.338)
6.340***
4.876***
5.289***
(0.539)
(0.517)
(0.560)
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
120,334
120,334
120,334
Panel C: Dependent variable is
SNAP as % of total household Income
−7.509***
−6.169***
−4.377***
(0.175)
(0.191)
(0.197)
−2.855***
−2.121***
−1.774***
(0.302)
(0.299)
(0.314)
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
120,334
120,334
120,334

(4)
(5)
(6)
Only year
Individual
State-year FE
eﬀects
controls
and individual
Panel B: Dependent variable is
SSI as % of total household income
−8.923***
−3.246***
−4.327***
(0.152)
(0.151)
(0.192)
−0.323
0.559*
0.0799
(0.340)
(0.322)
(0.351)
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
120,334
120,334
120,334
Panel D: Dependent variable is UI, WC,
and Vet as % of total household income
−3.088***
−1.529***
−1.656***
(0.0985)
(0.0878)
(0.114)
−2.355***
−2.372***
−2.593***
(0.161)
(0.164)
(0.186)
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
120,334
120,334
120,334
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NOTE: *** signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level. Households whose head is 18 and older, has no high school diploma. The reported coeﬃcients and
standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained from OLS regressions as Equation (4.1) in the text. Each column/panel reports coeﬃcients from a diﬀerent
regression. The dependent variable is listed at the top of the panel, the explanatory variable is in the ﬁrst column. The observations are pooled individuals
resident in the United States, from the March CPS, over the years 2000–2014. Each regression includes year ﬁxed eﬀects.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using CPS data.
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on welfare are due to unobservable characteristics of immigrants possibly related to their skills and attitudes. Nevertheless, I will discuss
research ﬁndings that suggest that immigration status—undocumented,
especially—and their limited familiarity with these programs may play
an important role in reducing their participation.
The Impact of Recessions/Expansions on Wage and Employment
of Immigrants
The larger probability of working for low-skilled MCA immigrants
and their stronger reliance on wage income, as well as their lower participation in welfare programs, should imply that economic recessions are
more painful for that group. Relative to similarly educated natives, the
income and economic well-being of MCAimmigrants is more dependent
on the state of the economy, and these changes aﬀect their economic status
more than that of natives. The high sensitivity of low-skilled immigrants
to the business cycle could also be strengthened by the fact that many
immigrants’ jobs are in sectors such as manufacturing and construction,
which have a strong cyclicality of employment. The recent recession
(2007–2009) has been an example of an economic downturn with very
large loss of jobs in those two sectors, and this made it particularly painful for MCA immigrants.
Orrenius and Zavodny (2010) focus on this issue and show clearly
that the employment and wages of Mexican immigrants were much
more sensitive to state-speciﬁc economic growth in the 1994–2009
period when compared with the wages of natives. While they consider all workers, they also show that among those with no high school
diploma, Mexicans’ employment probability responds to average GDP
growth in a state with elasticity seven times larger than non-Hispanic
white workers with no diploma. Namely, a drop in GDP growth by one
percentage point in a U.S. state reduced the employment probability
of low-skilled natives in that state by 0.14 percentage points, and such
a drop was not statistically signiﬁcant. To the contrary, it decreased
the employment rate of low-skilled immigrants by about 1 percentage
point, and the drop was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 in a statistical
sense.
In our regression analysis, in order to capture potential diﬀerential
eﬀects of recessions on employment and income of MCA (and other)
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and unskilled natives, I include in regression (1) two interaction terms.
I interact the dummies MCA and OTH with a dummy variable taking a
value of one during recession years within our considered period. Considering only the oﬃcially sanctioned national recessions (in the NBER
classiﬁcation), this dummy takes a value of one in 2001 and in the triennium 2007–2009. The presence of a time eﬀect in each regression
makes the inclusion of the main eﬀect for a “recession dummy” redundant. Table 4.4 shows the estimated coeﬃcients on the MCA and OTH
dummies and the interaction with the recession dummy, with “probability of employment” as the dependent variable, and Table 4.5 shows
the coeﬃcients of the dummies and interactions in regressions with
wages as a share of household income as dependent variable (Panel
A) and SNAP as a share of household income (Panel B). The interaction dummies may be a rough way of capturing the recession eﬀect as
they simply identify regression year at the national level and do not
exploit the state-speciﬁc severity of the recession (as done in Orrenius
and Zavodny [2010]).
The results from Table 4.4 show a negative but small additional
recession eﬀect for low-skilled MCA immigrants on the order of 1 percent, signiﬁcant at a 95 percent conﬁdence level only in one speciﬁcation. This implies that recessions erode about 1 percentage point of the
13 percentage point diﬀerence in employment rate between low-skilled
MCA immigrants and natives. This is not a large eﬀect but it still suggests a somewhat stronger exposure of immigrants to recessions. Table
4.5, on the other hand, does not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerential eﬀect of
recessions on reliance on wage income or reliance on SNAP of MCA
immigrants. While both groups increased signiﬁcantly the use of welfare, especially SNAP in recessions (as shown in Figure 4.6), the diﬀerence between the two groups does not seem to change with it.
Overall, the results in the literature and (in part) those from our
simple regression analysis suggest that MCA immigrants are somewhat
more exposed to the employment eﬀects over the business cycle, and
given their larger dependence on wage income, they may suﬀer more
signiﬁcant income losses in recessions.
However, there are two other margins (besides changes in employment or wages) along which MCA immigrants seem to respond to economic cycles more than natives. These adjustments should help somewhat reduce the ﬂuctuations of their wages and employment rates. The
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Speciﬁcations
MCA immigrants
Other immigrants
(MCA immigrants) × (Recession years)
(Other Immigrants) × (Recession years)
Individual controls
State-by-year ﬁxed eﬀect
Observations

Sample: Head of households, no diploma
Sample: Adults, no diploma
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Only year
Individual State-year FE
Only year
Individual State-year FE
eﬀects
controls
and individual
eﬀects
controls
and individual
Dependent variable: Dummy “employed”
0.328***
0.129***
0.139***
0.279***
0.134***
0.149***
(0.00402)
(0.00407)
(0.00459)
(0.00275)
(0.00281)
(0.00314)
0.107***
0.0709***
0.0814***
0.0633***
0.0534***
0.0634***
(0.00615)
(0.00522)
(0.00557)
(0.00407)
(0.00357)
(0.00380)
−0.00723
−0.0107
−0.00894
−0.00617
−0.0102**
−0.00906
(0.00758)
(0.00702)
(0.00802)
(0.00520)
(0.00491)
(0.00557)
−0.0134
−0.00469
−0.000279
−0.0079
−0.00426
−0.00481
(0.0116)
(0.00959)
(0.0102)
(0.00775)
(0.00669)
(0.00710)
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
150,818
150,818
150,818
318,867
318,867
318,867

NOTE: **signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level; ***signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level. Individuals age 18 and older, no high school
diploma. The reported coeﬃcients and standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained from OLS regressions as (1) in the text, including
the interactions of the immigrant origin dummies with a dummy for recession years (namely 2001, and 2007–2009). Each column reports
coeﬃcients from a diﬀerent regression. Columns 1–3 include only head of households with no high school diploma in the sample. Columns 4–6 include all adults with no diploma. The dependent variable is the dummy “employed,” the explanatory variable is in the ﬁrst
column. The observations are pooled individuals resident in the United States, from the March CPS, over the years 2000–2014. Each
regression includes year ﬁxed eﬀects.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using CPS data.
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Table 4.4 Unskilled Immigrant-Native Diﬀerential in Employment, Recession-Year Eﬀect
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Table 4.5 Unskilled Immigrant-Native Diﬀerential in Welfare Dependence, Recession-Year Eﬀect
Speciﬁcations:

MCA immigrants
Other immigrants
MCA immigrants × Recession years
Other immigrants × Recession years
Individual controls:
State-by-year ﬁxed eﬀect
Observations

(1)
(2)
(3)
Only year
Individual State-year FE +
eﬀects
controls
Individual
Panel A: Dependent variable is
wages as % of household income
20.27***
12.28***
13.26***
(0.328)
(0.333)
(0.393)
5.992***
4.484***
5.399***
(0.649)
(0.624)
(0.674)
0.237
−0.119
0.664
(0.624)
(0.607)
(0.740)
−0.506
−0.442
−0.423
(1.162)
(1.099)
(1.187)
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
120,334
120,334
120,334

(4)
(5)
(6)
Only year
Individual
State-year FE
eﬀects
controls
and Individual
Panel B: Dependent variable is
SNAP as % of total household income
−6.604***
−5.057***
−4.303***
(0.210)
(0.221)
(0.235)
−2.573***
−1.802***
−2.051***
(0.362)
(0.360)
(0.377)
−0.393
−0.204
−0.284
(0.337)
(0.329)
(0.373)
0.538
0.653
1.064
(0.661)
(0.646)
(0.669)
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
120,334
120,334
120,334

NOTE: *** signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level. Households whose head is 18 and older, has no high school diploma. The reported
coeﬃcients and standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained from OLS regressions as Equation (4.1) in the text, inclusive of an interaction between the immigrant dummy and a dummy for recession years (2001 and 2007–2009). Each column/panel reports coeﬃcients
from a diﬀerent regression. The dependent variable is listed at the top of the panel, the explanatory variable is listed the ﬁrst column.
The observations are pooled individuals resident in the United States, from the March CPS, over the years 2000–2014. Each regression
includes year ﬁxed eﬀects.
SOURCE: Author’s calculaitons using CPS data.
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ﬁrst is that, especially during the Great Recession of 2007–2009, lowskilled immigrants were signiﬁcantly more mobile, looking for jobs
across U.S. labor markets relative to low-skilled natives. Cadena and
Kovak (2016) show that, among low-skilled workers, the net migrationresponse to local economic shocks was much larger for immigrants
than for natives. They also show that such net ﬂow of migrants across
local labor markets reduced somewhat the local wage ﬂuctuation for
natives so that labor markets with a larger share of low-skilled immigrants experienced smaller ﬂuctuations in the employment and wages
of natives.
The second channel of adjustment to the business cycle is represented by the fact that during periods of recession, net immigration
from Mexico declines signiﬁcantly and return-migration to Mexico
increases. Hence, during economic booms the supply of low-skilled
Mexicans increases while during recessions it decreases. Simpson
and Sparber (2013) document this mechanism as it worked during the
2000–2009 period, showing the eﬀects of state business cycles on the
location of new immigrants and their net ﬂow. These two mechanisms
should somewhat reduce the wage vulnerability of MCA immigrants
in the United States and may be responsible for the small eﬀects I ﬁnd
in Table 4.4. Overall, it appears the employment sensitivity of MCA
immigrants to U.S. business cycles is somewhat larger than for natives.
This implies, for this group, that the income consequences of recessions
are proportionally larger than for natives.
Why Do Immigrants Have Low Participation Rates to
Welfare Programs?
The lower participation and reliance on welfare programs of lowskilled MCA immigrants relative to natives depend, at least in part,
on their ineligibility for some of these programs. First, undocumented
immigrant families and families on temporary visas (such as seasonal
workers or agricultural workers on H1A and H2A visas) do not qualify
for any welfare support, including SNAP, SSI, UI, and Disability Insurance. Their children, however, if they are U.S. born, do usually qualify
for SNAP and Medicaid. The group of undocumented can be as large
as half of the group of MCA immigrants with no diploma and, hence,
the behavior of undocumented MCA immigrants strongly aﬀects the
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average for this group.3 Second, even Legal Permanent Residents’ eligibility for some of these programs has been restricted drastically after
the welfare reforms of 1996 (the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act). This reform created a very sharp distinction between
citizens and noncitizens in their access to welfare, and overall it made
welfare much more connected to searching for a job. Further, it capped
the maximum dollar amount that could be received by a family over
their lifetime. More importantly as it relates to immigrants, the 1996
reforms reduced the role of the federal government in covering several welfare programs for noncitizens, and it pushed states to decide
whether to reinstate the programs at their expense. Some less generous
states have kept the eligibility of noncitizens quite limited, and this has
signiﬁcantly reduced foreign-born participation (see Bitler and Hoynes
2011).
The reason for restricting noncitizen access, motivating part of the
1996 reform, was a fear that welfare transfers would be a magnet for
immigrants and entice them to locate in states that were particularly
generous. Some studies (e.g., Borjas 1999) claimed that the location of
low-skilled immigrants was signiﬁcantly aﬀected by state welfare generosity and that this constituted a burden for the state and federal government. However, the evidence on this was always mixed, and several
studies showed that the generosity of welfare among U.S. states did not
play much of a role in the location of immigrants (e.g., Kaushal 2005;
Zavodny 1999)
While the 1996 reform limited eligibility of noncitizens—and some
states have maintained those restrictions—a second important factor
potentially reducing participation was the immigrants’ perception. The
reforms created a general understanding that noncitizen’s eligibility
to means-tested programs was signiﬁcantly restricted and may have
created a so-called chilling eﬀect that has discouraged even eligible
households from applying and claiming some of these beneﬁts. More
recently, a combination of the chilling eﬀect from welfare policies
together with toughening of the enforcement for undocumented immigrants may have discouraged some immigrants—both documented and
undocumented—from participating in programs for which they or their
children are eligible. An interesting study by Watson (2014) shows that
the participation in Medicaid among eligible children of immigrants
was negatively aﬀected by the intensity of enforcement against undocu-
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mented immigrants (measured as number of individuals identiﬁed for
deportation) in the state-year. Undocumented parents whose children
are eligible for Medicaid may be less likely to participate and expose
themselves by travelling to doctors, ﬁlling out forms, and interacting
with public agents who can help them if they perceive a strong enforcement eﬀort against undocumented. Not just welfare policy but immigration policies and enforcement may contribute to this chilling eﬀect
in the participation of immigrants in some welfare programs.
Another important factor in determining the participation of immigrants in these means-tested programs when eligible is immigrants’
ability to navigate the details of applications and requirements. Their
limited knowledge of the English language and U.S. policies may discourage families from applying; further, their awareness of the existence of these programs may also be limited. Furtado and Theodoropulos (2013) show that participation in programs such as SSI is greater
when immigrants can rely on a local network of coethnic people who
have already applied for those and who are likely to help them navigate
the system and bridge language and cultural barriers. Immigrants are
more likely to apply and receive these beneﬁts if they are in an area with
a high percentage of long-term resident conationals. This may reﬂect
assimilation of norms, but also the existence of language and information costs in the application process that can be reduced by previous
immigrants and the network of information and informal services they
provide.
Importantly, the low participation in welfare programs by MCA
immigrants could also be due to the motivation of these people to
migrate to the United States and the selection of type of workers who
migrate. Most low-skilled immigrants moved to the United States to
have a job and to raise the living standards of their family through their
(hard) work, attracted by wage and employment opportunities. Many
of them also migrate with the idea that they may return to their home
country once they have achieved a certain degree of economic success
(or a target of income, as is often described in this literature; see, for
example, Dustmann and Weiss [2007]). This may create a stigma of
reliance on welfare transfers and a sense of not accomplishing one’s
immigration goals, so MCA immigrants are willing to look harder for
a job and accept lower-wage jobs relative to individuals raised in the
United States.
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It is also important to notice that this tendency of working more
and not relying on welfare income, which is typical of U.S. low-skilled
immigrants, is not a feature of, for example, low-skilled European
immigrants. In countries where welfare states are generous, such as
Sweden, Norway, and Finland, evidence (e.g., Bratsberg, Raaum, and
Red 2010; Hansen and Lofstrom 2009; Koninig 2011) shows that they
rely more on welfare and have lower participation rates in the labor
force relative to similar natives. The generosity of welfare programs in
some European countries is substantial, and the access for refugees is
complete so that those countries can become magnets for low-skilled
immigrants. Thus, the motivation and selection of immigrants and the
incentive structure in place in the receiving country seems important
in determining the dependence on either working or welfare for lowskilled immigrants. In this respect, the United States selects working
immigrants, and the job availability and limited generosity of welfare
programs keeps them working, even if they are not documented.
A ﬁnal consideration on low-skilled immigrants is also important.
Within the group of low-skilled people, which is the one at highest risk
of incarceration (and possibly drug use and alcohol abuse), the MCA
immigrants are signiﬁcantly less prone to incarceration and health
problems, some of which are related to risky behavior such as smoking (Hispanic immigrants are 18 percent less likely to smoke than nonHispanics) and drinking. Butcher and Piehl (2007) show that lowskilled immigrants—particularly newly arrived immigrants—have a
much lower rate of incarceration relative to similar natives. Fear of
deportation, higher probability of working, and possibly a selection of
individuals without a history of alcohol and substance abuse among the
immigrants could be the reason for the lower incidence of crime and
health issues. Remarkably, despite their more limited access to health
care due to their immigration status, ﬁrst-generation Hispanic immigrants enjoy signiﬁcantly better health than non-Hispanic whites in the
United States. Relative to similarly aged whites, they are 39 percent
less likely to have heart disease and 49 percent less likely to have cancer.4 Although several studies try to identify the causes of better health
among MCA immigrants—the explanations range from diet to working
to incidence of risky behavior—the picture of a healthier low-skilled
population among MCA immigrants relative to natives seems clear.
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In summary, while a large share of MCA immigrants live in poverty
because their low education only gives access to relatively low-paying
jobs, they constitute a type of economically poor population that is different from natives. Relative to natives who are similar in age, education, and location in the United States, they have a much higher probability of working, they work longer hours, they are in families with
more children, and they rely less on welfare cash and noncash transfers.
They are also healthier and less likely to be incarcerated. Hence, it is
likely that policies oriented to enhancing labor market access, education, and opportunities rather than toward welfare transfers may be
more eﬀective in improving the economic outcome of this group, especially by raising their income and decreasing their chances of being in
poverty. I will discuss some of these policies later in the section titled
“Policy Ideas.”

INDIRECT EFFECT OF IMMIGRANTS ON NATIVE JOB
OPPORTUNITIES AND INCOME
Immigrants constituted almost 26 percent of the adult population
with no high school diploma in 2014—in some states this percentage
was much larger—and economists have asked whether the immigrants’
presence and their very high propensity to be employed comes at the
expense of native workers’opportunities or wages. Do MCA immigrants
in a labor market crowd out natives because of strong job competition?
Or do they complement natives, allowing growth and the expansion of
the economy and leaving natives’ opportunities unaﬀected? By aﬀecting the labor income of natives, or their employment opportunities,
immigrants could aﬀect their probability of being in poverty and their
reliance on welfare income. I consider this to be a potential indirect
eﬀect of immigrants on U.S. poverty in that immigrants’ labor market
competition can aﬀect natives’ outcomes. I discuss the plausibility of
the existence of such an eﬀect and how large it could be.
The answer to this question depends on several factors. First,
researchers ﬁnd that in the United States low-skilled immigrants move
to places where job opportunities are more abundant. Hence, one can
observe that low-skilled immigrants and low-skilled natives’ employ-
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ment/wages are positively correlated across locations and over time.
Basso and Peri (2015) clearly show this point by documenting that
local labor markets (commuting zones) experiencing increases in
immigrants’ share, in any decade between 1970 and 2010, also experienced growth in low-skilled natives’ wages in the same decades. In this
respect, therefore, there is no negative association between the inﬂow
of immigrants and the wages or employment of natives across areas
and over time; rather, the opposite association is observed. Second, as
low-skilled immigrants come to a local economy, ﬁrms expand (Olney
2013); manual production tasks (largely performed by immigrants)
become less expensive, which creates complementary opportunities for
other production tasks performed by natives (Peri and Sparber 2009);
ﬁrm’s technology adjusts (Lewis 2011) to make the most of immigrants’
skills; and immigrants boost local goods and service demand (Bodvarson, Van der Berg, and Lewer 2008). Overall, native workers can
beneﬁt from these transformations in response to immigration. Third,
low-skilled immigrants take jobs in niches that natives are leaving (in
agricultural, personal services, and manufacturing), which generates
market segmentation that reduces job competition between natives
and immigrants. Fourth, locations where low-skilled immigrants go
(especially large metropolitan areas) are also locations chosen by many
highly skilled immigrants. Hence, the relative proportion of more- and
less-educated workers, which could aﬀect their relative wages, did not
change much because of immigration in many large labor markets. In
particular, considering the years since 2000 (as shown in Peri [2011]),
net immigration in the United States has been more college intensive
than unskilled intensive and hence has not produced dramatic shifts in
the relative supply of labor—and certainly not toward a larger share of
workers with no college degree. Combining these factors and mechanisms, and depending on their relative intensity, inﬂows of immigrants
can be absorbed with negative, positive, or null changes in native’s
labor market opportunities. Ultimately, the impact of immigration on
low-skill wages needs to be assessed empirically, and several studies
have done just that.
Turning to such empirical evidence, it usually reveals small eﬀects
of the inﬂow of immigrants on less-educated natives’ labor market performance using several approaches (either reduced-form regression
analysis; quasi-experiments/diﬀerence in diﬀerence; or more structural,
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production-based approaches) and diﬀerent levels of analysis (national
or local). Card (1990, 2009), Peri and Sparber (2009), Peri and Yasenov
(2015), and Card and Peri (2016) all ﬁnd small and not very signiﬁcant
eﬀects. A series of papers by George Borjas (Borjas 2003, 2006, 2015;
Borjas and Katz 2007) indicate, instead, the existence of signiﬁcant
negative eﬀects of immigration on native low-skilled wages. However,
once spurious bias and measurement error are accounted for (Basso
and Peri 2015; Card and Peri 2016; Peri and Sparber 2009), and once
the speciﬁcations of skill complementarities are made more ﬂexible
(Ottaviano and Peri 2012), my assessment is that no signiﬁcant negative eﬀects survive. While it is hard to rule out small negative wage and
employment eﬀects for low-skilled natives, it is also diﬃcult to dismiss
small positive gains. Overall, the evidence is consistent with no eﬀects
on less-educated natives.
Some studies focus on the impact of immigration on speciﬁc groups
of natives, such as young workers (Smith 2012) or previous immigrants
(Card 2001), and they point out a somewhat stronger competition eﬀect
and some negative wage impact on those groups. This makes sense, as
these groups can be more exposed to low-skilled immigrant competition; however, there is also signiﬁcant evidence that young people adjust
their occupation (Peri and Sparber 2009) and skill level (Hunt 2012) in
response to immigrants, and hence the overall impact can be small.
Peri (2011) looks more directly at the connection between immigration and native poverty. In that paper I analyze—using aggregate
estimates of the elasticity of substitution between high and low-skilled
workers and between immigrants and natives of similar education and
age—the indirect eﬀect of inﬂows of immigrants during the 2000–2010
period on the poverty rates of natives in U.S. cities and states, through
their wage competition. The main result of the paper is that, because of
the large share of highly educated immigrants arriving in 2000–2010,
and because of the relatively small competition eﬀect on less-skilled
natives, in most cases such impact was small. In fact, during the 2000–
2010 period in some locations, skilled immigrants helped reduce native
poverty by creating job opportunities as low-skilled workers are complementary to high-skilled ones. For instance, an inﬂow of immigrant
engineers, business people, and scientists increases income in a location
and generates higher demand for services, creating jobs that low-skilled
natives provide (such as construction workers, janitors, and baby sit-
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ters). My assessment in that paper was that immigration did not constitute a relevant factor in determining poverty rate increases in U.S.
cities and states in the recent decade (2000–2010). Instead, during that
period the great recession produced a signiﬁcant increase in poverty
rates, related to the local labor market characteristics rather than to the
inﬂow of immigrants.
So, while immigrants contribute directly to higher poverty rates in
the United States—a signiﬁcant percentage of them are in the group of
less-educated, and this group has a signiﬁcant probability of being in
poverty—I do not ﬁnd evidence of two other channels relating immigrants to poverty. First, within the group of less educated, they are, if
anything, slightly less likely to be in poverty and much more likely to
work. Second, there seems to be no evidence of an eﬀect on natives’
poverty through their labor market eﬀects. When I included the economic role of highly skilled immigrants, they may actually reduce
natives’ poverty through improved labor markets; that group can largely
contribute to economic growth that may beneﬁt all workers in the long
run (see Peri 2011).
Few studies analyze the impact of immigrants on other local economic variables that may also have a role in determining economic
well-being of natives. Notably, Cortes (2008) shows the eﬀect of immigrants in reducing the price of low-skill-intensive services such as gardening, landscaping, personal services, baby-sitting, house cleaning,
and others. This may contribute to a positive eﬀect on real income at
the local level, as money will go farther when purchasing these services
locally. However, Cortes also shows how these prices are likely to be
more relevant in the consumption basket of wealthier people, and thus
they will not aﬀect the real income of poor families as much.
Much less developed is the analysis of the impact of immigrants
on availability and quality of local public goods, such as health care
or recreation facilities. Does the presence of immigrants strain these
local services? Are local resources for low-income families crowded by
immigrants? Given the low reliance on welfare income and the lower
participation in welfare programs, immigrants may not be such a burden. However, I am not aware of detailed analysis of the type done
for their labor market eﬀects at the local level. One exception is the
impact of low income immigrants on schooling and on school quality.
As immigrants have larger families, lower incomes, and possibly lower
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English proﬁciency, their presence may aﬀect local schools. I focus on
this aspect in the next section.

IMMIGRANTS AND SCHOOLING
Public schooling is a crucially important local public service. It is
a key tool to increase opportunities of children of low-income families,
and in the long run it plays a crucial role in social mobility. The quality
of schooling can be very diﬀerent across districts, and the location of
U.S. families with children is aﬀected in a signiﬁcant way by considerations of school district quality. The role of primary and secondary public
schools in providing the education and tools needed to succeed in the
labor market is widely recognized by economists. Being in a district with
well-functioning schools, good teachers, and good programs is likely
to signiﬁcantly increase the chances of children in low-socioeconomicstatus households to improve their economic perspectives, ﬁnd a good
career, and be socially mobile. Hence, in the long run and for the intergenerational transmission of poverty, the quality of schools and possibly
the quality of the peers can be a most relevant factor.
Immigrants can transform school districts in three crucial ways.
First, if native families see immigrant inﬂows as a threat to the quality
of their school districts, they may leave for other school districts (that
are prevalently nonimmigrant). Alternatively, they may segregate in private schools when the inﬂow of MCA immigrants increases, generating
a lack of integration and diversity in schools that could aﬀect the abilities of those left behind. Segregation between immigrants and natives
will increase because of natives’ demand for a homogeneous schooling environment, the consequence of which can be important for the
learning environment of low-income family children. If native families
with higher incomes leave school districts where immigrants arrive, the
socioeconomic level of peers will decline for low-income children and
they will not beneﬁt from a group of peers that may be more motivated
and higher-achieving. Second, if the inﬂow of immigrants is not accompanied by an investment in schools and new programs, overcrowding
of schools can produce a negative eﬀect on educational attainment and
deteriorate human capital accumulation. Third, if school integration and
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peer eﬀects are particularly important for the assimilation and economic
success of immigrant children, then this segregation will be particularly
damaging to them. I will analyze each aspect in turn, reviewing the
existing evidence and research.
Several reports (e.g., Orﬁeld et al. 2016) and some sociological
studies (e.g., Wells 2009) describe a high level of segregation of MCA
immigrants in U.S. schools, particularly in California, as it is home to
the largest number (and population share) of Hispanic immigrants and
children. Orﬁeld et al. (2016) show that the average Latino student in
the United States was attending a school in which 47 percent of “other”
students were Latinos. This reveals high segregation, as the average
presence of Hispanics/Latinos nationally was equal to 16–17 percent.
Similarly, in most western U.S. states, 40–50 percent of Latino children were in schools that are 90–100 percent Latinos, and in California
Latino children attend schools that are, on average, 87 percent Latino.
Typically, many of these children are second-generation MCA immigrants, and the large degree of segregation in schools is in part due to
the overall geographic concentration of MCA immigrants and the fast
growth of this population in the recent decades.
However, Cascio and Lewis (2012) reveal a concerning trend showing that U.S.-born non-Hispanic families leave school districts where
MCA immigrants arrive and/or move their children to private schools.
In their analysis of California elementary and middle schools, they show
that between 1970 and 2000, for each inﬂow of 10 low-English proﬁciency Hispanic children, about 14 non-Hispanic white children left
the district. The concentration of non-Hispanic white children in private
schools and the overall segregation of Hispanic and non-Hispanic across
school districts increased substantially. The study uses past settlement of
Mexicans to predict the areas that would receive the highest inﬂow of
new MCA immigrants and compares the outﬂow of children and their
families from those districts relative to other adults, in response to immigration. This method isolates native ﬂight driven by school considerations rather than by other aspects of the inﬂow of immigrants and ﬁnds
a signiﬁcant eﬀect.
An older study by Ellen et al. (2002) analyzes the degree of segregation of immigrant students in New York City and identiﬁes a large
variation across groups. That study, mainly descriptive, emphasizes that
highly segregated low-income immigrants (such as Dominicans in New
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York) were attending schools in which their peers were more likely in
poverty, had low English proﬁciency, and had teachers with lower experience and lower education. While the paper falls short of establishing
causal connections, it shows a picture in which low-income immigrant
children are segregated in schools whose quality and peer indicators
were quite low. Given the existing literature emphasizing the important role of teacher quality (e.g., Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005)
and peer academic quality (e.g., Sacerdote 2001) on students’ academic
achievements, one can argue that immigrants segregated in lowerquality schools will experience worse educational outcomes and possibly negatively aﬀect their career opportunities in the long run.
There is no systematic direct evidence for the United States on the
impact on school performance, and long-run schooling achievement (of
natives and immigrants) proceeding from the high level of segregation
described above. Researchers have not analyzed whether the higher
concentration of children from low-educated immigrant families aﬀect
the outcomes of natives. Nevertheless, research relative to Norway
(Hardoy and Schone 2013), Denmark (Jensen and Rasmussen 2011),
Israel (Gould, Lavy, and Paserman 2009), and several other European
countries (Brunello and Rocco 2013) seems aligned in ﬁnding that
increased immigrant concentration in elementary and middle schools
reduced students’ Program for International Student Assessment scores,
increased the probability of dropping out, and possibly reduced their
probability of college attendance. Such ﬁndings may reveal that limited school resources are strained when immigrant children with low
language proﬁciency levels arrive, that peer eﬀects may matter, or that
segregation along income and ethnic lines may be bad for learning,
especially if the combination of crowding and segregation leave lowincome children concentrated in disadvantaged schools.
The most studied issue recently has been the impact of immigrant
inﬂow on the probability of U.S.-born individuals to attend college
(Hunt 2012; Smith 2012). On one hand, as argued above, school competition may reduce the quality of schooling (if many children from
non-English speaking and low socioeconomic status households produces a deterioration of the learning environment) and hence may negatively aﬀect the probability that U.S. natives go to college. On the other
hand, the presence of less-skilled immigrants may induce natives to
seek careers and a job specialization that complements them rather than
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competes with them. This would increase the incentive to extend their
education to college as that degree gives access to jobs that are not in
competition with those performed by less-educated immigrants. Both
studies ﬁnd evidence that the inﬂow of less-skilled immigrants in a
cohort and in a state increases the probability that natives in that cohort
will attend college. Hence, the incentives induced by a labor market
price mechanism may in part oﬀset the negative direct impact through
school crowding. At least for a subset of natives who have a reasonable
prospect of going to college, the competition of unskilled immigrants
may increase their enrollment and graduation rates from college.

POLICY IDEAS
The economic characteristics and choices of immigrants at high
risk of poverty described in this chapter—in particular, their diﬀerences
with respect to natives with similar skills—should provide guidance
for predicting and understanding the potential impact that policies may
have on their income and economic well-being. I consider an overview
of diﬀerent types of policies that can aﬀect the economic success of
low-skilled immigrants and their children, sometimes called secondgeneration immigrants. Rather than being exhaustive, I suggest some
important policy ideas that can be considered as crucial when addressing issues of immigrants and poverty.
Path to Legalization and Intensity of Enforcement
Given the high propensity to work, improving access to jobs—
especially better paid ones—is going to be a crucial aspect of any policy
that aims to increase the socioeconomic status of ﬁrst-generation lowskilled immigrants. The largest contribution on this side is probably
achieved by allowing undocumented immigrants a legal status and a
path to permanent residence. By increasing the bargaining power of
workers, their mobility, and their willingness to invest in U.S.-speciﬁc
skills, legalization may have a signiﬁcant impact on wages. Several
studies (e.g., Barcellos 2010; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002; RiveraBatiz 1999) have shown that, in the years after legalization, immigrants
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gain between 4 and 10 percent in their wages relative to the previous
trajectory. These analyses consider the regularization program called
the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 and follow
individuals after they participate.
If undocumented immigrants can circulate freely in the United
States, they can consider more job opportunities and likely increase
their productivity and the quality of their job matches, which will result
in wage gains. Regularization will also allow those immigrants to leave
the shadows and be more conﬁdent in participating in welfare programs
for which their children qualify. For younger immigrants, it will give
them a less uncertain outlook, encouraging them to acquire language
skills and on-the-job skills. Even a very limited legalization reform
granting undocumented immigrants the right to work legally, but
restricting access to welfare or citizenship, would substantially improve
their incomes and the prospects of their children. At the very minimum,
protecting them from deportation unless they commit crimes (as the
executive action of the president that in 2014 created the Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans and expanded the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals) would provide some extra certainty and probably
still improve their labor conditions. Less aggressive enforcement would
also likely increase the participation of immigrant children in health
care programs and in schools.
Reduce Barriers to Enroll in Welfare Programs
At least part of the limited participation in welfare programs—
which would certainly improve health care and nutrition opportunities
for immigrant children (Medicaid and SNAP)—may be due to diﬃculties in both applying for the programs and navigating the system.
Support from more established Spanish-speaking communities, simpliﬁcation of the process, and measures to ensure privacy and protection
from deportation when enrolling may boost participation rates. There is
clearly some opposition to policy proposals that aim to expand eligibility of social programs to be more inclusive of immigrants, as it may be
perceived as adding to the cost of low-skilled immigrants. However, the
idea that immigrants should be able to access and claim that for which
they are already eligible should be rather uncontroversial, and helping
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them get such beneﬁts and reducing the costs of doing so seems a reasonable and feasible policy.
Access to Education: Assistance to Highly Impacted Districts
The second most crucial policy that could beneﬁt low-skilled immigrants and their communities is assisting school districts experiencing
large inﬂows of non-English-speaking immigrants with more resources
and better responding to their needs. If the inﬂow of immigrants is
accompanied with investments in better, larger schools and more teachers, even the non-Hispanic ﬂight to private schools can be stemmed
and the eﬀects of segregation reduced. One interesting idea is to put all
the revenues from a regularization program—namely, the income from
ﬁnes and back-taxes owed by undocumented immigrants in order to
obtain regularization—toward the school districts where undocumented
children reside, in proportion to their number. Similarly, the processing
fees paid by employers for new visas for low-skilled immigrants (H1A)
could be directed toward school districts in proportion of the presence
of low-skilled immigrant workers.
Another proposal is to subsidize bilingual education in these communities for both immigrants and natives. This could turn the presence
of immigrants into opportunities for natives. A bilingual education,
which is regarded by many as a valuable asset for all children, could
also substantially improve the level of integration of Hispanic immigrants into native communities.
Education and Opportunities: DREAM Act
A second important idea in promoting the assimilation and success of the second generation of immigrants is associating schooling
achievements—and possibly a college degree—with the possibility of
regularization. The DREAM Act, ﬁrst proposed in the Senate in 2001
and reintroduced several times since, was such legislation. This proposal would ﬁrst grant conditional residency to young individuals who
arrived under the age of 16 and were enrolled in high school, and would
have allowed a permanent residence permit if the individuals enrolled
in an institution of higher learning (or in the military). A policy of this
kind that associates the opportunity to regularize the immigration status
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(and eventually allows for permanent resident status) to a schooling
career culminating with a college degree has two important beneﬁts.
First, it would provide strong incentives for attaining a college education to a group (children of low-skilled MCA immigrants) that may
have otherwise opted for less education. Second, it would provide a less
uncertain job outlook, signiﬁcantly improving the labor market opportunities of undocumented young immigrants once they graduate and
therefore strengthen their commitment to a U.S. education and learning
economically valuable skills.
It is worth emphasizing that several states have already recognized
the extreme importance of college education for the success of the
young generation of children of undocumented immigrants. Thirteen
states, including California, have passed state legislation that allows
access to public universities for these undocumented students at the
same conditions as citizens who are residents of the state. This is a great
ﬁrst step. However, without a legal option to work after graduation, the
positive impact of college education would be greatly diminished.
Labor Market Policies: Minimum Wages
A policy that has been discussed recently, albeit in a much broader
context, and would probably have an important impact on the poverty
rate of immigrants, is the increase in the federal minimum wage. Some of
the jobs performed by immigrants (in services and agriculture) are likely
to be at or close to the minimum wage. Hence, an increase in the minimum wage will boost their income, provided employers do not respond
by cutting hours or reducing employment. The existing empirical evidence on the employment eﬀects of minimum wages does not seem to
support the idea that its increase would reduce employment (e.g., Card
and Krueger 1994; Krueger and Card 2000), hence, such a policy may
help low-skilled immigrants by supporting their labor income.
The concerns over stagnation and declining wages at the low end of
the distribution is driving the current support for an increase in the federal minimum wage, a measure already proposed by the Obama administration in 2014. As long as low-skilled immigrant workers constitute a
large share of workers in the lower percentiles of the wage distribution,
a measure that would push those up could aﬀect immigrants’ poverty in
a signiﬁcant way.
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To summarize, a simple and overarching principle of eﬀective policies to reduce poverty among low-skilled immigrants and help their children achieve economic success should focus on improving labor market
access for the ﬁrst generation and the quality of schools in immigrantheavy districts for the second generation. Economically, it makes sense
that the increased cost of public schools should be supported in part by
the immigrants themselves, and in part by their employers, as those are
the groups receiving the largest economic beneﬁts from labor migration. Moreover, in doing so, part of the economic beneﬁts generated
by immigrants could beneﬁt whole communities and help muster the
political consensus to allow a larger inﬂow of low-skilled immigrants.

CONCLUSIONS
This chapter provides an overview of some important issues at the
intersection of immigration and poverty in the United States. It emphasizes that a large part of the population at risk of poverty—because
of low levels of education and thereby limited access to high paying jobs—is of immigrant origin, especially from Mexico and Central America. The chapter then shows that economically and socially
low-skilled immigrants are quite diﬀerent from similar natives. They
are much more likely to be employed, they work more weeks, their
incomes are in large part made of wage earnings, and they are strongly
aﬀected by the overall economic cycle. They do not rely on welfare programs and transfers as much as natives, and they have larger families,
lower probability of incarceration, higher likelihood of moving across
U.S. states in response to job availability, and are in better health than
similar natives.
These features make immigrants particularly sensitive to policies
that aﬀect labor markets and to overall economic conditions. These
immigrants, albeit poor, generally move to booming cities and contribute to local economic growth. They do not seem to worsen the
labor market opportunities of natives. However, they may create some
crowding of (and ﬂight away from) local public schools. As schooling
and education are key factors allowing their children—and the children
of natives in the same communities—to succeed economically, direct-
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ing policies and resources to reducing the crowding impact on schools
should be a ﬁrst-order concern.
Within this framework I see a path to legalization that requires payment of a fee and back taxes that generates local revenues for schools
as a reasonable and proﬁtable policy both for immigrants and native
communities where they live. Other policies improving their labor market and schooling prospects, such as the DREAM act, are also win-win
options for immigrants and the communities where they live. While also
important, lowering barriers to their access to welfare—and increasing
their eligibility—can come with advantages especially for their children, but at the cost of being perceived as a burden for natives and a
disincentive to their employment.

Notes
1. The data we use are from the 2000–2014 March CPSs. Each ﬁgure note provides
details on the variables shown.
2. The percentage of individuals with no high school diploma among MCA immigrants was about 60 percent in 2000 and declined to about 52 percent in 2014. The
same percentage for natives decreased from 18 percent to 9 percent in the same
period. Other immigrants’ percentage of no diploma among 18 years and older
was very close to that of natives’.
3. The Pew Research Center (2014) indicates that for the United States, 52 percent of
illegal immigrants are from Mexico. Hence, the percentage of less-educated MCA
likely to be undocumented is certainly very high.
4. “Hispanic Health,” Centers for Disease Control, http://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/
hispanic-health/ (accessed on February 22, 2016).
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The unintended consequences of tougher immigration enforcement
ﬁrst emanated from tighter controls along the U.S.-Mexico border, with
higher and multiple walls that separated us from our neighbors and led
many desperate individuals seeking a better life in the United States
to opt for riskier crossing methods. Drownings in the Rio Grande and
deaths in the desert were just one manifestation of the harsher conditions migrants were willing to endure to make it to the other side. Yet,
the consequences of intensiﬁed interior immigration enforcement have
received lesser publicity, in part due to their more recent nature.
Interior immigration enforcement spending grew exponentially following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (see Figure 5.1). Many local- and
state-level measures that involved employers, as well as the local and
state police, were enacted to identify, apprehend, and deport a population of undocumented immigrants that had been on the rise during
the 1980s and 1990s, and that exceeded 10 million by the mid-2000s
(see Figure 5.2). An array of interior immigration enforcement measures adopted over the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century led to
the deportation of more than 5 million undocumented immigrants during President Barack Obama’s administration—a stand that ultimately
earned him the title of “Deporter in Chief” (Department of Homeland
Security 2016). It remains unclear what Americans gained from such
actions; yet, the costs are becoming somewhat more palpable, especially as time goes by.
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Figure 5.1 Immigration Enforcement Spending Adjusted to 2015 $,
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Figure 5.2 Estimated Number of Unauthorized Resident Aliens,
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There are 11.4 million undocumented immigrants living in the
United States, 66 percent of whom have been living in the country for
more than a decade (Gonzalez-Barrrera and Krogstad 2017). As a result,
it should come as no surprise that more than 4.5 million American
children, including approximately 8 percent of all U.S.-born children,
have an undocumented parent. To the extent that these are American
children, it is still unclear what the consequences and costs of tougher
interior immigration enforcement will be for the nation’s political landscape as they come of age and head to the voting booth.
In this chapter, we provide an overview of some of the impacts of
intensiﬁed interior immigration enforcement on families, ranging from
living in broken households to enduring a life of poverty following
restricted access to employment opportunities and the deportation of
breadwinning household heads. Our hope is to inform about the development of interior immigration enforcement while raising awareness of
its consequences.

BACKGROUND ON INTERIOR
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
Spending on immigration enforcement has expanded greatly over
recent decades. After 9/11 in particular, states and localities started to
enact their own immigration policies, often justifying them on the inaction by the federal government concerning comprehensive immigration
reform. Apprehensions and deportations from the interior quickly rose,
especially after 2008, following the introduction of the Secure Communities program, as we shall discuss. Almost 2 million people were
deported between 2009 and 2013 alone (Vaughan 2013). And although
greater emphasis eventually would be placed on the deportation of serious criminals, the number of noncriminal removals continued to exceed
that of removals for criminal oﬀenses (see Figure 5.3).
To understand the evolution of interior immigration enforcement,
we need to recall two main immigration acts that led to the growth
of undocumented immigration to the United States. The ﬁrst was the
1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, which established country-level
numerical immigration quotas. Prior to its enactment, during the Bra-
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Figure 5.3 Aliens Removed by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, by Criminal Status
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2004 and 2014.

cero program, nearly 450,000 guest worker visas were issued annually
for Mexicans (Espino and Jimeno 2013). As a result, when the Mexican
quota was set at 20,000 per year, the number of undocumented entries
quickly rose and undocumented immigration grew from 540,000 in
1969 to roughly 3.2 million by 1986 (see Figure 5.2). To address the
large number of undocumented immigrants in the country, Congress
passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986, which
allowed for the legalization of undocumented immigrants who satisﬁed certain conditions, made it illegal to knowingly hire undocumented
immigrants, and paved the way for intensiﬁed border enforcement.
However, employer sanctions were never seriously enforced, and crises
in Latin America, along with economic growth in the United States,
only contributed to the continued rise of undocumented immigration
during the 1990s and well into the 2000s.
A second key piece of legislation came in 1996, when Congress
passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
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Act (IIRIRA). This act further enhanced border control and, perhaps
most importantly, set the guidelines for future employment veriﬁcation and interior immigration enforcement. It is notable for setting the
framework for future collaborations between the federal government
and states/localities on immigration enforcement matters. Such collaborations, however, did not take place until after the terrorist attacks
of 2001. In 2002, Florida became the ﬁrst state to activate a 287(g)
agreement of collaboration between the state police and Immigration
Customs Enforcement (ICE) as contemplated in the 1996 IIRIRA.
Soon after, in 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was
created to replace the old Immigration and Naturalization Service. By
2005, DHS had introduced a Consequence Delivery System, criminalizing illegal entry or reentry. Enforcement increased almost tenfold
during 2004 and 2010 (see Figure 5.4), and removals, now often of
newly classiﬁed criminals, rose as localities started to implement the
287(g) agreements contemplated in the 1996 IIRIRA. On average, they
rose from 3 percent during the 1970–1996 period to 19 percent during
2003–2006, and to a record high of 65 percent in 2012 (Bergeron and
Hipsman 2014).
In what follows, we describe the main interior immigration enforcement initiatives, distinguishing according to whether they were local
(city or county) level or state level measures (see Table 5.1).
Local Policies
We focus our attention on two types of local initiatives that expanded
rapidly after 9/11: 287(g) agreements and the Secure Communities
program (currently, the Priorities Enforcement Program). We refer to
them as police-based measures since they rely on local law enforcement
resources to assist ICE in the implementation of federal immigration
policy. In addition, both are responsible for much of the rapid growth in
deportations from the interior of the United States.
The 287 (g)
These agreements evolved from the 1996 IIRIRA. Through a Memorandum of Agreement, state and local agencies could enforce federal
immigration law. Designated oﬃcers who satisﬁed certain conditions
and received four weeks training from DHS were deputized to act as
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Figure 5.4 Expansion of the Total Enforcement between 2004 and 2010
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Figure 5.4 (continued)
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SOURCE: Authors’ tabulation of their immigration enforcement index.

immigration enforcement agents in their corresponding jurisdictions.1
The number of agreements increased from 8 in 2007 to 61 in 2008.
Since the ﬁrst agreement signed by the state of Florida in 2002, ICE has
trained and certiﬁed more than 1,675 state and local oﬃcers to enforce
immigration laws (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2016).
There are three types of 287(g) agreements: task force, jail enforcement, and the hybrid kind. The task force model allows state and local
law enforcement to interrogate and arrest noncitizens during their regular duties, whereas the jail enforcement model permits local and state
law enforcement to question arrested immigrants about their immigration status. In 2012, the administration announced a decrease in funding for 287(g) agreements in order to expand the Secure Communities
program. Several factors contributed to that decision, including accusations of racial proﬁling, high implementation costs, and minimal oversight and support from ICE, to name a few (Immigration Policy Center
2012).2
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nities/Priority
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Omnibus
immigration
laws
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Employment- E-Verify
based
measures

Objective
Make communities safer by the
identiﬁcation and
removal of serious
criminals.

Who imple- Geographic
ments it?
coverage Signed by
State and
State and
local
local law
enforcement

Police
Make communities safer by the
identiﬁcation and
removal of serious
criminals using biometric information.

Local

Types

Task Force: allows local and
State and
state oﬃcers to interrogate and
local law
enforcement arrest noncitizens during their
regular duties on law enforcement operations.
Jail enforcement: permits
local oﬃcers to question immigrant who have been arrested
on state and local charges
about their immigration status.
Hybrid model: allows participation in both types of
programs.
Local law
enforcement

2010–

State
Identiﬁcation and State and
removal of undocu- local law
mented immigrants. enforcement

State
governor

2006–

Prevent the hiring
of undocumented
immigrants.

State

State
governor

Employer
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Table 5.1 Description of Enforcement Laws
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Secure communities
ICE announced the Secure Communities program in March 2008.
Its purpose was to prioritize the use of enforcement resources to target
noncitizens who had committed serious crimes. Under this program,
ICE maintained an electronic presence in jails. Once arrested, criminal
noncitizens were identiﬁed by checking their ﬁngerprints against the
Federal Bureau of Investigation data set on oﬀenders and the DHS data
set tracking their immigration history. Local agents were not deputized
to implement immigration enforcement, however, as is the case with the
287(g) agreements.
Although it was established as a voluntary program, Secure Communities grew rapidly from its initial implementation in 7 jurisdictions in 2008 to all the nation’s 3,181 jurisdictions by 2013. During the
program’s ﬁrst years, the number of ﬁngerprints submitted grew from
828,119 in 2009 to 6.9 million in 2011 (Meissner et al. 2013). The Priority Enforcement Program replaced Secure Communities in July 2015
(U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2017), although President Trump appears to have reinstated Secure Communities through a
number of executive actions in February 2017.
As local law enforcement increased its cooperation with ICE, state
and local governments became concerned about how the sharing of
information and cooperation with ICE was potentially undermining
community trust and the community cooperation with the police, both
key for eﬀective policing. The so-called sanctuary cities, as their opponents have labeled them, wanted to reassure immigrants that they could
report to the police without fear of being deported. Through many city,
county, or statewide ordinances, sometimes reﬂecting long-standing
practices by the local/state police, they limited the cooperation with
ICE, most notably by restricting the transfer of arrestees to ICE custody
following a detainer. Nearly 6 million undocumented immigrants reside
in these localities (Rosenblum 2015), and President Donald Trump has
vowed to withhold funds from these jurisdictions.
State Level
Omnibus immigration laws
Several states further enacted legislation intended to intensify immigration enforcement. Arizona was the ﬁrst state to do so in 2010 under
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the so-called Senate Bill 1070. After being challenged in court, the U.S.
Supreme Court issued a ruling in the case Arizona v. United States in
2012. According to the ruling, the sections that made it a state misdemeanor for an immigrant not to be carrying documentation of lawful
presence in the country allowed state police to arrest without a warrant
in some situations, or made it unlawful under state law for an individual
to apply for employment without federal work authorization were considered to be preempted by federal law. All justices agreed to uphold
the portion of the law allowing Arizona state police to investigate the
immigration status of anyone who is stopped, detained, or arrested if
there is reasonable suspicion they might be in the country illegally. Five
other states—Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah—
followed Arizona’s footsteps and enacted similar legislation in 2011,
even though the lower courts have partially enjoined these statutes.
Employment veriﬁcation systems
Another statewide immigration enforcement initiative, this one
restricted to the labor market, has been mandated employment veriﬁcation. While all employers are required to participate in paper-based
employment eligibility veriﬁcation by requesting that prospective hires
complete an I-9 form and present two documents establishing identity
(e.g., a driver’s license) and work authorization (e.g., a Social Security
card), in most states, employers can opt to use the online work authorization system, E-Verify. The program checks the individual’s work
authorization based on the information in the Social Security Administration and, if applicable, the DHS databases. The pilot program started
back in 1997 with ﬁve states that had a greater immigrant concentration, and it has quickly grown over time as individual states enacted
employment veriﬁcation mandates. Arizona was the ﬁrst state to require
all public and private employers to enroll in the program in 2007. Afterward, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, and South Carolina made
E-Verify mandatory for all public and private employers. Many other
states require work veriﬁcation for some type of employers. Overall,
enrollment in E-Verify increased by more than 400 between 2001 and
2015 (National Conference of State Legislatures 2017), despite some
inherent problems with the system. DHS introduced several actions
in order to improve the veracity of E-Verify screening, which led to a
large number of false positive and false negative errors. One of these
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actions was the new “self-check” feature, which makes it possible for
job applicants to check their own employment veriﬁcation and resolve
data discrepancies in advance.

DATA AND IDENTIFICATION CHALLENGES
Once some of the key interior immigration enforcement initiatives
in place over the past two decades have been reviewed, it is worth discussing some of the various data and identiﬁcation challenges studies
have to confront when trying to gauge the impact of the aforementioned
measures. This allows us, in turn, to understand the diverse approaches
of the literature. We refer to them in what follows.
Measuring the Intensity of Interior Immigration Enforcement
Capturing the intensity of immigration enforcement to which an
individual might be exposed is a diﬃcult task because of the overlap
of measures in place at any given point, as well as the distinct implementation of the measures by those responsible for doing so. Hence,
one should start by emphasizing that any policy measure, whether it is
a dummy or an index, is only a proxy for the intensity of immigration
enforcement to which individuals are ultimately exposed to.
That said, how do most of the studies capture the intensity of immigration enforcement? The vast majority of the literature relies on dichotomous variables that take the value of 1 when a given policy is in place
and 0 otherwise. This is traditionally the case in studies focusing on
the impact of speciﬁc measures, including 287(g) agreements (Kostandini, Mykerezi, and Escalante 2013; Watson 2013), Secure Communities (Ciancio 2016; Miles and Cox 2014), omnibus immigration laws
(Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano 2017a; Good 2013), or employment
veriﬁcation mandates (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak 2012; Bohn, Lofstrom, and Raphael 2014; Orrenius, Zavodny, and Gutierrez 2016).
Several authors, however, have addressed the task of capturing the
intensity of immigration enforcement by creating an index that incorporates the multiplicity of measures in place, while at the same time
addresses a number of challenges that arise in empirical research. One
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such challenge emerges when the basic geographic unit in the study
is larger than the geographic scope of the measure in question. For
example, this is the case when the ﬁnest geographic detail in the data
set is the metropolitan statistical area (MSA)—a geographic unit that
can incorporate various counties. Some of those counties might have
adopted tougher immigration enforcement policies, but others might
have not. In those instances, it can be helpful to use population weights
that take into account the share of the MSA population exposed to the
measure in question along with the share that is not. A second challenge refers to the distinct period of times during which measures are in
place in any given year. Some of them might have been in place for six
months, whereas others might have been in place year-round. The index
oﬀers the opportunity to weight each measure by the number of months
during any given year that the measure was in place. Finally, many of
these measures are closely intertwined. They were, perhaps, enacted to
substitute, replace, or add to a preceding or existing measure, as in the
case of the Secure Communities program and the 287(g) agreements
between ICE and the local/state police. They utilize the same local/state
law enforcement resources. As such, their overlap might have a multiplicative impact easier to capture using a single index, such as
(5.1)
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where 1(Et,a) is an indicator function that informs about the implementation of a particular policy in city a at time (month) t. Pa,2000 refers to the
population of city a according to the 2000 Census (prior to the rolling
of any of the enforcement initiatives being considered), and N is the
total population in MSA m. Hence, the overall enforcement to which
an individual living in MSA m and year t are exposed to is computed
as the sum of the indices for each enforcement initiative at the (MSA,
year) level:3
(5.2)
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Identifying the Likely Unauthorized
If measuring the intensity of immigration enforcement in any given
location is a challenging task, so is the ability to identify who is an
undocumented immigrant. This is because representative data sets, such
as the American Community Survey (ACS) or the Current Population
Survey (CPS), lack information about the legal status of immigrants.
Faced with that challenge, the literature has taken various approaches to
identifying the population that we refer to as the “likely unauthorized”
or “likely undocumented.” Logical imputation methods are probably
the most common in the literature. For example, most of the literature
uses Hispanic noncitizens as a proxy for individuals who are likely to be
undocumented (Bohn and Pugatch 2013; Orrenius and Zavodny 2016;
Passel and Cohn 2009; Pope 2016). In recent work (Amuedo-Dorantes
and Arenas-Arroyo 2017, 2018), we restrict our attention to Hispanic
noncitizens who have not completed high school and who have lived
in the United States ﬁve years or more in order to exclude low- and
high-skill individuals with nonimmigrant visas. Using all these traits,
along with the weights of the ACS, we obtain an estimated unauthorized immigrant population close to the estimated population of 11–12
million undocumented immigrants in the United States using the residual method.
The fact that the combination of these descriptors does a reasonable
job when trying to proxy for the likely undocumented status of immigrants is understandable. First, the Census Bureau and DHS estimate
that nearly 40 percent of noncitizens are authorized immigrants (Acosta
et al. 2014; Hoefer, Baker, and Rytin 2013). That is, among noncitizens we have all unauthorized immigrants, as well as many authorized
immigrants. Second, because of geographic proximity and poor economic and social conditions at home, as well as extensive migrant networks, more than two-thirds of unauthorized immigrants in the United
States are Hispanics from Mexico and Central America. Third, as previous research has pointed out (see, for example, Bohn and Lofstrom
[2013], and Orrenius and Zavodny [2016]), most unauthorized immigrants have relatively little education because they are from countries
with low average levels of educational attainment. About three-quarters
of adult unauthorized immigrants have no more education than a high
school diploma (Passel and Cohn 2009). Finally, to address any con-
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cerns regarding the possibility that the sample might include lowskilled immigrants or college students with nonimmigrant visas, one
can also restrict the designation of individuals as likely undocumented
to Hispanic noncitizen individuals who have not completed high school
and have lived in the United States for ﬁve years or longer. This last
restriction further ensures that the low-skill migrant is not legally in the
United States on a nonimmigrant visa, which is typically granted for a
much shorter duration.
In some instances, when information on the immigration status
and the dependent variable outcome of interest is jointly observed in
a representative data set from the same sample universe, it is feasible
to improve upon the aforementioned prediction of immigrant legal status using statistical imputation methods, as noted by Van Hook et al.
(2015). Unfortunately, the ability of doing so is often constrained by
various factors. First, one needs a “donor” data set that, in addition to
containing information on the outcome of interest, is representative of
the unauthorized migrant population, has information on their legal status, and is derived from the same sample universe. The donor sample is
then used to predict migrants’ legal status in the main data set (Rendall
et al. 2013). Secondly, the donor data set needs to be representative for
examining outcomes within the geographic unit of interest, often states,
MSAs, or counties.
Identiﬁcation Challenges
Anytime that we are interested in learning about the impact of
intensiﬁed immigration enforcement on the well-being of unauthorized immigrants or their family members, we are faced with a number
of identiﬁcation challenges characteristic of most policy analyses. For
instance, when using a quasi-experimental approach, such as a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences methodology, it is crucial to ensure that any impacts
attributed to the policy are not diﬀerences between unauthorized immigrants and their comparison group that predated the intensiﬁcation of
enforcement itself. In addition, while nonrandom, it is important to conﬁrm that the outcome studied was not a determinant of tougher enforcement in the ﬁrst place.
Still, one of the most prevalent challenges in immigration studies is
the nonrandom residential location of likely undocumented immigrants.
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To the extent that immigrants are a mobile population, more so in the
case of unauthorized immigrants, addressing the selective exposure to
tougher immigration enforcement is an essential, yet often missing, part
of any analysis of enforcement impacts. One way to address this challenge is by instrumenting the location of these immigrants using historical data on the location of alike countrymen prior to the intensiﬁcation of immigration enforcement. To address concerns of such locations
potentially being correlated with economic conditions still dominant in
those sites, researchers rely on data from 20-plus years ago, and control
for trends in macroeconomic characteristics in those settlement areas.

THE WIDE SPECTRUM OF IMPACTS OF INTENSIFIED
INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
As we noted in the ﬁrst section of this chapter, for quite some time
now, the immigration literature has investigated the consequences of
intensiﬁed border enforcement in the United States (see for example,
Bean et al. [1990]; Espenshade [1990, 1994]). Recently, attention has
shifted toward the impact of intensiﬁed interior immigration enforcement (see Table 5.2 for an overview of the literature). In what follows,
we review some of the most recent research on the implications of
intensiﬁed interior immigration enforcement on families with likely
undocumented migrants to gain a better perspective about the impact
that these policies appear to be having on the targeted population, as
well as on their children, many of whom are U.S. citizens.
Residential Choices
Along with its impact on labor market outcomes, the most examined eﬀect of intensiﬁed interior immigration enforcement is the one
on the residential choices made by undocumented immigrants. These
studies ﬁnd mixed results likely due to their focus on distinct enforcement initiatives, time period, data, and methods. For example, Bohn,
Lofstrom, and Raphael (2014) use the synthetic control method to document a decrease in the share of Hispanic noncitizens (a group more
likely to include “likely undocumented immigrants”) after Arizona
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Amuedo-Dorantes
and Lozano
(2017b)

Residential choices
Policy
Sample
Speciﬁcation
Group
Synthetic con- Mexican noncitizens
ACS 2001–2012,
SB 1070
and LAWA and data on removals trol method
from Customs Border
Patrol

122

Table 5.2 Summary of Selected Literature Findings
Coeﬃcient
Mexican noncitizens leaving
the state of Arizona became 7
times more likely to relocate to
New Mexico

Amuedo-Dorantes
and Lozano
(2017a)

SB 1070

Monthly CPS,
1998–2013

Synthetic con- Hispanic noncitizens
trol method

Minimal to null (−0.0016)

Bohn, Lofstrom,
and Raphael
2014

LAWA

Monthly CPS,
1998–2009

Synthetic con- Hispanic noncitizens
trol method

Declines of 1.5 to 2.0 percentage points

Good (2013)

OILs

Low-skilled, Hispanic nonMonthly CPS, August Diﬀerences2005–September 2011 in-diﬀerences citizens who arrived after
1982

E-Verify
Orrenius and
Zavodny (2016)

Watson (2013)

287(g)

Decline by 24%

ACS, 2005–2014

Decline by 40%
Ordinary least Noncitizens from Mexico
or Central America with at
squares
most high school and 20–54
years old

ACS, 2005–2011

Ordinary least Aggregated analysis:
Population <65 years old
squares
Individual analysis:
Population 18–49 years old

10/22/2018 1:43:56 PM

Probability of Leaving the U.S:
Rises by 8.7 pp,
Probability of Moving
Elsewhere: Rises by 1.1 percentage point, No eﬀect when
Maricopa County is excluded
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Employment and Wages
Speciﬁcation
Group
Coeﬃcient
Ordinary least Hispanic noncitizens
Employment: Decline 5.4%,
squares
16–45-year-olds with a high Hourly wages: 9%
school education or less

Policy
E-Verify

Sample
CPS, 2004–2010

E-Verify

CPS 2004–2011

Ordinary least Hispanic noncitizens
Employment: Decline 4.8%,
squares
16–45-year-olds with a high Female hourly wages:
school education or less
Increase 16.9%

Bohn and Lofstrom LAWA
(2013)

Monthly CPS,
1998–2009

Synthetic con- Hispanic noncitizens
trol method

Bohn, Lofstrom,
and Raphael
2015

Annual Social and
Synthetic con- Low-skilled, U.S.-born,
Economic Supplement trol method
non-Hispanic whites
to the Current Population Survey to the
CPS, 1998–2010

Employment: Decline 4.43 pp.,
Weekly earnings:
Increase by $124.73

Kostadini,
287(g)
Mykerezi, and
Escalante (2013)

ACS, 2005–2010

DiﬀerencesWorking population
in-diﬀerences

Expense per worker: increase
by $534.127, Farm income:
Decrease by 51%, Worker per
Acre: Decrease by 16%

Orrenius and
E-Verify
Zavodny (2015)

CPS, 2002–2012

Ordinary least Low-skilled Mexican
squares
immigrants

Real hourly earnings of noncitizen men: Decline by 8%,
Employment of noncitizen
women: Increase by 2.5%,
Real hourly earnings Hispanic
male citizens: Increase by 9%

Amuedo-Dorantes
and Bansak
(2012)
Amuedo-Dorantes
and Bansak
(2014)

LAWA

Wage: Decline 11.4 pp, SelfEmployment: Increase 8.3 pp.
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Table 5.2 (continued)
Families and Children Outcomes
Speciﬁcation
Group

Coeﬃcient

Amuedo-Dorantes
et al. (2018)

287(g), SC, ACS, 2005–2011
E-Verify,
OILs

Ordinary least Families with at least one
squares and
U.S. citizen child and one
instrumental noncitizen Hispanic parent
variables

Household income:
Decline by 18%,
Poverty: Increase by 4%

Amuedo-Dorantes
and ArenasArroyo (2016)

287(g), SC, ACS, 2005–2014
E-Verify,
OILs

Ordinary least Low-skilled Hispanic noncitizen women
squares and
instrumental
variables

Probability of childbearing:
Decline by 6%

Amuedo-Dorantes
and ArenasArroyo (2017)

287(g), SC, ACS, 2005–2015
E-Verify,
OILs

Ordinary least U.S.-citizen children
squares and
instrumental
variables

Probability of living in households singly headed by their
moms with absent spouses:
Increase by 20%, Probability
of living without their parents:
Increase by 19%

Amuedo-Dorantes
and Lopez
(2017)

287(g), SC, CPS, 2000–2013
E-Verify,
OILs

Ordinary least Hispanic children ages 6–17 Probability of repeating a
squares
grade: Increase by 14%;
Probability of dropping out of
school: Increase by 18%
Crime

Thomas J. Miles
and Cox (2014)

SC

FBI’s Uniform Crime DiﬀerencesAll U.S. counties
Reports 2004–2012
in-diﬀerences

No eﬀect
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NOTE: SB 1070 = Senate Bill 1070; LAWA = Legal Arizona Workers Act; OILs = omnibus immigration laws; SC = Secure Communities;
ACS = American Community Survey; CPS = Current Population Survey; pp = percentage points.
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made it mandatory for all employers, public and private sector, to verify
the employment eligibility of all new hires.
In the same line, looking at all states with employment restrictions
policies and comparing the size of the immigrant population before
and after the states enacted E-Verify mandates, Orrenius and Zavodny
(2016) ﬁnd that E-Verify reduced the number of Mexican noncitizens
in some states as they relocate across other states or leave the country,
many of them involuntarily through deportation. Amuedo-Dorantes and
Lozano (2017b) examine the status in which Mexican noncitizens leaving Arizona were relocating following the adoption of tougher enforcement measures. They ﬁnd that Mexican noncitizens who migrated
from Arizona to other U.S. states went primarily to New Mexico and
California. However, the trajectories of Mexican noncitizens leaving
Arizona overlapped with those of non-Hispanic natives, hinting on the
role that socioeconomic and political factors, in addition to potential
complementarities between immigrants and natives, might have played
in explaining the destinations of Mexican noncitizens leaving Arizona
after 2007.
In that regard, Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano (2017a) examine the
eﬀect of the Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070, which includes the so-called
“show me your papers” clause.4 Following the same methodology as
Bohn, Lofstrom, and Raphael (2014), the authors show that the impact
of Arizona’s 2010 omnibus immigration law was minimal to null. Like
these authors, Watson (2013) studies the eﬀect of the 287(g) agreements
on location choice. While she ﬁnds some evidence of relocation of noncitizens with a college education, she notes that cross-border migration ﬂows are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by that particular immigration
enforcement measure one Maricopa County in Arizona is excluded
from the sample. Finally, using yet another enforcement measure, Good
(2013) examines immigrant outﬂows from states with omnibus immigration laws. Using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach, he ﬁnds evidence of noncitizen immigrant outﬂows, but no evidence of signiﬁcant
impacts on native ﬂows.
Employment and Wages
A vast literature has also explored the eﬀect of employment veriﬁcation mandates (E-Verify mandates) on the labor market outcomes
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of the likely unauthorized, as well as on those of natives. The studies
ﬁnd mixed eﬀects on employment and wages, depending on the data
sources, methodology, and gender of the respondents. However, they
generally conclude that the mandates make it diﬃcult to switch jobs for
Hispanic immigrants who are likely to be unauthorized (see AmuedoDorantes and Bansak 2012, 2014; Bohn and Lofstrom 2013; Bohn,
Lofstrom, and Raphael 2015; Orrenius and Zavodny 2009; Orrenius,
Zavodny, and Gutierrez 2016).
In particular, Bohn and Lofstrom (2013) test whether the 2007 Legal
Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) limited the employment and earnings of
likely unauthorized immigrants. Using data from the CPS (1998–2009)
and the synthetic control method, they ﬁnd that LAWA lowered the
wage and increased self-employment among noncitizen Hispanic men
with at most a high school education. Using the same approach, Bohn,
Lofstrom, and Raphael (2015) show that native non-Hispanic workers
in Arizona are less likely to ﬁnd a job but have higher earnings because
of LAWA.
A common concern using the synthetic control method is coming
up with a reasonable control group. In particular, it might be argued that
it is not possible to ﬁnd a suitable control for Arizona. Yet, studies using
diﬀerent estimation approaches sometimes conclude similarly. For
instance, exploiting the geographic and temporal variation in the implementation of the employment veriﬁcation mandates, Amuedo-Dorantes
and Bansak (2012, 2014) document a decrease in the employment of
those likely undocumented, mixed eﬀects on their wages, and a redistribution of labor toward sectors where the implementation of the mandates is lax, such as agriculture or food services when using CPS data
from 2004 through 2011. They also document that E-Verify mandates
can increase employment and wages for non-Hispanics natives. Orrenius and Zavodny (2015) use CPS data from 2002 to 2012 and conclude
that E-Verify mandates reduce the hourly earnings for undocumented
Mexican men, increase the labor force participation among Mexican
women, and raise the earnings of native Hispanics.
Employment veriﬁcation mandates have even had some international consequences. At a micro level, the drop in earnings has curtailed
remittances ﬂows (Amuedo-Dorantes and Puttitanun 2014). At a macro
level, they have curtailed foreign-direct investment in the United States,
leading to employment cutbacks by U.S. aﬃliates of foreign companies
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(Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak, and Zebedee 2015). States have started
to take immigration matters into their own hands. For example, many
states have been mandating the use of E-Verify.
Focusing on the indirect employment impacts of other immigration
enforcement measures, such as the 287(g), Kostandini, Mykerezi, and
Escalante (2013) examine how intensiﬁed enforcement is impacting
employment in the agriculture sector—a sector that depends heavily on
immigrant labor. Using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach, and focusing on relative changes in immigrant labor and wages of farm workers
by number of years elapsed since the adoption of each agreement, they
document a decline in farm incomes, immigrant labor, and overall labor
expenses in the aﬀected counties.
Household Poverty
While much of the literature has focused on the impacts of intensiﬁed immigration enforcement on the size, residential choices, and labor
market outcomes of likely undocumented immigrants, the eﬀects of
enforcement on families and children have started to receive increasingly more attention. This is imperative given the growing magnitude
of this demographic. In 2009, 23 percent of youth under the age of 18
resided in an immigrant household, and 29 percent of those children
had at least one undocumented parent (Passel and Cohn 2011). U.S.born children with undocumented parents represented 8 percent of all
U.S.-born children in 2012—twice as many as in 2002 (Passel, Cohn,
and Rohal 2014). And, by 2016, second-generation Latinos made up
about one-third (32 percent) of Latino eligible voters, up from 27 percent in 2008 and 26 percent in 2000 (Krogstad et al. 2016).
A ﬁrst step in understanding the implications of tougher immigration enforcement on families is to look at how the latter is aﬀecting
their bottom line—namely, their household income and their exposure
to life in poverty. The focus on household economic sources is critical, given their well-known role in children’s health, education, and
development outcomes later in life. To that end, Amuedo-Dorantes,
Arenas-Arroyo, and Sevilla (2018) analyze how intensiﬁed interior
immigration enforcement has impacted households, especially those
headed by likely undocumented parents with U.S. citizen children.
They discuss the various channels through which intensiﬁed immigra-
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tion enforcement can impact household resources. First, employment
veriﬁcation mandates can adversely aﬀect the labor market outcomes
and overall employment opportunities of likely undocumented immigrants. Second, fear of apprehension might induce families to live in the
shadows to evade encounters with law enforcement. For instance, they
might decide not to drive their car to work to avoid police stops. Such
behaviors can have negative consequences on labor market outcomes
and household income. Third, the deportation of the main household
earner, as has been the case in most instances, can lead to a drastic drop
in household income and contribute to the drop of household income
below the poverty threshold.
Using data from the 2005–2011 ACS, Amuedo-Dorantes, ArenasArroyo, and Sevilla (2018) show that the average yearly increase in
interior immigration enforcement over that period lowered the household incomes of families with a likely undocumented parent and U.S.
citizen children by 18 percent, raising their exposure to poverty by 4
percent. Furthermore, they provide evidence of local and police-based
measures (the ones directly linked to deportations) being the most relevant ones in increasing the household’s poverty exposure. The negative impacts of intensiﬁed immigration enforcement are present even
among intact households—that is, households that have not suﬀered the
deportation of one of their members. The fact that the negative eﬀects
are found even among these intact households suggests that deportation fears alone might be suﬃcient for the household to endure economic hardship. These ﬁndings are robust to alternative measures of
our dependent variable, to whom is considered a likely unauthorized
migrant, and to the exclusion of speciﬁc downturn years or of counties that are particularly harsher in their implementation of immigration enforcement measures, as in the case of Maricopa County in Arizona. Similarly, the eﬀects prove robust to several identiﬁcation tests
accounting for the potential endogeneity of enforcement policies and
the residential location of likely undocumented immigrants.
Immigrant Fertility
Household economic resources and a certain level of predictability
regarding family unity are key determinants of fertility. Because immigrants and their oﬀspring are key in guaranteeing the United States’
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ability to reach near replacement fertility rates and the sustainability
of Social Security (Kotkin and Ozuna 2012), knowledge of how immigrant fertility responds to intensiﬁed enforcement is also important.
This is particularly true following the decrease in Hispanic female fertility (see, for example, Livingston and Cohn [2012]).
Amuedo-Dorantes and Arenas-Arroyo (2016) explore whether
the unexplained drop in the fertility rate of Hispanic women might
be related to the intensiﬁcation of interior immigration enforcement.
Tougher enforcement can impact immigrant fertility through several
channels. Inevitably, the deportation of the household’s head or her/
his partner is likely to either end fertility or place it on hold. And, even
among families not aﬄicted by deportation, the uncertainty regarding
the future of the family unit, its economic resources, and/or access to
important health care services and beneﬁts is likely to make the decision to conceive a risky and costly choice. These impacts are likely to
curtail immigrant fertility. However, it is also foreseeable that, given the
advantages of birthright citizenship, undocumented women might want
to have their kids while still in the United States to provide them with
better life opportunities.
Using data from the 2004–2013 ACS, we ﬁnd that a one standard
deviation increase in the intensity of interior immigration enforcement
lowers the childbearing likelihood of likely undocumented women by
6.3 percent. This eﬀect seems to be driven by police-based measures,
as opposed to employment-based policies like E-Verify mandates. Furthermore, the fact that the eﬀects are also present among intact families,
families headed by a likely undocumented couple, as well as among the
poorest families, suggests the importance of limited income resources,
along with increased uncertainty emanating from an intensiﬁed fear of
deportation, on likely unauthorized women’s fertility.
Children’s Living Arrangements
Ultimately, a main concern when examining the implications of
intensiﬁed immigration enforcement on households headed by a likely
undocumented immigrant is how it might be impacting other individuals in the household, especially more vulnerable populations, as would
be the case with children. This concern becomes more salient when
most of the children living in households headed by a likely undocu-
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mented immigrant are U.S. citizens. The growing number of deportations accompanying the intensiﬁcation of immigration enforcement at
the local and state levels since 9/11 have been breaking up families,
and it has changed the structure of many families headed by an unauthorized parent, typically through the deportation of fathers. Given the
emotional, cognitive, and long-run socioeconomic costs of being raised
in single-headed households or without parents, gaining a better understanding of the collateral damage of heightened enforcement on the
families to which these children belong is warranted.
To learn more about the consequences of intensiﬁed immigration
enforcement on these children, we explore how it may have contributed
to the incidence of two speciﬁc living arrangements: 1) the likelihood
of living in single-headed household with a mother whose spouse is
absent, and 2) the propensity to live without any of the parents. Using
2005–2015 ACS data, we ﬁnd that the average yearly increase in interior immigration enforcement over that time span increases the likelihood by 20 percent that a Hispanic child might be living with her/his
likely undocumented mother in a female-headed household where the
other spouse is absent. It also elevates the child’s propensity to live
without any parent by nearly 19 percent. The ﬁrst result points to the
possibility that these children might have been impacted by the deportation of their fathers, given that undocumented migrants are more likely
to be married to other undocumented immigrants. The second ﬁnding
further points to the possibility that, through the deportation of one
or both parents, children might be left behind living with relatives or
friends who are not at risk of deportation. Both ﬁndings prove robust to
many identiﬁcation and robustness checks, and reveal that the observed
impacts originate from immigration enforcement more directly linked
to deportations, as is the case with police-based enforcement—namely,
immigration enforcement involving local and state police.
As noted earlier in this chapter, in recent years, several localities
have enacted ordinances and legislation pieces (sometimes labeled
Trust Acts) with the purpose of increasing the community trust and
cooperation with the police after the chilling eﬀect of prior immigration enforcement measures (Fagan and Meares 2008; Fagan and Tyler
2008; Skogan and Frydl 2004; Tyler 2010). To examine if the observed
impacts are indeed stemming from tougher immigration enforcement,
we reestimate our model excluding states with a statewide Trust Act
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(so-called sanctuary city). Such estimates should be somewhat larger.
Indeed, we ﬁnd that the same increase in immigration enforcement
raises these children’s likelihood of residing in a household headed by
their moms, whose spouses are absent, by 17 percent, and the probability of living without any parent by 22 percent.
Educational Attainment of Children
So far, this chapter has discussed how interior immigration enforcement has been particularly damaging to families headed by undocumented long-term residents of the United States (Rosenblum et al.
2014). Furthermore, even though most of the children are U.S. citizens from birth, and as such they are not the main target of intensiﬁed
enforcement, they often face signiﬁcant social and economic disadvantages because of a parent’s unauthorized status (Debry 2012; Passel
and Taylor 2010). These children endure the negative consequences
of deportation fear, stress, and anxiety (Amuedo-Dorantes, Puttitanun,
and Martinez-Donate 2013). Several authors have documented their
changes in sleeping and eating patterns, anger, and physical ailment,
along with diﬃculties accessing proper services as their families ﬁnd it
necessary to relocate or to start living in the shadows in order to evade
apprehension (Bacon Immigration Law and Policy Program and the
Southwest Institute for Research on Women 2011; Chaudry et al. 2010;
Watson 2014). And, as shown earlier, it is not solely fear. The deportation of, typically, the household head leads to ﬁnancial hardship, which
translates to concentration diﬃculties, disruptive classroom behaviors,
school absences, and parental disengagement, which can have detrimental impacts on schooling progression (Capps et al. 2007; Chaudry et
al. 2010). This is particularly true for immigrant boys, given their lower
educational attainment and overall outcomes compared to girls (Qin
2006; Suarez-Orozco and Qin-Hillard 2004).
Amuedo-Dorantes and Lopez (2015, 2017) examine how intensiﬁed interior immigration enforcement, through its link to deportation
fear and ﬁnancial constraints, impacts children’s school performance.
Using data on Hispanic children aged 6–17 from the 2000–2013 CPS
October School Enrollment Supplement, they show that the intensiﬁcation of interior immigration enforcement raises young children’s (aged
6–13) probability of repeating a grade by 14 percent and the likelihood
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of dropping out of school of older children (aged 14–17) by 18 percent. While the eﬀect on younger children aged 6–13 does not survive
all identiﬁcation and robustness checks, and is seemingly concentrated
among Mexican children in particular, the impact of intensiﬁed immigration enforcement on the propensity of older youth aged 14–17 to
drop out of school is robust. Additionally, the authors consider the
policy channels through which these impacts are taking place and ﬁnd
that the increase in police-based enforcement from 2000 through 2013
raised the likelihood of grade repetition by 14 percent among kids aged
6–13 typically attending K–8. In addition, the spread of employmentveriﬁcation mandates appears to have raised school dropout rates by 9
percent among older, often work-eligible, youth aged 14–17.
Overall, the ﬁndings from Amuedo-Dorantes and Lopez (2015,
2017) uncover some of the hidden costs of intensiﬁed enforcement on
children who are, for the most part, U.S. citizens. This is an important
area of research for various reasons. First, the fact that the number of
U.S.-born children under the age of 18 living with at least one unauthorized parent more than doubled between 2000 and 2012 (Passel, Cohn,
and Rohal 2014). Second, it is well known that that grade retention is
one of the strongest predictors of dropping out of school. Finally, low
educational attainment is the most important determinant of the earnings gap between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites (Trejo 1997; Xia
and Kirby 2009).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have aimed to provide an overview of the growth
and modalities of interior immigration enforcement, the data and econometric challenges encountered by researchers interested in examining
its implications, and some of the consequences on undocumented immigrants and their families—many of them mixed-status households with
U.S. citizen children. We show how, in addition to adversely impacting
residential choices and the labor market outcomes of undocumented
immigrants, the measures also break apart families, raise the poverty
exposure of 4.5 million of U.S. citizen children, and negatively aﬀect
their schooling outcomes.
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A better understanding of the collateral damage of intensiﬁed immigration enforcement on U.S. citizen children and immigrant families
is crucial, given that some of the sought-after goals, such as reducing
crime (e.g., Thomas and Cox 2014), do not seem to have materialized.
The Trump administration is planning to recover the 287(g) mandates,
together with the Secure Communities program. It has also expanded
the priority list of ICE and raised deportations—actions that are leading to the broken families. Our hope is that the provided evidence will
inform the public and guide us toward a joint eﬀort to enact a comprehensive and more humane immigration reform.

Notes
1. The conditions included being U.S. citizens, having their backgrounds investigated, and having a minimum of one year of tenure in their current position (ICE
2016).
2. Various counties had the Department of Justice look into allegations of racial proﬁling. See, for example, the investigation by the Department of Justice in Maricopa
County, which concluded that the sheriﬀ’s oﬃce regularly committed racial proﬁling of Latinos. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/crt/legacy/2011/12/15/
mcso_ﬁndletter_12-15-11.pdf% (accessed November 17, 2017).
3. Where k refers to each policy; that is, 287(g) local, 287(g) state, Secure Communities, omnibus immigration law, and E-Verify.
4. This clause established that police have to determine the immigration status of any
person suspected of being an illegal during a lawful stop.
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Understanding Migration Policy
Insights from Models of International Trade
Alfonso Cebreros
Daniel Chiquiar
Monica Roa
Martín Tobal
Mexico Central Bank

Recent developments have placed immigration at the forefront of
the policy debate, creating much controversy around the associated
trade-oﬀs for host economies. Indeed, immigration triggers opposing
eﬀects on the welfare of diﬀerent groups within a country, and this
opens the door for conﬂicting arguments and heated debates. The implication has been a proliferation of arguments both in favor of and against
immigration. In turn, this creates a need for accomplishing theoretical
and empirical work that can better inform the policy debate.
This chapter takes a step in this direction by showing how instruments traditionally included in the economists’ tool kit can shed light
on relevant but largely controversial issues. In particular, the chapter
uses a standard model of international trade to show that immigrants
with complementary skills may increase the productivity of scarce factors and, through this channel, enhance overall welfare in host nations.1
However, the income levels of some groups within the host country
may be negatively aﬀected, and thus they may oppose migration.
There are several arguments that either have been or could in principle be used to support immigration. One of these arguments claims
that immigrants play an active and indispensable role in promoting
dynamism, innovation, and scientiﬁc progress in host economies. This
argument is consistent, for instance, with the ﬁnding that 45 percent
of high-tech ﬁrms from the Fortune 500 had either a ﬁrst- or a secondgeneration immigrant among its founders (Partnership for a New Amer-
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ican Economy 2011).2 Moreover, the premise that immigrants largely
contribute to scientiﬁc progress is consistent with Figures 6.1 and 6.2.3
Figure 6.1 shows that the number of Nobel prizes obtained by a country is positively associated with the ratio of immigrants-to-natives that
have won the prize, and Figure 6.2 shows that this ratio is positively
correlated with the number of registered patents, even after controlling
for real GDP per capita.
An additional argument in favor of migration could be that immigrants complement native workers in host labor markets. According to
this argument, immigrants’ skills are generally complementary to those
possessed by native workers and, therefore, immigration reduces labor
shortages in both low- and high-skilled occupations. By complementing native workers in production, immigration would create job opportunities and increase their wages. Consistent with this idea, Figure 6.3
shows that immigrants in the United States are relatively concentrated
at the top and at the bottom of the skill distribution, while natives are
relatively more concentrated in the middle.
Figure 6.1 Nobel Prizes Awarded, 1901–2014 (top 5 countries)
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from Nobelprize.org and the World Atlas.

Pozo book.indb 2

10/22/2018 1:43:56 PM

Understanding Migration Policy 143
Figure 6.2 High-Skill Migration and Patents Registered (as a percentage
of GDP per capita)
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NOTE: Each observation in the ﬁgure is represented as proportion of real GDP per
capita.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from Nobelprize.org, World Atlas,
World Bank, and U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce.

On the opposite side of the debate, several arguments have been or
could be used to oppose immigration and favor restrictions to international labor mobility. One of these arguments emphasizes that, in those
markets in which natives compete with foreigners, immigration triggers
competition for the same types of jobs, depressing wages and raising
unemployment (see De New and Zimmermann [1994] for evidence on
the German labor market). Another argument relies on the ﬁscal costs
that foreigners could impose on host countries. It has been argued that,
due to their age, skill, fertility, and language characteristics, immigrants
may consume large amounts of government-funded goods but, on the
other hand, increase ﬁscal revenues only by a small amount (Nowrasteh
2015).
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Figure 6.3 Native-Born Americans and Nonnatives (as a percentage of
their total population, aged 25 and over, 2015)
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NOTE: The total population aged 25 and over is divided into native and foreign born,
and then each category is divided according to educational attainment. Thus, the gray
bars sum up to a 100% and the black bars sum up to 100%. The category “graduate
degree” groups people with masters, doctoral, and professional degrees.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Current Population Survey,
2015.

The fact that immigration can in principle generate several and
conﬂicting eﬀects on welfare, as well as the existence of inconclusive answers to relevant questions, highlights the need for economists
to take part of the policy debate that surrounds immigration. Indeed,
economists need to steer this debate toward policy prescriptions and
cost-beneﬁt analysis, which is better informed by economic theory and
empirical work. A proper cost-beneﬁt framework and, more generally,
a more proactive role by economists, could improve our understanding
of relevant trade-oﬀs and increase the number of good estimates about
immigration impacts.
In this context, this chapter proposes a simple framework to formalize some of the trade-oﬀs that have been associated with immigration.

Pozo book.indb 4

10/22/2018 1:43:57 PM

Understanding Migration Policy 145

Speciﬁcally, it sets a standard two-good, two-factor, two-country model
of trade and explores a topic that has not yet been deeply investigated in
the literature. To be more precise, the model explores the importance of
assessing the skill composition of migration when performing welfare
analysis and investigates how certain public policies aﬀect migration.
The analysis is carried out by studying the impacts of international
trade and migration under ﬁve diﬀerent scenarios: (1) autarky; (2) free
trade and no migration; (3) mutual trade restrictions and no migration;
(4) free migration and no international trade; and (5) tax on migration
and no international trade. This analysis generates several interesting
and insightful conclusions.
First, when the welfare function of the recipient country is assumed
to correspond to the well-being of local inhabitants—that is, either
because immigration policy decisions are taken ex ante or because, just
as in any theoretical model of political economy, decision makers care
about voters—the free-trade and the free-migration scenarios generate isomorphic results in terms of welfare and redistribution. In other
words, by complementing the abundant factor, immigrants increase
overall welfare but reduce the returns to the scarce factor in the recipient country.
Although the aforementioned equivalence between trade and immigration is frequently evoked in academic circles, this chapter contributes
to the literature by showing that the result holds precisely for the most
relevant measure of welfare from a political point of view (migrants do
not vote and, thus, electoral speeches frequently focus only on natives).
Moreover, the use of this measure is an innovation relative to existing
theories that investigate the eﬀects of migration in factor proportion
models (Dixit and Norman 1980).
Second, there is an additional and relevant contribution of the chapter that is also based on the equivalence between the free trade and
the free migration scenarios, particularly on public policies associated
with the associated equilibria. Speciﬁcally, we compare outcomes of
the mutual trade restrictions environment analyzed in scenario (3) with
those that arise from the immigration policy case considered in scenario
(5). Through this comparison it is shown that, for each level of mutual
trade restrictions, there is a migration tax that replicates the same results
in terms of welfare and redistribution eﬀects from the perspective of the
host country.
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Third, we can conclude that, given that migration enhances overall welfare but generates income redistribution, just as an import tariﬀ
does, migration policies may be strongly inﬂuenced by political economy concerns and not necessarily by eﬃciency considerations—that is,
protectionist policies on trade and migration have the same redistribution eﬀects and, therefore, may be based on the same kind of political
economy considerations. Hence, we propose an extension of the model
to illustrate one of the channels through which this inﬂuence may occur.
That is, we combine a standard relative endowment framework with a
political economy model for the determination of immigration policies.
Consistent with the results of Galiani and Torrens (2015), we conclude
that restrictions to international labor mobility may result from political
economy motivations.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Economists have long been interested in understanding the eﬀects
and determinants of immigration, as well as the impacts of diﬀerent
immigration policy measures. This interest has given rise to both theoretical and empirical works, several of which keep a close relationship with this chapter. On the empirical front, economists’ interest has
produced a large body of literature performing evaluations in three
domains: 1) the determinants of migration decisions, 2) the impacts of
migration on host labor markets, and 3) the eﬀects of migration policies.
As for the factors determining immigration decisions, Borjas (1991)
and Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) are two relevant studies. Both coincide that educational attainment is a critical determinant of immigration,
meaning that diﬀerences in the skill returns between source and host
countries provide distinct incentives to migrate to workers located in
diﬀerent segments of the skill distribution. Along these lines, Chiquiar
and Hanson show that Mexican immigrants to the United States are
on average more educated than Mexican residents but less educated
than U.S. natives. Continuing with this line of research, Mayda (2010),
Beine, Docquier, and Özden (2011), and Ortega and Peri (2013) ﬁnd
that immigration decisions are also inﬂuenced by three additional determinants: 1) income per capita and unemployment in the source and des-
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tination countries, 2) the stock of people from the source nation residing in the destination country, and 3) the restrictiveness of immigration
policies.
Regarding the strand of literature dealing with the impacts of migration on host labor markets, several of the arguments were proposed
by Card and Borjas in the context of the “Mariel boatlift” episode—
45,000 Cubans arrived in Miami, increasing its labor supply by 7 percent (mostly low-skill labor). On one hand, Card (1990) compared the
labor market outcomes of workers from diﬀerent ethnicities and workers at diﬀerent segments of the wage distribution within Miami across
time periods, and the outcomes for diﬀerent workers in Miami with
outcomes of similar workers in other American cities. This comparison
led him to conclude that the surge of labor supply in 1980 had no discernible impact on labor market outcomes in Miami (i.e., the changes
in employment and wages in Miami were comparable to those observed
in other American cities over the same time period). On the other hand,
Borjas (2016) later revisited the Mariel boatlift episode and argued that
60 percent of the inﬂux of Cuban workers were high school dropouts
and that, as one focused on this speciﬁc segment of the labor market,
wages in Miami decreased between 10 and 30 percent.
The third strand of empirical literature explores the eﬀectiveness
of immigration policies mainly on the size and the composition of
migration ﬂows. It has been shown that tighter immigration restrictions
signiﬁcantly reduce the size of migration ﬂows, except for the case of
asylum migration (Czaika and de Hass 2014; Thielemann 2004).4 In
contrast, the impacts on the composition of migration ﬂows are harder
to assess, mostly because it is diﬃcult to construct indexes that can
capture the restrictiveness of policies on speciﬁc groups of immigrants.
Along these lines, Thielemann (2004) and de Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli
(2014) propose diﬀerent indexes and using them show that immigration
policies have aﬀected the size of migration ﬂows but not necessarily
their composition. This suggests that more research is required to come
up with appropriate restrictiveness measures when studying the composition of migration ﬂows. An additional challenge is given by the
lack of studies evaluating the long-term impact of immigration policies,
because most existing studies focus on immediate impacts (Czaika and
de Hass 2013, 2015).
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As a ﬁnal remark on the empirical literature it should be noted that,
although much has been done in terms of assessing relevant impacts,
there is further need for empirical work investigating the relationship
between the skill proﬁle of migrants and the skill proﬁle of the host
country’s labor force. At the same time, it would be important to investigate whether the skill supply of migrants is generally complementary
to or substitute of the skill supply of the native labor force.
On the theoretical front, two works relate closely to ours: Dixit and
Norman (1980) and Galiani and Torrens (2015). Just as we do here,
Dixit and Norman (1980) set a standard model of international trade to
investigate the eﬀects of immigration. In the benchmark case, they consider a neoclassical factor proportion framework with two countries,
two factors, and two goods.
An interesting point of comparison between Dixit and Norman
(1980) and our work refers to the measure of welfare used in each case.
Unlike us, they take as a welfare measure the well-being of both native
and migrant workers and, in this context, show that immigration entails
two types of eﬀects. First, there is a direct eﬀect that results from changing the size of the host country’s population while holding prices constant. Given our interest in using a more politically relevant measure,
this is the eﬀect that our model does not consider. Besides, there is an
indirect eﬀect that results from changes in the terms of trade. Dixit and
Norman’s conclusion (1980) is that there are no clear-cut answers for
the net eﬀects of migration.
The second theoretical paper related to ours is Galiani and Torrens
(2015). In contrast with our factor proportion approach to international
trade, they opt for a Ricardian framework featuring diﬀerences in technology across sectors and countries. However, just as our study does,
their work extends a standard model of trade to account for political
economy motivations. They combine their Ricardian economy with a
simple international political economy model in which governments
jointly decide on trade and immigration policies. In their framework,
countries specialize in diﬀerent goods and thus use diﬀerent types of
technologies. This implies that trade does not reduce real wages in any
of the countries, but immigration diminishes them in the technologically advanced rich nation. Real wage diﬀerences induce workers to
migrate there, increasing the labor supply and depressing real labor
returns. Hence, while trade can be supported as a Nash equilibrium
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of the international political economy game, free international labor
mobility cannot. In the same spirit of this chapter, they conclude that
restrictions to migration are the result of political economy motivations.

MODEL SETUP
Consider a world with two countries, two factors, and two goods.
The two countries, North and South, are indexed by N and S; the two
factors, skilled and unskilled labor, are denoted by H and L; and the
two goods are a skilled-intensive good and an unskilled-intensive good.
The price of the former good is referred to as P, while the price of the
latter good is chosen as the numeraire and will thus take the value of 1.
North is assumed to be the skilled-labor abundant country; hence,
LN /HN < LS /HS.
Technologies are identical across nations. In both countries, production is given by the following Cobb-Douglas constant-returns-toscale functions:
ఉ ଵିఉ

(6.1)

ܻ௦ ൌ ߝ௦ ቀܪ௦ ܮ௦ ቁ

(6.2)

ఈ ଵିఈ
ܻ௨ ൌ ߝ௨ ൫ܪ௨
ܮ௨ ൯

where ܻ௦ and ܻ௨ refer to the production of the skilled- and unskilledintensive goods in country j and our skill-intensity assumption implies β
> α, where β < 1 and α < 1; Hjs and Ljs denote the amounts of skilled and
unskilled workers used in the production of ܻ௦ ; and εs = β −β (1 − β)−(1 − β)
and εu = α−a(1− α)−(1 − a) are normalizations of the production functions.
Preferences, also identical across regions, are given by the following utility function:
(6.3)

ఊ  ଵିఊ 

ܷ ൌ ܿ௦ ܿ௨ 

where γ < 1 represents the relative preference for the skilled-intensive
good and cjs denotes country j’s consumption of this product. The indirect utility function associated with Equation (6.3) can be written as
follows (see the online appendix for a full derivation):
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(6.4)

ିఊ

ܸ ൌ ߛ ఊ ሺͳ െ ߛሻଵିఊ ܫ ܲ 

where Ij and Pj are the nominal income level and the price of the skilledintensive good in country j. Equation (6.4) states that utility is increasing in real income; that is, given that the price of the unskilled-intensive
good has been chosen as the numeraire, the price index faced by consumers in this region equals ሺͳሻଵିఊ ܲఊ ൌ ܲఊ.
Labor and product markets are perfectly competitive; therefore, in
equilibrium, proﬁts must equal zero. Finally, we assume that relative
labor supplies are suﬃciently similar across regions that there is always
incomplete specialization in equilibrium.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
It is possible to illustrate common patterns among the ﬁve scenarios we consider in terms of welfare. For scenarios (1)–(3), we follow
the literature and use the indirect utility function shown in Equation
(6.4). In scenarios (4) and (5), the argument is subtler since these scenarios consider migration, which in turn may threaten the validity of
the expression in Equation (6.4) as an appropriate indicator of welfare.
To see this, note that when utility is measured as in (6.4), total income
increases with factor endowments. The implication is that, when migration takes place, there is an almost mechanical increasing impact on
utility through a rise in the country’s population. In turn, the problem is
that, by increasing the population size, immigration could also end up
diminishing welfare in per capita terms.
Therefore, to prevent our measure from increasing mechanically in
response to immigration, but also to concentrate on political economy
aspects of migration policies, we focus on the welfare of native inhabitants. That is, in scenarios (6.4) and (6.5), the analysis abstracts from
the direct impact of migration. Instead, this analysis focuses on the
impact of migration on welfare through its eﬀect on wages and on the
relative price of the skilled-intensive good (see Equation [6.5] in the
online appendix for a representation of the resulting measure of welfare). Hence, to evaluate welfare eﬀects in scenarios (6.4) and (6.5), the
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chapter will concentrate on changes in real income and only on changes
in this income arising from variations in relative prices, just as we will
in scenarios (6.1)–(6.3). In this regard, it is important to note that this
common pattern arises only from the fact that we have chosen the most
relevant measure of welfare from a political economy point of view.
Indeed, in a perfect competition environment where proﬁts are
zero, real income equals the sum of real wage bills of skilled workers and unskilled employees. Thus, changes in a country’s welfare—
for instance, due to immigration—can be mapped to variations in its
skilled wage, its unskilled wage, and its price index, which are in turn
directly dependent on changes in the price for the skilled-intensive good
(qj , wj and Pj).5 Thus, consider for instance a rise in Pj. The direct impact
of this rise is a proﬁt increase for producers of the skilled-intensive
good and a proﬁt reduction for producers of the unskilled-intensive
good. Hence, following the rise in Pj , the skilled wage must increase
and the unskilled wage must fall so that the proﬁts of both producer
types return to zero. Moreover, the direction of these changes also holds
for wages in real terms.
In summary, there are common patterns in terms of welfare among
the ﬁve scenarios we consider. In all these scenarios, changes in a country’s welfare depend on variations in its real income and, thus, on variations in its real skilled and unskilled wages, which in turn depend on
movements on the price for the skilled-intensive good. That is, in the
ﬁve scenarios we consider, changes in the welfare of country j can be
expressed in terms of Pj . Equations (7) and (8) in the online appendix
show that qj and wj can be written in terms of Pj and parameters of the
production.
Taking this into account, Equations (6) and (9) in the online appendix derive an expression for real income and therefore for welfare
that remains valid for each of the ﬁve scenarios we consider; thus,
for instance, to assess the welfare level obtained in a given scenario,
it would suﬃce to plug in this common expression the relative price
for the skilled-intensive good corresponding to the referred scenario.
Using this common expression, the online appendix shows that under
certain conditions, real income in country j is well described by Figure
6.4. This ﬁgure shows that there is a value of Pj that we call Pj* in which
the eﬀect of a price change on the skilled wage fully oﬀsets its eﬀects
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Figure 6.4 Real Income (our measure of welfare) as a Function of Pj
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on the unskilled wage; that is, the eﬀect of a marginal price change on
real income is equal to zero.

AUTARKY
This section studies the equilibrium properties and welfare characteristics of two autarkic economies, North and South. The absence of
international trade and migration implies that in the present section the
two regions must be understood as fully separate economies, implying
that their equilibria must be solved separately. In this scenario, North
and South will have diﬀerent prices for the skilled-intensive good and,
thus, their real skilled and unskilled wages will diﬀer in equilibrium.
Skilled and unskilled wages in each region are determined separately
by the corresponding pair of zero-proﬁt conditions—as noted above,
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proﬁts equal zero for the producers of the two goods. Since this implies
that goods prices equal unitary cost, which in turn depend on wages,
the zero-proﬁt conditions can be used to obtain skilled and unskilled
wages in equilibrium. Precisely, these conditions allow writing skilled
and unskilled wages in each region in terms of the price for the skilledintensive good and, then, real wages also in terms of the same price. The
online appendix uses the zero-proﬁt conditions in Equations (10) and
(11) to solve for skilled and unskilled wages in North under autarky in
(12) and (13), i.e., ݍே௨௧and ݓே௨௧, in terms of the relevant price, ܲே௨௧ ;
real wages are shown in (14) and (15); Equations (20) and (21) repeat
the same procedure for South.
The results show that, as noted above for a more general case, a
rise in the price of the skilled-intensive good increases the skilled wage
while reducing the unskilled wage under autarky, and the intuition for
this result goes as follows. In each region, the rise in this price increases
proﬁts for producers of the skilled-intensive good but reduces proﬁts
for producers of the unskilled-intensive good. Thus, the skilled wage
must increase and the unskilled wage must fall so that the proﬁts of
both producer types return to zero. Moreover, given that real income
depends directly on real skilled and unskilled wages, one can also write
welfare in each region in terms of the price for the skilled-intensive
good (see Equation [16] in the online appendix). In fact, this expression
for welfare is symmetric to the expression that characterizes all scenarios mentioned in the previous section. Indeed, it is the same expression
except for the fact that it contains the relative for the skilled-intensive
good that corresponds to the autarky case, ܲே௨௧ .
Having written wages in terms of this price, the ensuing expressions
can be used to solve for the additional market-clearing condition—
namely, equilibrium in the market of the skilled-intensive good—and,
through this channel, ﬁnd the equilibrium value of this price. Thus, using
the expressions for wages obtained from the zero-proﬁt conditions, we
derive skill premia and use them to derive the supply of and demand for
this good and, ultimately, the equilibrium. As stated in Equations (19)
and (22) in the online appendix, the equilibrium price for the skilledintensive good in a given region is increasing in the unskilled-to-skilled
labor supply prevailing there.
This result is standard in the literature of factor-proportion models,
and its intuition lies in the fact that regions with a relatively greater
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supply of skilled workers have, holding everything else constant, also
a relatively greater supply of the skilled-intensive good. Thus, in these
regions, the relative price for the skilled-intensive good must be smaller
so that a larger amount of this is purchased in equilibrium. Moreover,
given that in our model, North is the skilled-labor-abundant region, a
direct implication of this standard result is that the price of the skilledintensive good is greater in North than in South in equilibrium; that is,
a LN /HN < LS /HS , as stated in the Model Setup section.
Regarding welfare, Figure 6.5 uses the expression in which welfare depends on the price for the skilled-intensive good that was mentioned earlier and that, as noted above, remains valid for all scenarios
we consider. Speciﬁcally, this ﬁgure shows the two curves that result
from plugging ܲே௨௧ and ܲௌ௨௧ separately in this expression. Note in this
ﬁgure that the equilibrium price under autarky is the price at which
the eﬀect of a marginal price change on real income is equal to zero;
using the notation from Figure 6.4, we write ܲே௨௧ = PN* and that ܲௌ௨௧ 
= PS* . In this regard, it is important to note that, although Figure 6.5
would seem to suggest that the welfare function attains a minimum at
Pj* for given endowment levels, we are not minimizing welfare through
resource allocation.
The autarky equilibria depicted in Figure 6.5 is the most eﬃcient
one among all feasible choices for the resources held in the economy.
Any of the other allocations in this ﬁgure yield a higher welfare but,
nonetheless, require relaxing the constraints deﬁning this function—
more resources or better technology. Indeed, as noted below, reaching
greater welfare is possible through the separation of consumption and
production decisions generated by international trade, which will lead
the economies to diﬀerent points of the curves by allowing them to
consume a diﬀerent bundle from the one they produce, just as if they
had more resources.

FREE INTERNATIONAL TRADE
This section considers a scenario in which there is international
trade but no migration ﬂows. While international trade equalizes the
price of the skilled-intensive good across regions, the absence of migra-
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Figure 6.5 Real Income as a Function of Pj in Autarky
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tion implies that real wages in this section are only determined by this
price and not by migration ﬂows.
Just as in the previous section, the zero-proﬁt conditions allow writing wages and real wages in terms of the price for the skilled-intensive
good; although, as noted above, this equilibrium price and thus wages
and real wages in this section are identical across regions. Equations
(23)–(26) in the online appendix show their expressions. Also, as in
the previous section, the price for the skilled-intensive good must be
market clearing in equilibrium and thus can also be found by equating
the demand for the skilled-intensive good to its supply. Yet, a diﬀerence
with respect to the autarky case is that in the free trade scenario considered in this section, the relevant demand is the world demand while
the relevant supply is the world supply. That is, unlike in the previous
section, the market-clearing conditions for the skilled-intensive good
with trade are deﬁned at the global level.
Thus, we use the expressions for wages as a function of the price
for the skilled-intensive good to derive skill-premia and the supply and
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demand of this good in each region, sum these supplies and demands,
and then ﬁnd the price that clears the world market (see Equations
[27]–[30] in the online appendix). The result shows that the price for
the skilled-intensive good is increasing in the unskilled-to-skilled labor
supply of the world economy; Equation (31) in the online appendix
shows this price, PFT. Intuitively, this result is analogous to the one
obtained in the previous section, implying that there is also a similar
intuition behind in this case. Speciﬁcally, the greater the world supply
of skilled workers, the greater the world supply of the skilled-intensive
good becomes and therefore the smaller the price of the good must be
in equilibrium. Indeed, the free trade equilibrium is analogous to the
equilibrium of an autarkic economy in which the labor supplies result
from summing the Northern and Southern supplies (HW = HN + HS and
LW = LN + LS).
Using these results, the eﬀects of trade on welfare and income distribution in each region can be obtained by comparing the equilibrium
price for the skilled-intensive good from this section to the one obtained
for the autarky case. The results show that trade leads the equilibrium
price of the skilled-intensive good to a point between the autarky price
of the North and the autarky price of the South, i.e., ܲே௨௧ < PFT < ܲௌ௨௧ .
This is also a standard result in factor-proportion models and shows that
the specialization induced by international trade obeys the patterns of
relative labor supplies of each country. Compared to autarky, the relative price change generated by trade induces each country to increase
production of the good for which it has a comparative advantage.
Furthermore, the change in the price for the skilled-intensive good
has relevant implications for redistribution. In North, this price increases
relative to the autarky case and this implies that, given that the zero-profits conditions must be fulﬁlled, the real skilled wage increases but the
real unskilled wage falls in this region. In other words, as predicted by
the traditional Stolper-Samuel Theorem and the so-called Jones Magniﬁcation eﬀect (Jones 1965), while in “northern economies” skilled workers gain from international trade, unskilled workers lose. In contrast, the
opposite movements are observed for South so that in this economy the
unskilled workers are the winners from trade.
Beyond these redistribution eﬀects, international trade in our model
generates clear predictions for welfare in aggregate terms, and these
predictions can be also assessed by comparing the price of the skilled-
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Figure 6.6 Real Income as a Function of Pj under Free Trade
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intensive good in the free trade equilibrium and the autarky scenario.
Figure 6.6 uses this result, and the expression for welfare that is valid
for the ﬁve scenarios, to show the results. Note in this ﬁgure that in both
North and South welfare increases relative to the autarky case. Indeed,
trade allows countries to reach an allocation that would only be possible
under autarky if each region had more resources and/or a better technology. The intuition for this result lies on the fact that, by allowing countries to separate consumption from production bundles, trade openness
provides the opportunity to reach an otherwise unfeasible consumption
basket.

MUTUAL TRADE RESTRICTIONS
Starting from a free trade environment, this section considers a scenario in which each region imposes an import tariﬀ on the product of
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the other region, but immigration is still not allowed. The goal is to set
a benchmark for comparison with the following section, in which immigration is permitted only to a certain extent, just as international trade is
only partially permitted in the present section.6
The tariﬀ is assumed to be identical across countries and to take the
iceberg form so that, for one unit of a product to arrive in the other country, τ > 1 must be shipped, i.e., the rest melts away in transit. This tariﬀ
increases the eﬀective price of the imported product in each region, creating a wedge between domestic and international prices and, through
this channel, preventing the eﬀective relative price of the skilledintensive good from being equal across regions—this price increases in
South and diminishes in North. Considering these changes, and given
that the zero-proﬁt conditions must still hold, the skilled wage must fall
and the unskilled wage must increase in North relative to free trade; by
the same token, the skilled wage must increase and the unskilled wage
must fall in South. Indeed, in the mutual restriction scenario, nominal
wages lie within a region deﬁned by their values of the free trade and
autarky scenarios (see Equations [38]–[41] in the online appendix.
Regarding real wages, the import tariﬀ generates an additional
eﬀect. By increasing the eﬀective price of imported products, the tariﬀ generates an increasing impact on the price index. This impact and
the above-mentioned eﬀect on nominal wages are shown in Equations
(42)–(45) in the online appendix, in which real wages are written in
terms of the price for the skilled-intensive good.
Given this result, and that real income depends directly on real
wages, we obtain an expression for welfare that is asymmetric to those
obtained for the remaining scenarios, if it were not for a single but relevant exception. That is, the expression for welfare we obtain in this
section could be derived by plugging PMTR in the common expression
for welfare mentioned in the Preliminary Considerations section, if it
was not for the fact that, in the present section, the import tariﬀ creates
a wedge between the relative price of the good and its eﬀective relative
price (see Equations [50] and [51] in the online appendix for the income
and real income expressions in North and (52) for PMTR ). For the case of
North, the implication is that the welfare expression contains the term
PMTR/τ rather than the term PMTR.
With this result in mind, it is easy to see that a tax on immigration
will be able to perfectly replicate the welfare implications of the import
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tariﬀ in North as long as it is able to induce an equilibrium in which the
relative price for the skilled-intensive good equals PMTR/τ.

FREE MIGRATION AND NO INTERNATIONAL TRADE
This section explores the equilibrium characteristics and welfare
implications of international labor migration. For this purpose, it considers a scenario in which there is no international trade but workers
are allowed to migrate freely to a diﬀerent region. To construct this
scenario, the chapter takes as a point of departure the autarky regime
presented earlier. Starting from this regime, it will ﬁnd the incentives
for migration and the equilibrium prices generated by these incentives.
Since workers’ incomes are deﬁned by the real wages they receive,
their incentives for migration are fully determined by diﬀerences in real
wages across regions. Workers will have incentives to migrate to a different region until real wages become equal between North and South.
Real wage equalization across regions is the equilibrium condition
introduced by free migration and, thus, the new condition considered
in this section.
To understand what this new equilibrium condition requires in
terms of international labor mobility, it will be useful to begin by looking at the determinants of real wages. In turn, since in this section trade
does not take place, we can use the expressions for real wages obtained
under autarky as a point of departure. As noted in the Autarky section,
real wages under autarky depend on the price for the skilled-intensive
good, and this price in turn depends on the unskilled-to-skilled labor
ratio of each region. Precisely, the fact that the skilled-labor-abundant
region (i.e., North) has a smaller equilibrium price for the skilledintensive good implies that the real skilled wage in this region is also
smaller under autarky, at the time that its real unskilled wage is greater.
The intuition for this result can be obtained directly from noting that the
supply of skilled labor is greater in North than in South, while the opposite holds true for the unskilled labor supply (see Equations [53]–[56] in
the online appendix for real wages).
Most importantly, the implication of these real wage diﬀerences
across regions is that they create incentives for unskilled workers to
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migrate North and for skilled workers to migrate South. The question
then is, at which point do these real wages become equal so that the
incentives for migration disappear? The answer lies in the fact that real
wages depend on unskilled-to-skilled labor supplies: it is only when
the ratio of unskilled-to-skilled labor is the same in the two regions
that their real wages equalize, vanishing any incentive for immigration.
Notably, the only case in which both unskilled-to-skilled labor supplies
become equal is when they are in turn equal to the world unskilledto-skilled labor supply. Hence, immigration will take place until this
condition is fulﬁlled.
To assess the welfare implications of free migration, we must again
return to thinking about the price for the skilled-intensive good. The
fact that in the free migration equilibrium the ratio of unskilled-toskilled labor supply is the same across the two regions implies that they
also feature the same relative price for the skilled-intensive good. Thus,
in this sense, it can be argued that in the same manner as international
trade, free migration leads to price equalization across regions.
Furthermore, not only is it true that the two regions have the same
price, but in equilibrium their unskilled-to-skilled labor supply is also
equal to that of the world. The implication is that the equilibrium price
in two regions equals the price of the free trade scenario (Equation [62]
in the online appendix states this result). Interestingly, the fact that free
migration yields the same price for the skilled-intensive good as free
trade implies that we can easily derive the welfare implications of migration in our model. As largely known, free trade is welfare-improving
relative to an autarky equilibrium. More generally, it is known that the
prices under free trade reproduce any of the allocations within the continuum set of Pareto eﬃcient allocations. This results from the First
Fundamental Welfare Theorem and from noting that our framework
does not exhibit market failures. Driven by these results, we know that,
because free migration implements the same price vector as free trade,
migration is not only welfare-improving but also optimal from a Pareto
point of view.
Moreover, an important feature of the free migration equilibrium is
that it does not determine the absolute number of workers of each type
in each region—it only determines the unskilled-skilled labor ratio. The
fact that the absolute number of workers in each region is not determined forces us to choose, so we proceed by focusing on migration
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going in a single direction, from South to North. Besides being consistent with one of the equilibria, a situation in which migrants only go
North constitutes the most interesting case and, importantly, is also the
only equilibrium conﬁguration in a more realistic scenario in which this
region has a technological advantage over South.7
Regarding the redistributive implications of free migration, it is
worth emphasizing the consequences that immigrants have for income
distribution in North, given that this region will be the focus of our
analysis in the political economy analysis section. To the extent that
real wages are determined by the price of the skilled-intensive good,
and that this price is the same in free trade and the free migration equilibria, the redistributive implications of immigration are the same as
those of international trade. Relative to autarky, migration reduces the
real unskilled wage and increases the skilled wage, harming unskilled
workers but beneﬁting skilled employees (Equations [63] and [64] in
the online appendix show the comparison between the prices of the
free trade and the free migration equilibria). Yet, unlike in the free trade
scenario, in which unskilled workers are exposed to global competition
through product markets, in the free migration scenario these workers
are exposed to global competition through local labor markets.

GENERAL WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRATION
Even though we have been able to show that fully removing migration barriers is optimal from a Pareto point of view, this section takes
a more general approach and investigates the welfare consequences
of migrants, regardless of whether moving across regions is fully or
partially free. The goal is to simplify the welfare analysis that we will
undertake in the next section.
Precisely, this section considers two types of migration eﬀects on
welfare. Given that, as noted below, we only consider the eﬀect of
migration on welfare through its impact on prices, these two types of
eﬀects are associated with changes in the price of the skilled-intensive
good. The ﬁrst eﬀect raises interest only from an analytical point of
view; it refers to migration ﬂows that generate only marginal—that
is, inﬁnitesimally small—changes in this price. The results show that
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these types of migration ﬂows have no impact on real income and thus
welfare (see Equation [65] and Figure 7 in the online appendix for the
expression). The intuition for this result goes as follows. In a situation
where international trade is not allowed, such as the one considered as a
point of departure in the free migration scenario, the increase in the real
skilled wage beneﬁting Northern skilled workers is fully oﬀset by the
fall in the real unskilled wage harming Northern unskilled employees.
The second type of migration eﬀect has a more relevant application;
it refers to migration ﬂows that induce discrete—non-inﬁnitesimally
small—changes in prices, such as those we observe in real life. The
results show that this type of migration exerts a positive impact on welfare and the intuition goes as follows. Starting from any of the situation
that lies between the free trade and the free migration scenarios, Southern migrants increase the real skilled wage. Thus, given that the zeroproﬁt conditions must be fulﬁlled, the price for the skilled-intensive
good rises in equilibrium. That is, migration takes the autarkic economy
closer to the free trade equilibrium (as is well-known, trade openness
always improves welfare in our model—see Equation [66] in the online
appendix for the analytical expression showing this result and Figure 8
for a representation).

TAX ON MIGRATION
This section investigates the eﬀects of a tax on migration. It departs
from the autarky regime and focuses on migration ﬂows of unskilled
workers going from South to North, in the same manner as the Free
Migration and No International Trade section does.
The tax on migration we consider is assumed to take the iceberg
form. Thus, a worker migrating to North receives only a fraction 1 − ϕ
of her wage, and the rest melts away in “her transit.” For the purpose
of our analysis, this tax is a suﬃcient statistic of migration policy; that
is, a suﬃcient indicator of policy-induced restrictions to international
labor mobility.
We begin by considering diﬀerences in real unskilled wages
between the two regions at our point of departure. In contrast with the
free migration case, in a situation in which immigration is costly, the
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incentives for migration are exhausted even before real wages equalize
across regions.
The tax diminishes the beneﬁt from migration, inducing unskilled
workers from South to migrate until the following indiﬀerence condition is satisﬁed:
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(see Equations [67] and [68] in the online appendix for expressions of
these wages). The tax on migration introduces a wedge between real
wages across regions and, through this channel, diminishes immigration and imposes a wedge between unskilled-to-skilled labor ratios.
Indeed, the migration incentives are exhausted as the real wage net of
the migration costs in North is equal to the real wage in South. Thus,
the equilibrium condition in this section is diﬀerent from the condition
considered in the free migration case.
This change has important implications for the price of the skilledintensive good in equilibrium. A smaller number of unskilled migrants
to North is associated with a smaller real skilled wage and, therefore,
a smaller price for the skilled-intensive good. The implication is that,
since income distribution and welfare in North depend crucially on this
price, the tax on migration aﬀects these variables in equilibrium.
Regarding welfare, it is important to note that because the tax diminishes the price of the skilled-intensive good in North, it triggers welfarereducing eﬀects. It is easy to see this by using the graphical tools shown
above. Furthermore, the fall in the equilibrium price for the skilledintensive good generates redistributive eﬀects relative to the free international labor mobility equilibrium. The tax diminishes the number of
unskilled immigrants and, thus the supply of unskilled labor increases
to a lesser extent in North. This makes the real unskilled wages greater
than in the free migration regime, implying that the real skilled wage
must fall for the zero-proﬁt conditions to be satisﬁed. Hence, the migration tax increases the real return to unskilled workers and reduces the
real return to skilled workers with respect to a free migration regime,
and therefore, in this sense, it can be argued that it has some eﬀects as
an imports tax in the context of international trade. This result is crucial
to understand why special interest groups may want to constrain migra-
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tion and therefore motivate the political economy analysis in the Political Economy Analysis section.

TAX EQUIVALENCE
The analyses in previous sections have shown that a migration
tax harms the abundant factor, beneﬁts the scarce factor, and triggers
welfare-reducing eﬀects relative to the free migration scenario. Interestingly, these impacts go in the same direction as those obtained in
a situation in which each region imposes an import tariﬀ on the products originating in the other region. Thus, the present section derives a
migration policy that replicates the same equilibrium characteristics in
North as the mutual trade restriction scenario considered above.
As noted above, for that purpose, it suﬃces to ﬁnd for each value
of τ a value of 1 − ϕ that implements the same relative price in North as
in the mutual trade restrictions scenario, PMTC/τ. The implementation of
the same relative price implies that the migration tax ϕ yields the same
prices, real wages, and welfare as the mutual imposition of τ.
Equations (74) and (74') in the online appendix show the expressions for the migration tax replicating the mutual trade restriction equilibrium properties in North. An implication of these results is that a
reduction in labor endowment diﬀerences across regions, which would
imply diminished welfare gains from international trade, is associated
with a smaller value of the migration tax.

POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS
The previous analysis has shown that immigration increases overall welfare but generates income redistribution eﬀects. In this context,
restricting migration may favor special interest groups. For the particular case analyzed in this chapter, a migration policy that restricts
unskilled migration beneﬁts unskilled workers in North at the cost of
smaller aggregate welfare levels. More generally, this suggests that
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political economy concerns may inﬂuence the design and implementation of migration policies in advanced economies.
Indeed, the premise that public policies can be inﬂuenced by special
interest groups has a long tradition in both economic theory and empirical work. For the case of regulatory measures, Djankov et al. (2002)
suggest that entry regulation generates rents that accrue to bureaucrats
and administrative employees. Yet bureaucrats, politicians, and administrative employees may be tempted to implement regulation not only to
obtain proﬁts directly, but also to collect bribes and contributions from
the relevant interest groups (see De Soto [1990], McChesney [1987],
Shleifer and Vishny [1993], and Tobal [2017] for the consequences on
international trade).
In the domain of international trade policy, perhaps the most inﬂuential work is from Grossman and Helpman (1994). In their seminal
paper, they show that lobbying groups have incentives for inﬂuencing
the design of import tariﬀs. Along these lines, this chapter shows that
there is some equivalence between international trade and migration
policies in terms of welfare and redistribution eﬀects. This again suggests that, just as with international trade policies, immigration policy
may be inﬂuenced by interest groups.
In this section, we develop an extension of the factor proportion
model presented previously with the goal of illustrating one among
the several channels through which special interest groups may aﬀect
immigration policy. In contrast with several of the channels through
which political economy concerns shape public policy in the literature,
the extension we present does not rely on the existence of a government
that attempts to extract private rents or to maximize political support.
Instead, our extension shows that, even when a government is forwardlooking and benevolent, it may have incentives to deviate from the
migration policy associated with the ﬁrst-best equilibrium.
As noted above, we consider the economy described by the factor
proportion model presented in previous sections and set as our point
of departure the autarky equilibrium. To simplify, it is assumed that
there is a single interest group representing unskilled workers, such as
unions. This group can aﬀect Congress’ decisions, possibly because
their actions inﬂuence media coverage and, through this channel, have
an impact on public opinion. When many unskilled workers go on a
strike, large media coverage frequently exerts pressure on Congress.
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For instance, if unskilled workers go on a strike, the pressure of the
media forces Congress to reject the migratory reform proposed by the
government, represented by the ϕ parameter.
More formally, assume that there is a probability that unskilled
workers do not go on a strike f (ϕ) and that this probability fulﬁlls the
traditional Inada conditions: (1) f (ϕ = 0) = 0: when free migration is
proposed, unskilled workers always go on a strike; (2) f (ϕ) is continuously diﬀerentiable; (3) f (ϕ) is strictly increasing in ϕ: the probability
of going on strike falls with the severity of the policy proposed (i.e.,
the higher the tax on migration, the lower the probability of going on
strike); (4) the second derivative is negative; (5) the limit of the ﬁrst
derivative of f (ϕ) is inﬁnite when ϕ tends to 0; (6) the limit of the ﬁrst
derivative of f (ϕ) is 0 when ϕ tends to inﬁnite.
In this environment, the government is interested in maximizing
expected welfare. In the context of our extension, this welfare can be
written as follows:

ܹܧሺ߶ሻ ൌ ݂ሺ߶ሻܹே ሺ߶ሻ  ሺͳ െ ݂ሺ߶ሻሻܹே௨௧ .

At the same time, it is known from the factor proportion model that
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Under these conditions, it is easy to show that the benevolent and
forward-looking government never chooses a migration tax equal to
zero (the section titled General Welfare Implications of Immigration
in the online appendix provides a formal proof). The intuition for this
result goes as follows. Even though the government knows that choosing a zero tax would be optimal in the absence of political economy
conﬂicts, it is also aware that doing so would lead the union to a strike
and, consequently, the Congress to reject the proposal. Under these conditions, the economy would remain in the autarky regime and reach
the lowest possible welfare level. Hence, to avoid this situation, the
benevolent and forward-looking government opts for proposing a positive migration tax and improving the probability that the reform gets
accepted.
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CONCLUSIONS
We have provided some theoretical tools that illustrate useful and
interesting insights into the economic eﬀects of migration, as well as on
political factors that may aﬀect the design of migration policy. To illustrate these points, we set a standard factor proportion model of international trade and used it to investigate the impacts of free trade, free
migration, an imports tariﬀ, and a tax on migration.
The analysis generates several interesting conclusions. First, freetrade and free-migration generate isomorphic results, precisely when
the most relevant measure of welfare from a political economy perspective is taken into account. Both trade and migration increase aggregate
welfare but have redistributive eﬀects. Second, along these lines, welfare outcomes arising from an imports tax can be replicated by implementing the proper migration policy. In light of these results, we then
conclude that migration policies may be inﬂuenced by political economy concerns. Thus, we develop an extension of our standard model
to illustrate one of the many possible channels through which these
concerns may aﬀect the determination of migration policies.
From a more general perspective, the takeaway from our analysis
is that there is large room for using economists’ tools to contribute to
a now heated policy debate. Just as we already have a tool kit to analyze trade policy and its welfare, redistributive, and political economy
dimensions, we can easily extend this literature to analyze migration
policy in these same dimensions.

Notes
1. A longer, more technical draft of this chapter is available online at https://doi
.org/10.17848/9780880999570.ch6A. Throughout this chapter it is referred to as
the online appendix.
2. The report by the Partnership for a New American Economy (2011) also ﬁnds
that by 2010 more than 40 percent of the Fortune 500 companies were founded
by immigrants or their children, that 7 of the 10 most valuable brands in the world
come from companies founded by ﬁrst or second generations of immigrants, and
that the revenue generated by Fortune 500 companies founded by immigrants or
children of immigrants is greater than the GDP of every country in the world outside the United States, except China and Japan.
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3. Although the ﬁgures provide information only on the correlation between the
variables illustrated, they serve to suggest that high-skilled migration entails net
beneﬁts for host countries.
4. Even though both studies measure policy eﬀectiveness in terms of volume,
Thielemann (2004) speciﬁcally assesses the impact on noneconomic migrants—
that is, those immigrants whose decisions are driven by political motivations.
5. Indeed, variations in the price depend exclusively on changes in the price of the
unskilled-intensive good because that price has been chosen as the numeraire.
6. Along these lines, upcoming sections will show that the mutual trade restriction
equilibrium can be replicated by an appropriate choice of a migration tax.
7. In this more realistic scenario, absolute wages for skilled and unskilled are greater
in North.
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Combining Physical and Financial
Solidarity in Asylum Policy
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Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Hillel Rapoport
Paris School of Economics–Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

The drawbacks of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS)
are so widely acknowledged that the European Commission itself
launched the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015 with the
objective of reforming it. One of the main issues of disagreement
among the European member states was how to share the potential
costs of receiving asylum seekers and hosting refugees, which is typically summarized as “burden sharing,” although many practitioners and
politicians prefer the terminology “responsibility sharing” as being less
oﬀensive to refugees. The initial proposal in the European Agenda on
Migration (European Commission 2015a) contemplated a formula to
relocate asylum seekers or resettle refugees according to GDP, population, unemployment, and past number of refugees hosted.
This chapter presents our own proposal for a system that can minimize the cost of allocating refugees at the European level, starting from
the European Union (EU) distribution key. The distribution key would
constitute the ﬁrst stage of our three-stage proposal. The new elements
would be the two following stages.
Stage two would be the creation of a compensation mechanism for
the exchange of the refugee-admission quotas distributed in stage one.
Allowing the member states to trade their initial quotas would let them
choose whether they want to contribute to the European public good of
providing refugee protection by accepting refugees (physical solidarity) or by paying other countries to accept them (ﬁnancial solidarity).
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Countries that perceive refugees as less of a burden would thus be compensated by other countries that perceive refugees as more of a burden.
Finally, stage three is needed to ensure that refugees’ and asylum
seekers’ rights are respected. In particular, we introduce a matching
mechanism that would assign refugees to their preferred destination
and destinations to their preferred refugees. This has two objectives.
First, we make sure that no refugee is forced to go to an undesired destination. Second, there are additional eﬃciency gains by letting countries choose their preferred types of refugees. The matching mechanism
does not alter the cost minimization properties of the market, as long as
we introduce a penalty mechanism for locations that refugees consider
undesirable. If a country is paid to receive refugees by the market and
refugees refuse to go there, we force this country to compensate the
country where the refugees actually end up.
Our three-stage proposal was ﬁrst developed and its eﬃciency properties were established by Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport
(2014). In Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2015a), we sketch
how the proposal could be adapted to the particular case of reforming
the CEAS by considering refugees and asylum seekers jointly and by
reviewing the problems and stated shortcomings of the European Relocation from Malta programme by which the EU relocated a number of
refugees and asylum seekers arrived in Malta to other European Member States between 2011 and 2012. More recently, Fernández-Huertas
Moraga and Rapoport (2015b) restate the proposal and apply some
simulations of how it would work in the case of the refugees from the
Syrian civil war.
This chapter focuses on a new set of simulations on how the system of tradable refugee-admission quotas (TRAQs), combined with a
matching mechanism, would work. The new simulations incorporate
the new elements of the European Agenda on Migration that the European Commission pushed during the second half of 2015, related to the
relocation of 160,000 refugees coming from Italy and Greece and to
the establishment of a permanent relocation mechanism. We also use
the preferences of the European member states that have been revealed
throughout the bargaining process, in particular, taking advantage of
the diﬀerences between the quotas imposed by the European Commission and the voluntary relocation processes that the member states were
willing to accept by July 2015.
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These simulations will be done under diﬀerent assumptions on cost
functions. They are helpful to understand which countries would beneﬁt more or less with and without the market for refugee admission
quotas that forms the implicit basis of our compensation mechanism.
They emphasize the ﬂexibility of the market in adapting to the diﬀerent
circumstances of the member states and the suitability of the matching mechanism to make sure refugee rights are respected at all times.
Finally, we show how the market can be instrumental in elucidating
information about the preferences of countries.

THE MODEL
This section outlines the model that combines the physical and
ﬁnancial solidarity aspects of the proposed scheme. The model is simply sketched here, while its mathematical properties are relegated to
Appendix 7A.
The theoretical problem that needs to be solved is the allocation of a
total number of refugees and asylum seekers across a set of destination
countries, which can be assimilated to the member states in the EU that
will be participating in the mechanism. The model takes as given both
the total number of refugees and asylum seekers to be allocated (such as
the 160,000 in the EU proposal of September 2015) and the perceived
costs and beneﬁts that the refugees impose on the destination countries.
Setup
In the current absence of any coordination mechanism and abstracting from the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, each country will
decide how many refugees and asylum seekers to accept by maximizing
a welfare function with two elements.
The ﬁrst one represents how countries beneﬁt from the fact that
other countries receive asylum seekers or refugees. There may be two
fundamental reasons for this. On the one hand, there is the international
public good aspect. We can consider that one country, either its government or its inhabitants, receive utility (welfare) from the fact that
refugees are protected, regardless of where. On the other hand, even in
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the case in which this country does not directly care about refugees and
perceives them as a simple cost, it beneﬁts indirectly from the fact that
other countries host them, since this may alleviate the pressure for it to
host them itself. In other words, a country can expect its asylum claims
to go down when the number of refugees hosted by other destinations
increases. Both explanations imply that refugees and asylum seekers
hosted by other countries exert a positive externality on the welfare
of one particular country. This implies that the unilateral provision of
protection to refugees and asylum seekers by individual countries leads
to a globally ineﬃcient solution. Fewer refugees are hosted overall than
would be optimal from a global perspective. The second element of the
welfare function is the net cost of hosting refugees and asylum seekers. This includes all the perceived costs and beneﬁts associated with
hosting refugees and asylum seekers, particularly the potential altruism of a country toward the reception of refugees—that is, the international public good element by which its welfare is increased whenever
refugees and asylum seekers are protected. It also includes the physical
and administrative costs of receiving refugees and asylum seekers and
processing their paperwork, initial allowances, and initial accommodation for the period. The net cost also considers the potential long-run
expected economic consequences of hosting these refugees and asylum
seekers as assessed by the country, for example, the immigration surplus or the fact that these refugees may either beneﬁt or harm domestic
workers once they integrate into the labor market. Finally, the net cost
also includes the social and political costs (or beneﬁts) of hosting these
refugees and asylum seekers.
Unilateral policies are not optimal because individual countries do
not consider the fact that their reception of refugees and asylum seekers has a positive eﬀect on other countries, and hence they perform
this activity at a lower level than that implied by a full maximization
problem.
As proved in Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2014,
2015a), the optimal solution involves equating the marginal costs of
hosting refugees and asylum seekers among all the potential destination
countries to a positive number that depends on the strength of the externality, while the noncoordinated solution equates these marginal costs
to zero. Hence, the noncoordinated solution results in fewer refugees
and asylum seekers receiving protection.
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The Compensation Mechanism with Tradable RefugeeAdmission Quotas
The optimal solution can be replicated by distributing responsibilities over the number of refugees and asylum seekers that each member
state must host (quotas) and letting them trade these responsibilities.
We deﬁne the initial quotas as the total sum of refugees and asylum seekers that it becomes the responsibility of particular countries
to host. If one country prefers to host a number lower than its quota, it
should compensate another country a price per unﬁlled refugee admission quota so that the other country will host them.
This means that every country would simply equate the marginal
cost of hosting an additional refugee or asylum seeker to the refugeeadmission quota price. This is exactly the global optimal solution.
Countries with a marginal cost over the price would prefer to pay other
countries to comply with part of their quota. Conversely, countries with
a marginal cost below the price would be willing to host more refugees
or asylum seekers than their quota implies.
As long as the market is competitive and countries are unable to
manipulate the quota price, every country will be better oﬀ under the
compensation scheme than fulﬁlling their compulsory initial responsibilities. This does not imply that individual countries would be better oﬀ
than under the noncooperative solution. However, the total welfare of
all the member states would be higher under the compensation scheme
than under the noncooperative solution or a mandatory distribution of
quotas such as the one proposed by the European Commission.
It would be theoretically feasible to manipulate the initial quotas so
that absolutely every country participating in the compensating scheme
would prefer to do so. We will come back to this point later when we
discuss our diﬀerent simulations. The fact that this is theoretically possible does not mean that gathering the necessary information to implement it is feasible without generating perverse incentives for countries
to manipulate their behavior.
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The Matching Mechanism
Refugees’ preferences
One crucial drawback with addressing the problem that countries
face is the fact that refugees or asylum seekers are perceived as interchangeable and can be moved around at the will of the European member states. This is clearly not acceptable, since every movement for
relocation or resettlement must be done with the full consent of the
individuals involved.
A way to obtain this consent, while improving the ﬁnal allocation
of refugees, is to ask them directly to express whether they are willing
to be relocated to any particular destination at all and also to rank the
destinations to which they would be willing to be relocated, rather than
remaining in their location at the time of questioning.
The matching literature (Roth 2002) provides many examples of
how this information can be used to match refugees to their preferred
destinations. The objective is to ﬁnd a mechanism such that no pair
of refugees can exchange their destinations and be made better oﬀ
at the same time. One example is the top trading cycles mechanism
(Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez 1999), also known as the random serial
dictatorship. It works in the following way:
• Each refugee ranks all potentially desired destinations (preferred
to the current one).
• An ordering of refugees is randomly chosen.
• Assign the ﬁrst refugee her ﬁrst choice, the second refugee her
ﬁrst choice, and so on, until a refugee’s ﬁrst choice is a country
whose quota is ﬁlled. Assign that refugee her second choice, or
if that one is also ﬁlled, her third choice, and so on.
This type of mechanism does not present any problem for the quota
allocation coming out of the market. In fact, there is only one situation in which the matching mechanism might interfere with the market.
If one of the destinations is such an undesirable place that no refugee
would consider going there, the quota of that country would not be
ﬁlled, and some refugees, the last in the random ordering, would prefer
to remain in their original location (say, a refugee camp) rather than
move there. If this is the case, some countries could have an incentive
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to create a bad image (e.g., be lenient on violence against refugees) to
discourage applications. They could even bid in the market to be paid
for hosting refugees whom they hope would refuse to move there.
How can this possibility be avoided? Two solutions could prevent
this from happening:
1) Since refugee preferences can be collected before opening the
market, countries could be forbidden to bid beyond the actual
number of individuals willing to relocate there. We would
have trade restrictions, but this would ensure that all refugees
are relocated through the market.
2) Alternatively, we can allow for a case in which the overall number of refugees and asylum seekers to be relocated or resettled
is not realized and the “rejected” country pays the price for the
unﬁlled part of its quota. This acts as a penalty and provides
incentives for countries to become attractive destinations.
In equilibrium, the penalty would always be zero, but it is needed
so that countries do not have incentives to become unattractive from
the point of view of refugees and asylum seekers. In practice, the EU
could oversee collecting this penalty in the case of some oﬀ-equilibrium
behavior.
Still, equating the marginal costs of hosting refugees and asylum
seekers across countries to the quota price is an optimal solution, even
in the presence of the matching mechanism.
Host countries’ preferences
Not only can refugee preferences be considered, there is also a
scope for considering the preferences of host countries regarding the
type of refugees that they would be more willing to host.
In the same way that refugees can establish a ranking of their preferred destinations, countries could establish a ranking of their preferred
types of refugees or asylum seekers. For example, some countries might
be more willing to host refugees than asylum seekers.
The only diﬀerence between the expressions of preferences on the
side of host countries lies in the fact that they should not be allowed to
refuse to take any refugee. Otherwise, they would have an incentive to
misrepresent their preferences and declare that some types of refugees
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are unacceptable for them. Refugees, on the other hand, should retain
the option to refuse to move to an undesired destination.
If countries’ preferences are taken into account, we would need to
change the algorithm governing the allocation of refugees to host countries. Both the country-proposing and the refugee-proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm could be applied (Fernández-Huertas Moraga and
Rapoport 2014, 2015a). According to Azevedo and Leshno (2016), both
would attain the same result, given that the number of refugees and
asylum seekers will be large.
In previous papers (Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport
2014, 2015a), we have argued that it could be best to adopt a countryproposing deferred acceptance algorithm on the grounds of its lower
degree of manipulability according to Pathak and Sonmez (2013).
Under this algorithm, countries would ﬁrst propose their marketassigned quotas to their preferred refugees. Then, these refugees would
have the option to accept or refuse among their oﬀers. For the unﬁlled
part of their quota, countries would then propose their second most preferred types of refugees, and so on, until all the quotas are ﬁlled, unless
there is a destination that is so undesirable that no refugee is willing to
go there. The introduction of the preferences of hosting countries would
have the beneﬁt of reducing their participating costs. As a result, either
more refugees could be hosted at the same total cost or the same number of refugees could be hosted at a lower total cost.
In exchange for these advantages, the matching mechanism introduces some uncertainty about the types of refugees and asylum seekers
that countries end up receiving. Again, this introduces a new bias favoring refugee-friendly countries, since it is more likely that the oﬀers from
these countries will be accepted earlier than the oﬀers that are perceived
as less refugee-friendly, and hence, are refugees’ lowest preferences.

RELATED LITERATURE
There is a large body of literature on how to reform the EU Asylum
Policy. Perhaps the best review of this literature corresponds to Hatton (2015), who explains how the harmonization of European policies
alone is not enough for an eﬃcient asylum policy. The reason for this
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is that the cost functions of the member states are too diﬀerent, and
harmonizing policies constrains the set of achievable outcomes. In this
sense, the market we propose here could oﬀer the ﬂexibility countries
need.
The idea of using a market to coordinate refugee-reception responsibilities across countries can be traced back to Schuck (1997), who
oﬀers the example of the Comprehensive Plan of Action for the resettlement of refugees from Vietnam in the 1980s. Bubb, Kremer, and Levine
(2011) take Schuck’s idea one step further and couple his bilateral
exchange with a screening device aimed at separating “true” refugees
from bogus asylum claims.
The main diﬀerence with the current proposal is the lack of a formal
market in Schuck (1997) and Bubb, Kremer, and Levine (2011). We
propose a centralized institution rather than a set of bilateral exchanges.
The rationale for this is the need to design the market so that large players cannot manipulate the price. Furthermore, we argue for the consideration of refugee preferences over destinations and countries’ preferences over refugees, both on humanitarian and eﬃciency grounds.
The ﬁrst stage of our proposal—that is, the allocation of initial
responsibilities among the member states—has often been considered
in the literature. For example, Thielemann et al. (2010) and Wagner and
Kraler (2014) calculate many diﬀerent “burden-sharing” rules, comparable to the one ﬁnally adopted by the European Council (2015). In the
case of Thielemann et al. (2010), the authors suggest that “fair burden
sharing” implies that 33–40 percent of asylum seekers should be transferred to diﬀerent European countries, many to new member states. In
their view, this policy should be complemented with a harmonization
of asylum seekers’ costs across countries. They also advocate the use
of larger ﬁnancial compensation for receiving countries. Finally, they
argue for the voluntary movement of asylum seekers from overburdened to less-aﬀected states. The reason they gave for these voluntary
movements is that forced movements end up being very costly. In fact,
the two last elements are included in our proposal: the ﬁnancial compensation operates through the market, while the matching mechanism
makes sure that all movements are voluntary, and hence less costly.
Finally, Hatton (2015) also argues for the need to redistribute refugees across the European member states in order to achieve a social
optimum. However, he also oﬀers the option of providing asymmetric
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subsidies per refugee hosted to diﬀerent countries—that is, the per capita compensation that the European Refugee Fund or the Asylum and
Migration Fund has traditionally oﬀered for the reception of refugees
should have diﬀerent levels for diﬀerent countries. Countries for which
it is more expensive to host refugees should receive higher subsidies,
whereas countries for which it is less costly should receive lower subsidies. The problem with this scheme is the lack of information on the
true costs and beneﬁts of hosting refugees. Furthermore, such a system
would create an incentive for countries to overreport how costly it is for
them to host refugees.

THE EUROPEAN AGENDA ON MIGRATION
In May 2015, the EU launched the European Agenda on Migration
to reform the European Asylum System. Before getting to that point,
it is useful to summarize some of the main elements of the existing
Common European Asylum System. Following Hatton (2015), we can
situate the beginning of the policy with the signing of the Dublin Convention in 1990. The Dublin system, renewed in 2003 and 2013 (Dublin
III), generally established that the country responsible for an asylum
claim in the EU would be the country of ﬁrst entry. We had to wait until
1999 for the formal launching of the CEAS in Tampere. The treaty of
Amsterdam allowed the European Commission to legislate on asylum
issues, and this prompted a whole series of directives aimed at harmonizing the asylum systems of the European member states in terms
of reception conditions, recognition rates, and border surveillance.
For example, the European Refugee Fund was created in 2000 with
the objective of formally sharing the ﬁnancial costs of hosting refugees among the member states. The fund continued after 2014 under the
name of the Asylum and Migration Fund.
Other European programs and agencies were born out of the harmonization eﬀorts, such as EURODAC in 2003, FRONTEX in 2005, and
the European Asylum Support Oﬃce (EASO) in 2010.
It could be argued that the European Agenda on Migration emerged
as a result of the concerns in European public opinion created by several
shipwrecks involving asylum seekers on the Mediterranean shores. In
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fact, the main elements of the Agenda (European Commission 2015a)
were:
• Emergency operations (Triton, Poseidon) to save lives at sea.
• Budget increases for existing policies and further harmonization.
• Relocation (40,000 from Italy and Greece) and resettlement
(20,000 from outside the EU) of refugees and asylum seekers
following a distribution key. This distribution key was the real
new policy included in the European Agenda on Migration. It
meant the creation of a new scheme for sharing the responsibility
of hosting refugees that went beyond the Dublin regulations and
the existence of ﬁnancial compensation. The distribution key
divided quotas according to a formula weighting:
• 40 percent total GDP of the member states. The larger the
GDP of the member states, the larger their responsibility
in the relocation and resettlement of refugees and asylum
seekers.
• 40 percent population. The criterion works in the same way
as the GDP. Larger countries (in terms of population) are
supposed to have a larger capacity to absorb refugees.
• 10 percent unemployment rate. This works in the opposite direction. Countries with a larger unemployment rate
would have to host fewer refugees.
• 10 percent number of asylum applications received and
refugees resettled per 1 million inhabitants between 2010
and 2014. The rationale is that those countries that contributed the most to the international public good of the
reception of refugees would be required to assume a lower
responsibility.
The initial response of the member states to these proposals was not
very favourable. In July 2015, the European Council refused to adopt
mandatory quotas. The European countries preferred to stick to voluntary pledges that fell short of the European Commission’s numbers:
32,256 for relocation (rather than 40,000) and 18,425 for resettlement
(rather than 20,000). However, the commission insisted, and in September 2015 its president, Jean-Claude Juncker, extended the relocation
mechanism to Hungary, while proposing to relocate 120,000 additional
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refugees and asylum seekers following the same distribution key. He
also announced a permanent relocation mechanism that could only be
avoided in exceptional cases by paying compensation equal to 0.002
percent of the GDP of the non-quota-complying state (European Commission 2015c).
Somewhat surprisingly, later in September 2015, the European
Council approved the quotas for the relocation of 160,000 refugees and
asylum seekers from Italy and Greece, although they still refused to
approve the permanent mechanism.
The European Parliament also approved Juncker’s plan, and it
added that refugee preferences must be taken into account in the relocation and resettlement procedures (European Parliament 2014–2019).
In September 2017, the European Commission moved away from
mandatory refugee relocations to a voluntary resettlement scheme,
incentivized through ﬁnancial subsidies of 10,000 Euros per resettled
refugee. Half a billion euros have been set aside for EU members to
take at least 50,000 refugees directly from Africa, the Middle East,
and Turkey (with an “increased focus” on taking refugees from North
Africa and the Horn of Africa, particularly Libya, Egypt, Niger, Sudan,
Chad, and Ethiopia). For purposes of simplicity and considering that
the recent propositions of the European Commission are in the process
of development and consolidation with member states, in this analysis
we will focus on the framework proposed in the 2015 European Agenda
on Migration.
Moreover, the refugee allocation system proposed in this chapter is
applicable to both resettlement and relocation schemes. Registering refugee characteristics and their preferences can take place in the countries
of origin (resettlement) as well as in refugee camps in ﬁrst entry countries (relocation). Therefore, at times this chapter uses resettlement and
relocation interchangeably. In the following section, we base our simulation on the relocation scheme proposed by the European Commission
in 2015, but as pointed out before, this simulation is transferrable to the
European Commission’s recent call for resettlement of 50,000 refugees
directly from the source countries.
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SIMULATIONS
This section presents a series of simulations of the outcomes that
a compensation mechanism with tradable refugee-admission quotas
might deliver if applied to the proposals of the European Agenda on
Migration. The simulations will focus on the compensation aspect and
disregard the matching component. In other words, we will assume that
enough migrants want to move to each of the destinations so as to ﬁll
the quotas that come out of the market. Another implicit simplifying
assumption is that the participating countries will be indiﬀerent about
the types of refugees and asylum seekers to be hosted. So, for simplicity, we now refer exclusively to refugees, although conceptually we are
considering both refugees and asylum seekers.
The simulations must start from an initial distribution of responsibilities across the member states; that is, an initial distribution of quotas to be traded. We also take this initial distribution as given by the
European Council decision of September 22, 2015 (European Council
2015).
We present two crucial inputs for the simulations below. The ﬁrst
is the cost function. The assumptions on the cost function determine
what the equilibrium price will be and how much countries will gain or
lose from the application of a particular mechanism. The second crucial
input is the total number of refugees to be resettled or relocated. Obviously, the larger the number of refugees to be resettled, the higher the
quota price and also the total cost of the mechanism will be.
We present one particular cost function in this section and present simulations of a diﬀerent one in Appendix 7B. Both will have a
key parameter governing the antirefugee sentiment in each destination
country. We will obtain two diﬀerent values of this parameter for each
country. The ﬁrst one, which we denote as revealed preferences, will be
based on the voluntary quotas accepted by the European Member States
in the Justice and Home Aﬀairs Council on July 20, 2015. The second one, denoted by stated preferences, will be based, as in FernándezHuertas Moraga and Rapoport (2015b), on the share of individuals in
each EU country disagreeing with the statement that “the EU member
states should oﬀer protection and asylum to people in need” from the
Special Eurobarometer 380 in 2011.
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In terms of the total number of refugees to be resettled, we propose
two diﬀerent scenarios as well. The ﬁrst one will be based on the ﬁrst
European Commission proposal from May 2015 for resettling 20,000
refugees from outside the EU and relocating 40,000 who arrived in Italy
and Greece (European Commission 2015b), for a total of 60,000 refugees to be allocated among the European member states. The second
one will correspond to the addition of 120,000 refugees in September
2015 (European Commission 2015c), thus totalling 180,000 refugees to
be resettled across Europe. We present only the ﬁrst one in this section
and leave the simulations of the second one in Appendix 7B.
Overall, this adds up to eight diﬀerent simulations: two cost functions times two preference parameterizations times two refugee totals.
Two of them are presented in the main text, and we relegate the rest
to Appendix 7B. Appendix 7B also introduces mathematically the two
cost functions that we will use for the simulations.
Outcomes
Here we present the outcomes from two of the eight diﬀerent simulation scenarios that we have run. We let every EU member state participate in the market, including those that did not choose to do so in
the distribution key that we use (European Council 2015). These countries—namely, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and the United Kingdom—are assigned a zero quota.
Simulation 1: Revealed Preferences, 60,000 Refugees,
Quadratic Cost
Table 7.1 shows the results from the ﬁrst simulation. We start from
an overall quota of 60,000 refugees to be distributed across the 28 European member states. As stated above, the cost functions of the countries
are assumed to be quadratic in the number of refugees hosted from the
total quota, proportional to the revealed taste parameter, and inversely
proportional to the population of the host country.
The “Voluntary quotas” column in Table 7.1 ﬁrst shows the quotas
agreed to by the European member states as of July 2015. They are
shown for comparison purposes and because they were used to back out
the refugee cost parameter shown in the third data column. The voluntary quotas from July 2015 fell short of the objective of 60,000 refugees
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to be resettled or relocated proposed by the European Commission, as
they only totalled 50,671.
The column of “Initial quotas (EU proposal)” represents the distribution of 60,000 refugees that would be deduced from the key that the
European Council approved in September 2015. We consider this the
initial allocation of quotas in the market that can then be traded; that is,
the ﬁrst step of our market of tradable-refugee admission quotas with
matching.
For most countries, the voluntary quotas are not far from the initial EU allocation. The reason is that the distribution key had already
been made public in May 2015, so many countries had already made
their voluntary contributions around the number they were supposed to
get. In principle, this goes against the usefulness of the market in this
simulation, since we are considering countries’ “true” preferences to be
close to the European Commission’s proposal.
The results of the market are shown in the column “Market quota.”
We can see that even in this case, when, by construction, there is not
a large diﬀerence between the voluntary and mandatory schemes, the
market is able to reduce overall costs by 95 percent. This result is heavily inﬂuenced by the cost function for Hungary, whose refusal to participate in the voluntary mechanism implies that the calibrated revealed
refugee cost parameter is extremely large. Hence, Hungary has a lot to
gain from the market, which allows the country to host just 1 refugee
rather than the 1,176 assigned by the EU proposal. Nevertheless, even
if we disregard Hungary, the total cost reduction achieved by the market with respect to the initial EU quotas would be equal to 23 percent,
which is not a negligible amount: 60 million euros, according to our
simulation.
We must point out that we are able to assign monetary variables
because we have assumed that the marginal cost of the voluntary quotas
for each country equals 6,000 euros, the per refugee subsidy oﬀered
by the Asylum and Migration Fund. Using this metric, we can actually
provide a monetary ﬁgure for the quota price in the market: It would
be equal to 7,105 euros. This makes intuitive sense. The voluntary
scheme managed to resettle just over 50,000 refugees, while the market
deals with up to 60,000, an 18 percent increase. As a result, the price
increases by 18 percent with respect to the subsidy, which is what we
could expect from linear marginal costs.
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Countries
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta

Voluntary
quotas
1,900
2,464
500
550
242
1,500
1,000
150
1,085
9,127
12,100
354
0
1,120
1,989
250
325
350
74

Refugee cost
parameter:
Initial quotas
deduced from
(EU proposal) voluntary quotas
1,775
26.9
2,225
27.3
775
86.9
516
46.3
134
21.3
1,446
42.0
0
33.8
181
52.6
1,169
30.1
11,784
43.3
15,488
40.0
0
186.3
1,176
59,264.2
0
24.7
0
183.4
255
48.0
378
54.3
215
9.4
65
34.5

Market
quota
2,250
2,918
592
651
287
1,776
1,184
178
1,285
10,807
14,327
419
1
1,326
2,355
296
385
414
88

Cost reduction Cost reduction
with respect to with respect to
initial quota voluntary quotas
(%)
(%)
7
19
10
26
6
−127
7
18
131
109
5
12
inf
240
0
−45
1
−15
1
−66
1
−63
inf
240
100
−inf
inf
240
inf
240
3
−2
0
−35
85
94
13
34
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Table 7.1 Revealed Preferences, 60,000 Refugees, Quadratic Cost
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Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
Total
Quotas traded

3,047
2,000
1,500
1,785
200
250
2,749
1,860
2,200

3,546
4,620
1,493
2,250
729
306
7,294
2,179
0

50,671

60,000

33.1
114.1
41.7
67.0
162.5
49.5
101.5
31.1
175.4

3,608
2,368
1,776
2,114
237
296
3,255
2,202
2,605

0
24
4
0
46
0
31
0
inf

−35
−307
5
−58
−623
−50
−388
−37
240

60,000
17%

95

−40

SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration. Cost parameter divided by one million, with Hungary assumed to host one refugee voluntarily.
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The result of the market is simple for individual countries. Each of
them tries to revert from the initial quota allocation to their preferred
(voluntary) quota from the ﬁrst data column. However, they end up with
higher numbers because the total number to be distributed is larger. The
simulation shows that 17 percent of the initial quotas distributed would
be traded.
The ﬁrst cost reduction column (ﬁfth data column) in Table 7.1
shows how the overall 95 percent (23 percent without Hungary) cost
reduction of the market is distributed across the participating countries.
Absolutely all of them see cost reductions; otherwise, they would not
trade. The larger the diﬀerence between the EU’s initial distribution of
quotas and the voluntary quotas, the larger the cost reduction will be for
participating countries. For some countries, the cost reduction is such
that they can turn a proﬁt out of the market. In this simulation, Cyprus,
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and the UK do so because most of
them are assigned a zero responsibility in the initial quota distribution.
Finally, the last data column in Table 7.1 shows the comparison of
costs with respect to the voluntary scheme. As can be expected, given
that the voluntary scheme resettles 50,671 refugees, while the market
would resettle 60,000, the market increases overall costs with respect
to the voluntary scheme by 40 percent. The simulated total cost would
increase from 152 million euros under the voluntary scheme to 213 million under the market. The total cost increases more than 18 percent (the
increase in the number of refugees resettled) because we are assuming
convex cost functions.
Again, the distribution of this increase in cost is shared very differently across countries. Cost increases are notably larger for countries whose initial quota is further from their voluntary scheme, notably
Hungary, Slovakia, and Spain. On the other side, for countries with a
large voluntary contribution with respect to the initial quotas, the market is an improvement even with respect to their voluntary contributions. This is the case for 13 out of the 28 countries, notably for the
zero-quota countries mentioned above.
Simulation 2: Stated Preferences, 60,000 refugees, Quadratic Cost
In this simulation, the refugee cost parameter is not calibrated to
match previous choices of countries, but it is assumed to come from
stated preferences. More precisely, we use the share of people in each
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country who disagreed with the statement “The EU Member States
should oﬀer protection and asylum to people in need” in the Special
Eurobarometer 380 in 2011.
Table 7.2 presents this information in the fourth column. According
to this measure, Sweden appears as the country with a more favourable
opinion toward refugees (only 4 percent of the respondents disagreed
with the statement), followed by Denmark, Poland, and Romania with
7 percent. At the other side of the spectrum, 31 percent of Hungarian
respondents disagreed with the statement, followed by Latvia (29 percent), Belgium, and Estonia (27 percent). The interpretation that we
give to these shares is that they are related to the political cost of hosting refugees in each of the countries. Hence, hosting refugees would be
comparatively more costly, relative to its population, for Hungary than
for Sweden.
Other than the refugee cost parameter, the simulation in Table 7.2
is directly comparable to the simulation in Table 7.1. The total number
of refugees to be relocated is 60,000, and the assumed functional form
is the quadratic one. The resulting quotas from the market, though, are
quite diﬀerent in both cases.
First, it must be noted that more quotas are traded in the stated preferences simulation than in the revealed preferences: 32 percent vs. 17
percent. The reason is that the stated preferences are further away from
the initial allocation of quotas proposed by the European Commission
than the revealed preferences.
Second, the distribution of quotas is quite diﬀerent in this case. Sweden takes relatively more refugees under the stated preferences—3,557
compared to 2,202—but this means that its cost is reduced more because
of the market (40 percent vs. a cost reduction barely larger than 0 in
the ﬁrst simulation). Under the highest refugee cost assumption, Hungary ends up taking 470 refugees rather than 1. The reason is that the
revealed preferences for Hungary implied an even larger refugee cost
parameter than the stated preferences approach.
The countries that would be more involved in trade in this simulation are France on the paying side and Italy on the receiving side. In the
case of France, this happens because they state a lower preference for
refugees because of their relatively high cost: 26 percent. This results in
France paying other countries to receive 8,048 of their initially assigned
11,784 refugees. For Italy, they are assigned a zero quota, so it is natural

Pozo book.indb 19

10/22/2018 1:43:59 PM

Pozo book.indb 20

Market
quota
660
612
972
369
60
705
1,186
72
670
3,735
10,832
1,351
470
453
5,274
102
289
58
52

Cost reduction Cost reduction
with respect to with respect to
initial quota voluntary quotas
(%)
(%)
39
47
53
61
6
−124
8
19
30
79
26
31
inf
241
36
7
18
5
47
11
9
−49
inf
1,557
36
−inf
inf
116
inf
803
36
33
6
−28
53
82
4
27
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Table 7.2 Stated Preferences, 60,000 Refugees, Quadratic Cost
Refugee cost
parameter:
Voluntary
Initial quotas taken from EuroCountries
quotas
(EU proposal) barometer 2011
Austria
1,900
1,775
19
Belgium
2,464
2,225
27
Bulgaria
500
775
11
Croatia
550
516
17
Cyprus
242
134
21
Czech Republic
1,500
1,446
22
Denmark
1,000
0
7
Estonia
150
181
27
Finland
1,085
1,169
12
France
9,127
11,784
26
Germany
12,100
15,488
11
Greece
354
0
12
Hungary
0
1,176
31
Ireland
1,120
0
15
Italy
1,989
0
17
Latvia
250
255
29
Lithuania
325
378
15
Luxembourg
350
215
14
Malta
74
65
12
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Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
Total
Quotas traded

3,047
2,000
1,500
1,785
200
250
2,749
1,860
2,200

3,546
4,620
1,493
2,250
729
306
7,294
2,179
0

50,671

60,000

8
7
13
7
19
17
9
4
25

3,103
8,012
1,183
4,204
421
179
7,624
3,557
3,795

2
54
4
75
18
17
0
40
inf

−33
−146
5
61
−991
−24
−603
18
398

60,000
32%

42

21

SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration. Cost parameter from the share of individuals in each EU country disagreeing with the statement: “The EU
member states should oﬀer protection and asylum to people in need” from the Special Eurobarometer 380 in 2011. Croatia is assigned
the Slovenian value.
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that it can be advantageous for them to host some refugees. Thus, for
this simulation they would end up hosting 5,274. Among the countries
with a nonzero initial quota, Poland would be the one receiving more
refugees and being paid for it: 3,392 more than their initially allocated
4,620. This comes from the fact that Poland states a relatively low
cost of hosting refugees in this simulation: 7 percent. For comparison
purposes, in the ﬁrst simulation, the biggest traders were Spain on the
paying side (4,039 refugees) and the UK on the receiving side (2,605
refugees).
The total cost reduction from adopting the market instead of the
initial allocation is 42 percent with the assumed cost functions. Leaving
Hungary out to make the comparison easier with respect to the previous
simulations, the cost reduction is 43 percent, which is notably larger
than the 23 percent coming out of the ﬁrst simulation. In general, we
can expect that more trade will be related to larger cost reductions, as
in this case. The largest cost reduction (aside from zero-quota countries) accrues to Romania (75 percent), while the lowest corresponds
to Spain, whose initial allocation turns out to be very close to the one
resulting from the market, so that it trades very little. In this particular
simulation, only the countries with an initial zero quota would actually
turn a proﬁt from the market.
One remarkable aspect about this simulation is that the total cost of
the market is 21 percent lower than the total cost of the voluntary quotas
described in the second column of Table 7.2. This is the case despite the
fact that 60,000 refugees would be relocated, rather than 50,671. The
reason is that the preferences stated by the citizens of the member states
in 2011 may be far from the actual costs that government leaders had in
mind when they agreed to host refugees in July 2015. However, this is
useful to illustrate how the initial allocation of quotas could have been
done in a way that would beneﬁt every single member state, even without taking the externalities of refugee protection into account.
The fact that the total cost is lower under the market does not mean
that there are not winners and losers from its creation because of the
initial distribution of quotas. As the last column in Table 7.2 shows, 19
out of the 28 European member states would be better oﬀ with the market, notably the zero-quota countries, but also Luxembourg, Cyprus,
Romania, and Belgium. On the negative side, the remaining nine coun-

Pozo book.indb 22

10/22/2018 1:43:59 PM

Combining Physical and Financial Solidarity in Asylum Policy 193

tries would be worse oﬀ, notably Hungary, but also Slovakia, Spain, the
Netherlands, and Bulgaria.
In principle, it would be theoretically possible to assign larger initial
quotas to favored countries, such as Luxembourg, Cyprus, Romania, or
the rest of the countries with positive cost reductions in Table 7.2, while
reducing the initial quotas assigned to Hungary, Slovakia, Spain, the
Netherlands, Bulgaria, and the rest of the countries in Table 7.2 with
negative cost reductions (cost increases). For example, reducing the initial Hungarian quota by 1,000 (from 1,176 to 176) and increasing the
French one by the same amount (from 11,784 to 12,784) would make
Hungary turn a proﬁt in the market, while France would still see its cost
reduced by 2 percent rather than 11 percent.
The fact that this is theoretically possible does not imply that it is
both feasible and desirable. From a feasibility point of view, the only
way to achieve an allocation satisfying every member state would be to
know their “true” cost functions. If that was the case, the market would
not be needed to begin with, since the initial quotas would already be
enough to share responsibilities. In terms of desirability, taking these
“true” costs into account would introduce incentives for countries to try
to manipulate them. For example, it would be beneﬁcial for Hungary to
show that refugees are particularly costly for them so as to be assigned
a lower initial quota than France.
With the methodology spelled out in Appendix 7B, the quota price
associated with the simulations in Table 7.2 is 6,600 euros, below the
7,105 euros obtained in the ﬁrst simulation with revealed preferences.
The total cost of the market is 198 million euros, which compares favorably with the 344 million euros associated with the initial allocation of
quotas, and even with the 251 million euros that the voluntary quotas
imply.
Discussion
The two simulations that we just presented (together with the six in
Appendix 7B) are useful to illustrate several characteristics of the market for refugee-admission quotas. The ﬁrst one is the relevance of the
total number of refugees and asylum seekers to be relocated or resettled. Under the simple functional form assumptions for costs that we
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have described, the size of the total quota translates directly into both
the ﬁnal costs that countries bear and the equilibrium price in the market. Obviously, this is true both with and without a market. If refugees
are assumed to represent a cost, it will be easier to relocate or resettle
smaller numbers than larger numbers. In the case of the market, this is
reﬂected in the equilibrium price.
With respect to the individual outcome of each of the countries from
participating in the market, the key element is the initial attribution of
responsibilities—that is, the distribution key for the initial quotas. Theoretically, we can set initial quotas in a way that encourages participation by absolutely every member state (Fernández-Huertas Moraga and
Rapoport 2014). We discussed an example of how this could be done in
our description of Table 7.2. As we mentioned there, it is not clear that
this theoretical possibility is either feasible or desirable.
The feasibility argument lies in the lack of information about the
actual cost functions of each of the countries. Generally, it is diﬃcult to
estimate the size of the externality in the welfare functions that governments maximize. As Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2014)
show, we need this externality to make sure we can distribute initial
quotas so that every participating country is better oﬀ under the market.
Even in cases like simulations 2 and B4, where the savings from the
market are so large it makes countries have lower costs overall than
under a voluntary distribution of quotas, we still need to know the precise functional form of the cost function that each country attaches to
refugees.
The market serves the role of revealing the actual marginal cost for
each country in equilibrium. This equilibrium marginal cost of hosting
an additional refugee runs from 6,600 euros in the ﬁrst simulation to
266,985 in the last one in Appendix 7B. The price is larger when the
total number of refugees to be hosted is larger and when the cost functions are assumed to be more sensitive to the number of refugees hosted
(cubic vs. quadratic cost functions).
To reveal the marginal costs and to lead to an eﬃcient (costminimizing) distribution, prices must be set up in a competitive market. We assumed that markets were competitive throughout our simulations, but empirically, there can be concerns that countries with a large
initial allocation, such as Germany, or simply quite rich, such as the
UK, could exercise some market power and distort the pricing mecha-
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nism. In this sense, there is scope for designing the market to prevent
this from happening. Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2014)
argue for a continuous computerized double auction mechanism, where
buyers and sellers would submit ask and bid prices repeatedly, and an
auctioneer—say, the European Commission—would choose the price
clearing the market. Diﬀerent experimental studies, starting with Friedman and Ostroy (1995), have shown that such a mechanism converges
to the competitive equilibrium price, even in the presence of a reduced
number of buyers and sellers. Intuitively, the mechanism promotes a
Bertrand-type competition, even among large players.

IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
This section clariﬁes some implementation issues related to our
proposal. We do so by oﬀering a direct comparison of how the system
works according to the CEAS and the European Agenda on Migration
and how it should work according to the proposal.
The Common European Asylum System implies that physical solidarity in the area of asylum provision is shared according to the country
of arrival of the asylum seekers (Dublin Regulation). With the European
Agenda on Migration, physical solidarity could also be achieved by
relocating some refugees from overburdened countries to other member
states according to a distribution key. At the same time, ﬁnancial solidarity was exercised through contributions to the Asylum, Migration
and Integration Fund out of the general EU budget. Hence, there were
separate systems for physical and ﬁnancial solidarity.
According to our proposal, physical and ﬁnancial solidarity can be
combined through the compensation mechanism, while the rights of
refugees to choose their preferred destinations (and not be forced to go
to undesired ones) would be guaranteed by the matching mechanism.
We would still keep the distribution key as a way to attribute responsibilities, but this time, there would be a combined physical and ﬁnancial
system.
Does this mean countries could “buy their way out” of hosting refugees? Yes, but only if other countries and refugees themselves accept
it. The other countries would have to accept it by obtaining a ﬁnan-
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cial compensation large enough so that it is advantageous for them.
The refugees would have to accept it by not objecting to moving to the
ﬁnal destination. In this sense, the deal between the EU and Turkey,
so that Turkey accepts asylum seekers present in Greece in exchange
for a ﬁnancial compensation (European Council 2016) would only
be acceptable in our proposal as long as asylum seekers accept being
removed from Greece to Turkey. Otherwise, the ﬁnancial compensation
should correspond to Greece rather than to Turkey. This should incentivize Turkey to become attractive to refugees, otherwise Turkey would
be unable to get any compensation.
It would not be feasible for every country to “buy its way out” of
physical solidarity. Suppose every country in Europe refused to admit
additional refugees: This implies that those with a large quota should
increase the ﬁnancial compensation they oﬀer to get rid of it. If nobody
accepted it, they should increase the amount until it would eventually
become attractive for some country to take care of the refugees. Hence,
not contributing physically could be very expensive ﬁnancially. The
expected outcome would be a mixture of the two contributions.
The compensation mechanism can be represented as a market in
which more refugee-unfriendly countries sell the provision of protection to refugee-friendly countries. However, it does not need to be
implemented as a market, and therefore we often use the more general
term compensation mechanism. A tax and subsidy system could implement the market solution, or the European Commission could act as
an auctioneer increasing the subsidy (currently 6,000 euros) until all
refugees are protected.
Regarding the implementation of the matching mechanism, the fact
that refugees can choose their preferred destinations does not mean that
all of them would get into their ﬁrst preference. In fact, they would only
be allowed to go to destinations where some slots are available. The collection of preferences should and can, of course, consider the fact that
families should move together. If there is a country to which no refugee
wants to go, the optimal strategy for that country would be to contribute ﬁnancially, rather than physically, in a voluntary way—through the
compensation mechanism. Otherwise, the country risks being penalized
because it would need to compensate the ﬁnal destination of the refusing refugees (possibly, the original refugee camp) for those refugees
who do not accept the move.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter explores the ways in which tradable refugee-admission
quotas (TRAQs), coupled with a matching mechanism taking into
account refugees’ preferences in terms of destination (as well as, possibly, countries’ preferences about refugees’ characteristics), may allow
for an improved policy response.
The ﬁrst part of the chapter shows, theoretically, that the combination of TRAQs and matching can go a long way toward addressing the
shortcomings of the current system and provides a sound basis for asylum policies to try to jointly achieve eﬃciency and fairness in responsibility sharing at the European level. It also demonstrates that the usual
concern with tradable quotas, namely social (or environmental or, in
our context, humanitarian) “dumping,” can largely be prevented owing
to the role of the matching mechanism in determining the market (i.e.,
ﬁnal) quota. Similarly, the existence of the market in which an implicit
price is put on a visa allows for avoiding the risk of a race to the bottom in humanitarian standards that a matching mechanism alone would
entail.
The second part of the chapter is dedicated to simulations of the
possible workings of a market for refugee-admission quotas under different scenarios. In the absence of reliable information on countries’
eﬀective costs of admission (which include the full economic, social,
and political costs of hosting refugees that a TRAQs system is precisely designed to reveal), it should be clear that these simulations are
illustrative only. However, they constitute a useful exercise in that they
demonstrate not only the overall gains, but also the distributive eﬀects
the proposed system would generate. As such, they have the potential
to identify the participation constraints that impinge on the negotiations
of the European member states, as well as the likely coalitions that can
emerge in support of the quota system.

Pozo book.indb 27

10/22/2018 1:44:00 PM

198 Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport

Note
We would like to thank Jonas Eriksson, Luc Bovens, and seminar participants at the
Swedish Permanent Representation in Brussels and at the Ministry of Justice in Stockholm, as well as conference participants at Heidelberg University and the University of
Western Michigan, for their helpful comments and suggestions. This chapter updates
and extends our eponymous report to the SIEPS (Swedish Institute for European Policy
Studies) of May 2016.

Pozo book.indb 28

10/22/2018 1:44:00 PM

Combining Physical and Financial Solidarity in Asylum Policy 199

Appendix 7A
Mathematical Presentation of the Model
The theoretical problem that needs to be solved is the allocation of a total
number of refugees and asylum seekers, denoted by R + A, across a set of
destination countries, denoted by N, which can be assimilated to the member
states in the European Union that will be participating in the mechanism. The
model takes as given both the total number of refugees and asylum seekers to
be allocated (such as the 160,000 in the EU proposal of September 2015) and
the perceived costs and beneﬁts that the refugees impose on the destination
countries.
SETUP
In the current absence of any coordination mechanism and abstracting
from the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, each country i will decide
how many refugees (ri) and asylum seekers (ai) to accept by maximizing their
welfare function
(7A.1)

max gi (R
ri , ai

¯i

, A i ) − ci (ri , ai )
¯

This welfare function has two elements. The ﬁrst one is gi (R i , A i ),
¯ asylum
¯
where Σj ≠ i rj and Ai = Σj ≠ i aj denote the total number of refugees and
seekers that are received by other destination countries diﬀerent from i. This
function represents how country i beneﬁts from the fact that other countries
receive asylum seekers or refugees. There may be two fundamental reasons
for this. On the one hand, there is the international public good aspect. We can
consider that country i, either its government or its inhabitants, receives utility from the fact that refugees are protected, regardless of where. On the other
hand, even in the case where country i does not directly care about refugees
and perceives them as a simple cost, they beneﬁt indirectly from the fact that
other countries host them, since this may alleviate the pressure for it to host
them itself. In other words, country i can expect its asylum claims to go down,
the larger the number of refugees hosted by other destinations. Both explanations imply that refugees and asylum seekers hosted by other countries exert a
positive externality on the welfare of country i. This would mean that
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> 0 and

> 0.

The positive sign of these derivatives leads the individual maximization of
Equation (7A.1) to a globally ineﬃcient solution. Fewer refugees are hosted
overall than would be optimal from a global perspective.
The second element of the welfare function of country i represented in
Equation (7A.1) is the net cost function of hosting refugees and asylum seekers,
denoted by ci (ri,ai). This function is a reduced form that includes all the perceived costs and beneﬁts associated with hosting refugees and asylum seekers.
In particular, it includes the potential altruism of country i toward the reception
of refugees; that is, the international public good element by which the welfare
in country i is increased whenever refugees and asylum seekers are protected
in i. It also includes the physical and administrative costs of receiving refugees
and asylum seekers and processing their paperwork, initial allowances, and
initial accommodation for the period decided by country i. The function also
considers the potential long-run expected economic consequences of hosting
these refugees and asylum seekers as assessed by country i—for example, the
immigration surplus or the fact that these refugees may either beneﬁt or harm
domestic workers once they integrate into the labour market. Finally, the function also includes the social and political costs (or beneﬁts) of hosting these
refugees and asylum seekers.
To ensure that the problem in Equation (7A.1) actually has a solution,
we assume that the net cost function is convex in the number of refugees and
asylum seekers; that is,
0 and
0
Given the externality, the individual solutions for Equation (7A.1) will not
be optimal from a global point of view. The reason is that individual countries
do not take into account the fact that their reception of refugees and asylum
seekers has a positive eﬀect on other countries, and hence, they perform this
activity at a lower level than that implied by a full maximization problem. This
full maximization problem can be represented as
N

(7A.2)

Pozo book.indb 30

max

{ri , ai}Ni = 1

Σ [g (R ¯ , A¯ ) − c (r , a )]
i

i

i

i

i

i

i=1

10/22/2018 1:44:00 PM

Combining Physical and Financial Solidarity in Asylum Policy 201
As proved in Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2014, 2015a),
the optimal solution to (7A.2) involves equating the marginal costs of hosting
refugees and asylum seekers among all the potential destination countries to a
positive number that depends on the strength of the externality, while the optimal solution to Equation (7A.1), the noncoordinated solution, equates these
marginal costs to zero.
THE COMPENSATION MECHANISM FOR TRADABLE
REFUGEE-ADMISSION QUOTAS
The optimal solution can be replicated by distributing responsibilities over
the number of refugees and asylum seekers that each member state must host
(quotas) and letting them trade these responsibilities.
We deﬁne initial quotas qi0 as the total sum of refugees and asylum seekers
whose hosting becomes the responsibility of country i. If country i prefers to
host a number ri + ai < qi0, then it should pay another country the market price p
per unﬁlled refugee-admission quota, so that this other country will host them.
That means country i should pay p(qi0 − ri − ai).
More generally, country i would be solving the following maximization
problem:
(7A.3)

max gi (R

{ri , ai}

¯i

, A i ) − ci (ri , ai ) + p (ri + ai − qi0 )
¯

The optimal solution to such a problem is
(7A.4)

∂ci (riM, aiM ) = p = ∂ci (riM, aiM )
∂ri
∂ai

If we denote market outcomes by M, initial quotas by Q and noncooperative unilateral solutions by NC, it would be true that


 M M




Q
Q
, A−i − ci riM , aiM + p riM + aM
(7A.5) gi R−i
i − qi0 > gi R−i , A−i


− ci riQ , aiQ
Inequality (7A.5) implies that every participating country is better oﬀ
under the market than under a system of mandatory quotas, such as the one
proposed by the European Commission.
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(7A.6)

N


 M M
 M M


g i R−
+ p riM + aiM − qi0
i , A−i − ci ri , ai

i=1

>

N


 NC NC


gi R−
− ci riN C , aiN C
i , A−i

i=1

It follows from Inequality (7A.6) that it would be theoretically feasible
to manipulate qi0 so that absolutely every country participating in the market
would actually prefer to do so.
THE MATCHING MECHANISM
Refugees’ Preferences
We can allow for the case where the overall number R + A is not realized
and the “rejected” country pays the price p for the unﬁlled part of its quota.
This acts as a penalty and provides incentives for countries to become attractive destinations. The problem that the countries solve becomes:
(7A.7)



M
+ p (ri + ai − qi0 )
max gi (R−i , A−i ) − ci riM M , aM
i


− p ri + ai − riM M − aiM M
{ri ,ai }

s.t.

riM M = Fi (r1 , r2 , ..., rN ; a1 , a2 , ..., aN )
M
= Gi (r1 , r2 , ..., rN ; a1 , a2 , ..., aN )
aM
i

The term p (ri + ai − riMM − aiMM ) is a penalty that unattractive countries
would have to pay for not being able to attract as many refugees and asylum
seekers through the matching mechanism as they would bid for in the market.
We denote by MM the allocations coming out of the matching mechanism,
which is mathematically represented by the functions Fi (.) and Gi (.). Countries
would bid quotas {ri ,ai}, but ﬁnally only riMM + aiMM individuals would end up
going to country i through the matching mechanism. If some individuals refuse
to move to country i, we would have riMM + aiMM < ri + ai .
In equilibrium, the penalty would always be zero, but it is needed so that
countries do not have incentives to become unattractive from the point of
view of refugees and asylum seekers. In practice, the EU could be in charge of
collecting this penalty in case of some oﬀ-equilibrium behavior.
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The ﬁrst order conditions of the problem are:
(7A.8)
(7A.9)

∂Fi
∂ri
∂Fi
∂ai

∂ci
∂ri
∂ci
∂ri




∂Gi
M
riM M , aM
−p +
i
∂ri
 MM MM 
∂Gi
ri , ai
−p +
∂ai

∂ci
∂ai
∂ci
∂ai




M
riM M , aM
−p
i

=0

 MM MM 
ri , ai
−p

=0

Still, equating the marginal costs of hosting refugees and asylum seekers
across countries to the quota price would be an optimal solution, even in the
presence of the matching mechanism.
Host Countries’ Preferences
The formulation of Problem (7A.7) is general enough that not only can
refugee preferences be taken into account, there is also scope for considering
the preferences of host countries regarding the type of refugees that they would
be more willing to host.
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Appendix 7B
Mathematical Presentation of the Cost
Functions and Additional Simulations
COST FUNCTIONS
The ﬁrst cost function that we employ comes from the original paper
by Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2014), but it was also used in
Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2015b). It is assumed to take this
shape:
(7B.1)

cquad
(ri ) =
i

γi ri2
2 popi

The cost perceived by each country i increases convexly on the total number of refugees resettled (ri ). The two other elements in the function are the
population of the country (popi ) and a parameter that expresses the “dislike”
for refugees (γi ). The function is decreasing in the population, with the rationale being that more populated countries can have a comparative advantage
in hosting larger numbers of refugees. The population numbers are those corresponding to 2014 according to Eurostat. We will refer to the cost function in
(7B.1) as the quadratic one.
In order to understand the role of functional form assumptions, we introduce a second cost function that multiplies the costs of hosting refugees that
we will term the cubic cost function. The exact expression is the following:
(7B.2)

ccub
i (ri ) =

γi ri3
3 popi

The marginal cost associated with the cubic cost function simply multiplies the marginal cost of the quadratic one times the total number of resettled
refugees.
The parameter γi is the one for which we oﬀer two diﬀerent simulations. In
the case of revealed preferences, we will back it up as:



rvoluntary
(7B.3)
cquad
rivoluntary = γirevealed i
=s
i
popi
(7B.4)
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The value of s can be used to pin down a monetary valuation for the cost
functions. We will be using the reference of 6,000 euros, since this is what
the Asylum and Migration Fund from the Common European Asylum System
oﬀered the Member States for each particular refugee that they committed to
resettle (European Commission 2015c).
In the case of stated preferences, the value of the parameter γi will just
be equated to the share of individuals in each EU country disagreeing with
the statement “The EU Member States should oﬀer protection and asylum to
people in need” from the Special Eurobarometer 380 in 2011. In this case, we
do not have a direct monetary equivalence, which is a disadvantage. For stated
preferences, Equation (7B.3) no longer holds; that is,


rvoluntary
quad
rivoluntary = γistated i
= s
(7B.5) ci
popi
To pin down a monetary value for comparison purposes, we can scale the
marginal cost in Expression (7B.5) by a factor f, so that the marginal cost for
each country approximates the subsidy of 6,000 euros established by the Asylum and Migration Fund (s = 6,000):
(7B.6)

f γistated

rivoluntary
 s
=
popi

We can transform the inequality in Expression (7B.6) into a proper equality by introducing an error term (ϵi):
(7B.7)

log f + log γistated + log rivoluntary − log popi − log s =

i

Finally, we can estimate the value of f that minimizes the sum of errors:

Σi ϵi .

OUTCOMES
Simulation B1: Revealed Preferences, 60,000 Refugees, Cubic Cost
Table 7B.1 simulates the same market as Table 7.1 in the main text, but
under a more convex cost function, cubic on the number of refugees hosted,
rather than quadratic. Given the way we back out the refugee cost parameter,
the cubic cost function leads to exactly the same market quota as the quadratic
cost function. The only diﬀerence between the two markets lies in the diﬀerence in total costs, which is obviously more pronounced for the case of the
cubic cost function.
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Under the assumed cubic costs of hosting refugees, the quota price
increases from 7,105 euros to 8,412 euros. However, larger costs also imply
larger cost reductions resulting from the market. In this case, the total cost
reduction increases from 96 percent (23 percent excluding Hungary) to 100
percent (48 percent excluding Hungary). As before, every country stands to
beneﬁt from participating in the market rather than keeping the initial EU
allocation.
The relative winners and losers from Table 7.1 are still the same, although
their relative earnings and losses are accentuated by the larger assumed costs.
Simulation B2: Revealed Preferences, 180,000 Refugees, Quadratic Cost
This simulation goes back to the cost function assumed in the ﬁrst one
(Table 7.1). This time, the diﬀerence comes from the total number of refugees
to be relocated, three times as many: 180,000 rather than 60,000.
The eﬀect from having to allocate a larger number of refugees can be
observed in Table 7B.2. Given the assumed linear marginal cost, Table 7B.2
simply multiplies by 3 the columns of the initial allocation of quotas and the
market quotas from Table 7.1.
The market price also multiplies by 3 and goes up to 21,314 euros. In the
case of the total cost, it multiplies times 9 rather than 3 because of its quadratic
structure, but in relative terms, the savings are the same. Excluding Hungary,
the euro savings from the market would still be 23 percent, but this would
mean 540 million rather than 60 million.
Simulation B3: Revealed Preferences, 180,000 refugees, Cubic Cost
This simulation presents the last combination for the case of revealed preferences. In this case, the cubic cost functions are assumed to guide countries in
allocating the 180,000 refugees.
Table 7B.3 is also a scaled version of Tables 7.1 and 7B.1, where the initial
quotas and the quotas resulting from the market are tripled.
The diﬀerence between Table 7B.2 (quadratic cost) and Table 7B.3 (cubic
cost) lies in the equilibrium market price. The latter is nine times the former:
75,711 euros, rather than 8,412. The diﬀerence is compounded for the total
costs, which multiply in this case by 27 with respect to the second simulation.
Again, we must remind the reader that larger costs also imply larger savings
coming from the market in absolute terms.
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Table 7B.1 Revealed Preferences, 60,000 Refugees, Cubic Cost
Refugee cost
parameter:
Initial
deduced
Voluntary quotas (EU from volunCountries
quotas
proposal) tary quotas
Austria
1,900
1,775
14.1
Belgium
2,464
2,225
11.1
Bulgaria
500
775
173.9
Croatia
550
516
84.2
Cyprus
242
134
87.9
Czech Rep.
1,500
1,446
28.0
Denmark
1,000
0
33.8
Estonia
150
181
350.9
Finland
1,085
1,169
27.8
France
9,127
11,784
4.7
Germany
12,100
15,488
3.3
Greece
354
0
526.3
Hungary
0
1,176 59,264,190.0
Ireland
1,120
0
22.0
Italy
1,989
0
92.2
Latvia
250
255
192.1
Lithuania
325
378
167.2
Luxembourg
350
215
26.9
Malta
74
65
466.1
Netherlands
3,047
3,546
10.9
Poland
2,000
4,620
57.0
Portugal
1,500
1,493
27.8
Romania
1,785
2,250
37.6
Slovakia
200
729
812.4
Slovenia
250
306
197.9
Spain
2,749
7,294
36.9
Sweden
1,860
2,179
16.7
U.K.
2,200
0
79.7

Market
quota
2,250
2,918
592
651
287
1,776
1,184
178
1,285
10,807
14,327
419
1
1,326
2,355
296
385
414
88
3,608
2,368
1,776
2,114
237
296
3,255
2,202
2,605

Total
50,671
Quotas traded

60,000
17%

60,000

Cost reduc- Cost reduction with tion with
respect respect to
to initial voluntary
quota (%) quotas (%)
25
39
35
52
14
−220
24
37
692
200
18
26
inf
432
0
−75
3
−21
2
−111
2
−106
inf
432
100
−inf
inf
432
inf
432
8
2
0
−57
413
173
47
65
0
−57
48
−540
12
13
1
−98
75
−1,101
0
−83
58
−684
0
−61
inf
432
100

−66

SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration. Cost parameter divided by 1,000 with Hungary assumed to host
one refugee voluntarily.
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Simulation B4: Stated Preferences, 60,000 Refugees, Cubic Cost
In this sixth simulation, stated preferences are assumed again to allocate
60,000 refugees. The diﬀerence compared to the one in Table 7.2 is the cost
function, which becomes cubic, rather than quadratic.
Table 7B.4 presents the results. The larger total and marginal costs lead
both to more trading (36 percent vs. 32 percent in the previous simulation) and
to larger cost reductions: 78 percent vs. 42 percent in the previous simulation.
This also means that the savings from the market with respect to the voluntary
quotas are larger: 55 percent rather than 21 percent. In fact, under this sixth
simulation, only four countries would be worse oﬀ under the market than under
the voluntary quotas: Hungary, Spain, Poland, and the Netherlands.
If we follow the methodology described in the previous section to scale the
marginal costs into monetary values, the equilibrium price would be calculated
at 29,665 euros, more than a four-fold increase over the second simulation. The
increase is also notable with respect to Table 7B.1, which also featured cubic
cost functions, where the price was just 8,412 euros. Such a high price would
lead many countries on the receiving side of the market to actually obtain a
proﬁt. In addition to the ﬁve zero-quota countries, 12 out of 23 remaining
countries would be in that situation. This simulated market would only have
six countries on the paying side: Germany, France, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria.
This simulation in Table 7B.4 is quite diﬀerent in terms of the ﬁnal distribution of market quotas from the one in Table 7.2. The diﬀerence stemming
from the comparison between the quadratic and the cubic cost functions is
particularly striking if we remember that the ﬁrst simulation in the text and the
ﬁrst in the appendix led to exactly the same distribution of market quotas (see
Tables 7.1 and 7B.1). This comes from the fact that the refugee cost parameter
(γi) took diﬀerent values in the ﬁrst simulation in the text and the ﬁrst in the
appendix, while we are keeping the same value for the second simulation in
the text and this one. Hence, the equivalent results in Tables 7.1 and 7B.1 were
due to the way we deﬁned revealed preferences, while the diﬀerences between
Table 7.2 and Table 7B.4 can be completely traced back to the distinction in
the functional forms.
Simulation B5: Stated Preferences, 180,000 refugees, Quadratic Cost
The seventh simulation goes back to the quadratic cost function assumption under stated preferences. This means that the simulation corresponds to
the same cost function that was underlying the second simulation in the text.
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The only diﬀerence is that the number of refugees to be allocated triples from
60,000 to 180,000.
In that case, the market leads to the ﬁnal distribution of quotas that can be
observed in Table 7B.5. As we could already see in the comparison between
simulations 1 and B2 (Tables 7.1 and 7B.2), the linear marginal cost associated with the quadratic cost function implies that tripling the total number of
refugees to be allocated just triples the market quota of each of the participating countries. Of course, the market price is also tripled: from 6,600 euros to
19,799 euros, while the total costs are multiplied by 9.
The multiplication of the total costs means that the market for allocating
180,000 refugees is no longer cheaper than the voluntary contributions to allocate 50,671. Only the zero-quota countries are better oﬀ and can actually make
a proﬁt, although we must remind the reader that our deﬁnition of “worse”
or “better oﬀ” only contemplates cost functions, since we did not make any
assumption on the positive eﬀect of the externality that the market addresses.
Simulation B6: Stated Preferences, 180,000 Refugees, Cubic Cost
Our last simulation replicates the previous one under stated preferences for
a cubic cost function. Hence, it is directly comparable to the sixth simulation in
terms of its cost function, with the only diﬀerence being that 180,000 refugees
are distributed, rather than 60,000.
The results are presented in Table 7B.6. Since the relative diﬀerences in
marginal costs are the same as in the sixth simulation, the ﬁnal distribution of
market quotas is exactly the same that can be observed in Table 7B.4, but multiplying every number by 3. For example, Germany would host 5,945 refugees
in Table 7B.4, while it would host 17,836 in Table 7B.6. However, the quota
price does not triple, as in simulation B4, it multiplies by 9, due to the quadratic marginal costs implied by the cubic total cost functions. The total price
is hence 266,985 euros, the largest in all the simulations we ran.
Other than in magnitudes, this simulation is completely analogous to the
sixth one. The total costs are exacerbated (they multiply by 27), but the sellers
and the buyers in the market are still the same. They are just willing to trade at
higher prices and three times as much, as the total size of the quota market is
three times larger.

Pozo book.indb 40

10/22/2018 1:44:01 PM

Combining Physical and Financial Solidarity in Asylum Policy 211
Table 7B.2 Revealed Preferences, 180,000 Refugees, Quadratic Cost
Refugee cost
Cost reduc- Cost reducparameter:
tion with tion with
Initial
deduced
respect respect to
Voluntary quotas (EU from volun- Market
to initial voluntary
Countries
quotas
proposal) tary quotas
quota
quota (%) quotas (%)
Austria
1,900
5,326
26.9
6,749
7
−630
Belgium
2,464
6,676
27.3
8,753
10
−563
Bulgaria
500
2,324
86.9
1,776
6
−1,940
Croatia
550
1,549
46.3
1,954
7
−639
Cyprus
242
401
21.3
860
131
185
Czech Rep.
1,500
4,339
42.0
5,328
5
−693
Denmark
1,000
0
33.8
3,552
inf
1,362
Estonia
150
543
52.6
533
0
−1,209
Finland
1,085
3,507
30.1
3,854
1
−935
France
9,127
35,351
43.3
32,421
1
−1,390
Germany
12,100
46,463
40.0
42,982
1
−1,366
Greece
354
0
186.3
1,257
inf
1,362
Hungary
0
3,529
59,264.2
4
100
−inf
Ireland
1,120
0
24.7
3,979
inf
1,362
Italy
1,989
0
183.4
7,065
inf
1,362
Latvia
250
766
48.0
888
3
−816
Lithuania
325
1,135
54.3
1,154
0
−1,118
Luxembourg
350
646
9.4
1,243
85
50
Malta
74
194
34.5
263
13
−497
Netherlands
3,047
10,637
33.1
10,824
0
−1,118
Poland
2,000
13,860
114.1
7,105
24
−3,562
Portugal
1,500
4,478
41.7
5,328
4
−759
Romania
1,785
6,750
67.0
6,341
0
−1,325
Slovakia
200
2,187
162.5
710
46
−6,408
Slovenia
250
919
49.5
888
0
−1,250
Spain
2,749
21,881
101.5
9,765
31
−4,293
Sweden
1,860
6,537
31.1
6,607
0
−1,135
U.K.
2,200
0
175.4
7,815
inf
1,362
Total
50,671
Quotas traded

180,000

180,000
17%

95

−1,162

SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration. Cost parameter divided by 1,000,000 with Hungary assumed to
host one refugee voluntarily.
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Table 7B.3 Revealed Preferences, 180,000 Refugees, Cubic Cost
Refugee cost
Cost reduc- Cost reducparameter:
tion with tion with
Initial
deduced
respect respect to
Voluntary quotas (EU from volunMarket to initial voluntary
Countries
quotas
proposal) tary quotas
quota quota (%) quotas (%)
Austria
1,900
5,326
14.1
6,749
25
−1,548
Belgium
2,464
6,676
11.1
8,753
35
−1,193
Bulgaria
500
2,324
173.9
1,776
14
−8,528
Croatia
550
1,549
84.2
1,954
24
−1,597
Cyprus
242
401
87.9
860
692
2,793
Czech Rep.
1,500
4,339
28.0
5,328
18
−1,886
Denmark
1,000
0
33.8
3,552
inf
9,065
Estonia
150
543
350.9
533
0
−4,632
Finland
1,085
3,507
27.8
3,854
3
−3,172
France
9,127
35,351
4.7 32,421
2
−5,598
Germany
12,100
46,463
3.3 42,982
2
−5,471
Greece
354
0
526.3
1,257
inf
9,065
Hungary
0
3,529 59,264,190.0
4
100
−inf
Ireland
1,120
0
22.0
3,979
inf
9,065
Italy
1,989
0
92.2
7,065
inf
9,065
Latvia
250
766
192.1
888
8
−2,540
Lithuania
325
1,135
167.2
1,154
0
−4,150
Luxembourg
350
646
26.9
1,243
413
2,074
Malta
74
194
466.1
263
47
−841
Netherlands
3,047
10,637
10.9 10,824
0
−4,150
Poland
2,000
13,860
57.0
7,105
48
−17,169
Portugal
1,500
4,478
27.8
5,328
12
−2,237
Romania
1,785
6,750
37.6
6,341
1
−5,251
Slovakia
200
2,187
812.4
710
75
−32,336
Slovenia
250
919
197.9
888
0
−4,852
Spain
2,749
21,881
36.9
9,765
58
−21,067
Sweden
1,860
6,537
16.7
6,607
0
−4,240
U.K.
2,200
0
79.7
7,815
inf
9,065
Total
50,671
Quotas traded

180,000

180,000
17%

100

−4,383

SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration. Cost parameter divided by 1,000 with Hungary assumed to host
one refugee voluntarily.
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Table 7B.4 Stated Preferences, 60,000 Refugees, Cubic Cost
Refugee cost
Cost reduc- Cost reducparameter:
tion with tion with
Initial
taken from
respect respect to
Voluntary quotas (EU Eurobaro- Market
to initial voluntary
Countries
quotas
proposal) meter 2011
quota
quota (%) quotas (%)
Austria
1,900
1,775
19
1,468
8
25
Belgium
2,464
2,225
27
1,413
30
49
Bulgaria
500
775
11
1,781
945
3,240
Croatia
550
516
17
1,097
663
566
Cyprus
242
134
21
444
4,106
775
Czech Rep.
1,500
1,446
22
1,517
1
11
Denmark
1,000
0
7
1,967
inf
1,623
Estonia
150
181
27
484
1,788
3,061
Finland
1,085
1,169
12
1,479
25
6
France
9,127
11,784
26
3,491
79
55
Germany
12,100
15,488
11
5,945
67
31
Greece
354
0
12
2,100
inf
41,852
Hungary
0
1,176
31
1,239
1
−inf
Ireland
1,120
0
15
1,216
inf
356
Italy
1,989
0
17
4,149
inf
1,915
Latvia
250
255
29
576
870
922
Lithuania
325
378
15
972
1,514
2,327
Luxembourg
350
215
14
435
522
198
Malta
74
65
12
413
40,244
26,740
Netherlands
3,047
3,546
8
3,182
3
−53
Poland
2,000
4,620
7
5,113
4
−1,088
Portugal
1,500
1,493
13
1,965
36
37
Romania
1,785
2,250
7
3,704
179
259
Slovakia
200
729
19
1,171
155
2,769
Slovenia
250
306
17
764
1,336
2,374
Spain
2,749
7,294
9
4,988
24
−1,326
Sweden
1,860
2,179
4
3,407
131
150
U.K.
2,200
0
25
3,519
inf
919
Total
50,671
Quotas traded

60,000

60,000
36%

78

55

SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration. Cost parameter from the share of individuals in each EU country
disagreeing with the statement “The EU member states should oﬀer protection and asylum to
people in need” from the Special Eurobarometer 380 in 2011. Croatia is assigned the Slovenian
value.
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Table 7B.5 Stated Preferences, 180,000 Refugees, Quadratic Cost
Refugee cost
Cost reduc- Cost reducparameter:
tion with tion with
Initial
taken from
respect respect to
Voluntary quotas (EU Eurobaro- Market
to initial voluntary
Countries
quotas
proposal) meter 2011
quota
quota (%) quotas (%)
Austria
1,900
5,326
19
1,981
39
−376
Belgium
2,464
6,676
27
1,836
53
−248
Bulgaria
500
2,324
11
2,915
6
−1,920
Croatia
550
1,549
17
1,106
8
−628
Cyprus
242
401
21
181
30
−92
Czech Rep.
1,500
4,339
22
2,115
26
−517
Denmark
1,000
0
7
3,558
inf
1,366
Estonia
150
543
27
216
36
−734
Finland
1,085
3,507
12
2,010
18
−755
France
9,127
35,351
26
11,206
47
−700
Germany
12,100
46,463
11
32,495
9
−1,241
Greece
354
0
12
4,054
inf
13,215
Hungary
0
3,529
31
1,410
36
−inf
Ireland
1,120
0
15
1,359
inf
247
Italy
1,989
0
17
15,823
inf
6,429
Latvia
250
766
29
305
36
−500
Lithuania
325
1,135
15
868
6
−1,052
Luxembourg
350
646
14
174
53
−59
Malta
74
194
12
157
4
−560
Netherlands
3,047
10,637
8
9,310
2
−1,100
Poland
2,000
13,860
7
24,036
54
−2,114
Portugal
1,500
4,478
13
3,550
4
−753
Romania
1,785
6,750
7
12,611
75
−252
Slovakia
200
2,187
19
1,262
18
−9,718
Slovenia
250
919
17
537
17
−1,017
Spain
2,749
21,881
9
22,871
0
−6,223
Sweden
1,860
6,537
4
10,671
40
−641
U.K.
2,200
0
25
11,384
inf
2,778
Total
50,671
Quotas traded

180,000

180,000
32%

42

−611

SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration. Cost parameter from the share of individuals in each EU country
disagreeing with the statement “The EU member states should oﬀer protection and asylum to
people in need” from the Special Eurobarometer 380 in 2011. Croatia is assigned the Slovenian
value.
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Table 7B.6 Stated Preferences, 180,000 Refugees, Cubic Cost
Refugee cost
Cost reduc- Cost reducparameter:
tion with tion with
Initial
taken from
respect respect to
Voluntary quotas (EU Eurobaro- Market
to initial voluntary
Countries
quotas
proposal) meter 2011
quota
quota (%) quotas (%)
Austria
1,900
5,326
19
4,404
8
−1,928
Belgium
2,464
6,676
27
4,240
30
−1,288
Bulgaria
500
2,324
11
5,342
945
84,887
Croatia
550
1,549
17
3,290
663
12,673
Cyprus
242
401
21
1,331
4,106
18,315
Czech Rep.
1,500
4,339
22
4,550
1
−2,303
Denmark
1,000
0
7
5,902
inf
41,212
Estonia
150
543
27
1,453
1,788
80,058
Finland
1,085
3,507
12
4,437
25
−2,441
France
9,127
35,351
26
10,474
79
−1,128
Germany
12,100
46,463
11
17,836
67
−1,762
Greece
354
0
12
6,300
inf
1,127,417
Hungary
0
3,529
31
3,716
1
−inf
Ireland
1,120
0
15
3,647
inf
7,007
Italy
1,989
0
17
12,447
inf
49,108
Latvia
250
766
29
1,729
870
22,288
Lithuania
325
1,135
15
2,916
1,514
60,237
Luxembourg
350
646
14
1,304
522
2,756
Malta
74
194
12
1,239 40,244
719,385
Netherlands
3,047
10,637
8
9,547
3
−4,029
Poland
2,000
13,860
7
15,340
4
−31,963
Portugal
1,500
4,478
13
5,895
36
−1,593
Romania
1,785
6,750
7
11,112
179
4,383
Slovakia
200
2,187
19
3,514
155
72,158
Slovenia
250
919
17
2,292
1,336
61,509
Spain
2,749
21,881
9
14,964
24
−38,397
Sweden
1,860
6,537
4
10,221
131
1,448
U.K.
2,200
0
25
10,557
inf
22,200
Total
50,671
Quotas traded

180,000

180,000
36%

78

−1,108

SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration. Cost parameter from the share of individuals in each EU country
disagreeing with the statement “The EU Member States should oﬀer protection and asylum to
people in need” from the Special Eurobarometer 380 in 2011. Croatia is assigned the Slovenian
value.
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